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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the literature that analyses the term structure of in-
terest rates from a macroeconomic perspective. Chapter 1 studies the transmission
of monetary policy shocks to the US macroeconomy and term structure. Based on
estimates of a Macro-A¢ ne model, it shows that monetary policy shocks trigger rel-
evant movements in bond premia, which in turn feed back into the macroeconomy.
This channel of monetary transmission shows up importantly in the pre-Volcker pe-
riod, but becomes irrelevant later. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the
macroeconomic implications of shocks to expectations about future monetary policy
actions.
Chapter 2 proposes a regime-switching approach to explain why the U.S. nominal
yield curve on average has been steeper since the mid-1980s than during the Great
Ination of the 1970s. It shows that, once the possibility of regime switches in the
short-rate process is incorporated into investorsbeliefs, the average slope of the yield
curve generally will contain a new component called level risk. Level risk estimates
were found to be large and negative during the Great Ination, but became moderate
and positive afterwards. These ndings are replicated in a Markov-Switching DSGE
model, where the monetary policy rule shifts between an active and a passive regime
with respect to ination uctuations.
Chapter 3 develops a DSGE model in which banks use short-term deposits to
provide rms with long-term credit. The demand for long-term credit arises because
rms borrow in order to nance their capital stock which they only adjust at in-
frequent intervals. The model shows that maturity transformation in the banking
sector in general attenuates the output response to a technological shock. Implica-
tions of long-term nominal contracts are also examined in a New Keynesian version
of the model. In this case, maturity transformation reduces the real e¤ects of a
monetary policy shock.
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Preface
Long-term bonds carry a wealth of information that can provide important insights
for economists. The prices of these assets reect average future expected short-
rates, information that is crucial for the investment decisions of rms, for the savings
decisions of consumers, and for the formulation of monetary policy. They also reect
premia that summarize the investorsassessment of the risks they face during the
period for which they hold the long-term bond. As a result of this, a literature has
developed that analyzes the determinants of bond prices.
The models employed in this literature are designed to explain the cross-section
of yields (bond yields of many di¤erent maturities) in parallel with their dynamic
evolution. No-arbitrage arguments are used to link bond yields of di¤erent maturities
and thus reduce the dimensionality of the problem. In the rst models, developed
in the late 1970s, the dynamic and cross-sectional properties of the term structure
depended on a set of estimated unobserved factors, which were extracted from the
term structure data itself. These factors were usually identied as level, slope and
curvature factors  closely related to the rst three principal components of the
term structure data and, in general, explain almost all variation in bond yields of
di¤erent maturities. However, as these models depend solely on yields, they appear
to lack macroeconomic structure. In fact, there is plenty of evidence that bond
prices react signicantly to macroeconomic news1.
More recently, many economists have succeeded in incorporating macroeconomic
fundamentals into empirically relevant models of bond price determination. The
gains from this are twofold. On the one hand, in some situations macroeconomic
fundamentals may clarify observed movements in bond yields. On the other, macro-
economic models that do not generate reasonable implications for asset prices should
be reconsidered, after all:
1See, for example, Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001), Green (2004), and Gürkaynak, Levin,
and Swanson (2006).
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"The centerpieces of dynamic macroeconomics are the equation of savings
to investment, the equation of marginal rates of substitution to marginal
rates of transformation, and the allocation of consumption and invest-
ment across time and states of nature. Asset markets are the mechanism
that does all this equating" [Cochrane (2005)].
This thesis consists of three chapters, each of which analyze some of the is-
sues that arise when the links between long-term bond prices and macroeconomic
fundamentals are explored. The chapters are ordered according to the degree of
complexity of the economic system that determines bond prices.
In Chapter 1, no-arbitrage bond prices are linked to a simple Vector Autore-
gression (VAR) on real economic activity, ination, and commodity prices. This
reduced-form system of macro-nance relationships is then used to study the im-
plications of unexpected monetary policy changes. The term-structure model I em-
ployed allows for exible bond premia that react to the monetary shock and feed
back into the macroeconomic VAR. I found that, following a monetary policy shock,
these feedback e¤ects from bond premia to the macroeconomy were empirically rel-
evant during the pre-Volcker period. In the post-Volcker sample, these e¤ects were
virtually inexistent.
Adding complexity to the linkages between bond prices and the macroeconomy,
Chapter 2 analyzes the term structure in a fully specied general equilibrium system.
The model is a version of the standard New-Keynesian framework of Woodford
(2003) that allows the monetary policy regime to switch over time. More specically,
an exogenous Markov chain dictates whether the central bank adopts an active
or a passive stance with respect to ination deviations from the target. In the
passive regime, which is characterized by stronger macroeconomic volatility than
when policy is active, investors demand larger premia in order to hold long-term
bonds. Additionally, because agents acquire di¤erent levels of precautionary savings
12
in each regime, the average level around which the short-term interest rate uctuates
di¤ers across regimes. The implications that this short-rate wedge across regimes
has for long-term bond prices are carefully explored in this chapter. The empirical
motivation for this chapter is the fact that the U.S. nominal yield curve has on
average been steeper since the mid-1980s than during the Great Ination of the
1970s, a feature that is very well explained in the Markov-Switching model.
Finally, Chapter 3 is the result of work done jointly with Martin M. Andreasen
and Pawel Zabczyk at the Bank of England. Our objective was to produce a frame-
work in which the microstructure of the market for long-term assets was explicitly
modelled. This was done by assuming that banks use short-term deposits to pro-
vide rms with long-term credit. The demand for long-term credit arises because
rms borrow in order to nance their capital stock, which they adjust only at infre-
quent intervals. We show that, in this general equilibrium framework, the presence
of maturity transformation in the banking sector has important business cycle im-
plications. In particular, the presence of maturity transformation in the banking
sector in general attenuates the output response to a technological shock. Implica-
tions of long-term nominal contracts are also examined in a New Keynesian version
of the model, where we nd that maturity transformation reduces the real e¤ects of
a monetary policy shock.
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1 TheMonetary TransmissionMechanism
in a Term-Structure Model with Un-
spanned Macro Risks
1.1 Introduction
To a large extent, bond prices reect the expectations that private agents form
regarding the future path of the short-term interest rate. Not surprisingly, many re-
cent papers in the macro-nance literature have tried to incorporate the information
contained in these prices into the study of the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism2. There is also overwhelming evidence that, beyond short-rate expectations,
bond prices reect time-varying and potentially sizeable premia components3. Cur-
rently, the literature o¤ers only scarce evidence regarding the role of these premia
in the monetary transmission mechanism.
How exactly do bond premia, namely term premia4, respond (if at all) to mon-
etary policy shocks? Is there any feedback from these responses to the macroecon-
omy? Do term premia responses change across di¤erent subsamples of the US data?
And nally, what happens when, after isolating term premia, a shock to future
monetary policy expectations occurs? Based on an empirical analysis of US data, I
provide in this chapter answers to all of these questions.
In order to succeed, I must overcome two crucial identication issues here. First,
there is the issue of identifying the unobserved term premium component implicit in
bond yields of di¤erent maturities. Then, I must devise a procedure for identifying
2E.g. Evans and Marshall (1998), Kuttner (2001), Evans and Marshall (2007), and Mumtaz
and Surico (2009).
3E.g. Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Dai and Singleton (2002), and
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)
4Throughout this paper, I dene term premia as the deviations of the actual bond yields from
the term-structure Expectations Hypothesis. A formal denition can be found in Appendix 1.D.
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unobserved monetary policy shocks. The framework I propose overcomes these two
identication issues simultaneously.
To address the rst issue, I model the joint reduced-form dynamics of the macro-
economy and the yield curve according to a Macro-A¢ ne Term Structure Model
(MTSM) similar to Ang and Piazzesi (2003). This family of models explores the
discipline imposed by no-arbitrage in order to clarify the links between macroeco-
nomic shocks and the entire yield curve. The identication of term premia in these
models follows naturally from the no-arbitrage conditions that are in the core of
these frameworks.
There are several variants of the Ang and Piazzesi (2003) framework available
in the literature. In this chapter I chose to follow the one proposed by Joslin,
Priebsch, and Singleton (2010). This framework is attractive for at least two reasons.
First, it is more general than Ang and Piazzesi (2003) in that it allows for two-way
feedback e¤ects between bond prices and macroeconomic variables. As a result,
movements in term premia have the potential to a¤ect not only bond prices but also
the macroeconomic variables included in the model. Second, the Joslin, Priebsch,
and Singleton (2010) framework does not have the property, shared by most models
in the Ang and Piazzesi (2003) tradition, that the macroeconomic variables in the
model are spanned by the yield curve5. Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010) show
that this spanning property is at odds with the US data.
Turning now to the identication of monetary policy shocks, the di¢ culty lies
in nding a procedure for di¤erentiating the truly exogenous movements in the
monetary policy instrument from those movements that arise endogenously as the
monetary authority responds to changes in the state of the economy. To overcome
this issue, I design the MTSM in such a way that identication through the recur-
siveness assumption of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) can be applied
5That is, most models in the Ang and Piazzesi (2003) tradition impose that a combination of
yields explains all of the variation in the macro variables.
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easily. More specically, I include the monetary policy instrument, which I assume
to be the short-term interest rate, in the state vector of the MTSM. Then I impose
a particular ordering of the elements in this vector in order to give rise to a recursive
causal relationship among the macro and term-structure variables.
The model is tted to quarterly US data on ination, economic activity, com-
modity prices, and long-term yields. To evaluate possible changes in the monetary
transmission mechanism, I split the data sample into two periods: 1959:1-1979:3
(pre-Volcker) and 1979:4-2007:4 (post-Volcker). My main nding is that monetary
policy shocks trigger relevant movements in long-term bond premia in both subsam-
ples. These movements feed back into the macroeconomy, giving rise to what I refer
to as the term-premium channel of monetary transmission.
More specically, I nd that an exogenous increase in the short rate temporarily
raises term premia across di¤erent maturities by a statistically signicant amount.
This result holds for both samples. However, the responses of term premia are more
pronounced and persistent in the pre-Volcker than in the post-Volcker subsample.
I further show that the responses of the macro variables after a monetary shock
can be decomposed into one portion due to term premia movements and another
due to movements in the term-structure that are consistent with the Expectations
Hypothesis. That is, I quantify the term-premium channel of monetary transmission.
Interestingly, my estimates show that the term-premium channel was particularly
important in the pre-Volcker period, while this channel turns out to be empirically
irrelevant in the latter period.
I then analyze how shocks to future monetary policy expectations a¤ect the
macroeconomy. This is motivated by the crucial role that modern central banks
across the globe give to e¢ ciently managing private agentsexpectations. My frame-
work is convenient for this analysis because it allows for the isolation of policy ex-
pectations from term premia i.e. it guarantees that the proposed shock a¤ects the
future policy expectations implied by the model, and not term premia.
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In the post-Volcker subsample, I nd that a shock to monetary policy expecta-
tions up to one year ahead will lead to more pronounced and more intuitive responses
for the macroeconomic variables than would standard shocks to the contemporane-
ous value of the monetary policy instrument. In other words, while a contractionary
shock to the current value of the short rate leads to counterintuitive rises in ina-
tion and economic activity in the post-Volcker sample, a shock to policy expectations
one-year ahead leads to declines in both macro variables. I further show that if one
directly shocks the long-term yield, which includes both policy expectations and
term premia, then identication of the expectations shock becomes biased. In par-
ticular, the responses of the macro variables after a monetary policy shock become
less pronounced than when I control for term premia.
There have been several earlier contributions to the macro-nance literature that,
in some sense, tried to address one or more questions raised in the beginning of this
chapter. In particular, Evans and Marshall (1998) were among the rst to study the
monetary policy transmission in a system containing both macroeconomic and term
structure variables6. Their model consisted of a standard Vector Autoregression on
macroeconomic variables and nominal yields that did not allow for feedback e¤ects
from bond yields to the macroeconomic variables. More recently, in a context similar
to mine, Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2006) and Mumtaz and Surico (2009)7
used the recursiveness assumption to identify monetary policy shocks in a MTSM
based on Nelson and Siegel (1987). My approach di¤ers from these three papers
in that my model rules out arbitrage opportunities across bonds of di¤erent matu-
rities. In addition, none of them quantify the term premium channel of monetary
transmission or study shocks to policy expectations.
This chapter is also related to a literature that uses Fed funds futures data
to identify monetary policy shocks. Kuttner (2001), for example, nds that long-
term yields respond signicantly to movements in the Fed funds rate that are not
6See also Evans and Marshall (2007).
7See also Bianchi, Mumtaz, and Surico (2009).
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anticipated by Fed funds futures. On the other hand, anticipated changes in the Fed
funds rate have only minimal e¤ects on long-term yields. More recently, Piazzesi
and Swanson (2008) show that accounting for premia in the Fed funds futures
data is crucial in pursuing the identication scheme proposed by Kuttner (2001).
Although this branch of the literature o¤ers important insights into the identication
of monetary policy shocks, it does not address the e¤ects of these shocks on the rest
of the economy. This chapter focuses precisely on these e¤ects.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the data used to t
the model; Section 1.3 describes how I use the MTSM to identify both term premia
and monetary policy shocks; Section 1.4 evaluates the model implied macro and
term-structure responses to a standard monetary policy shock; Section 1.5 analyzes
the e¤ects of a shock to future monetary policy expectations; Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data
My analysis focuses on quarterly data for the U.S. ranging from 1959:1 to 2007:4.
The term-structure series that I include in my analysis are the nominal yields on
6-month and 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5-year zero-coupon bonds obtained from the CRSP
database. For the short-term interest rate, I use the 3-month riskfree rate, also from
CRSP. All of the yields are compounded continuously, and are observed on the last
trading day of each quarter.
Three macro variables are included in the term structure model: the output gap
(GAP); the rate of ination (INF ); and a measure of commodity prices (COMM ).
Although many term-structure models in the literature already incorporate measures
of GAP and INF 8, I add COMM as in an extensive branch of the macro literature
8See, for example, Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Bikbov and Chernov (2010), and Joslin, Priebsch,
and Singleton (2010).
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that aims at identifying monetary policy shocks using structural VARs9.
Inspired by Bernanke and Boivin (2003), Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Moench
(2008), I extract measures of GAP and INF from rich datasets that include several
di¤erent output gap and ination indicators. The motivation for this approach is
that, in practice, central banks use many di¤erent economic indicators in order
to form their views about the underlying levels of economic slack and ination
in the economy (in other words, central banks act in a data-rich environment).
Therefore, I use the methodology proposed by Stock and Watson (1988)10, and
measure GAP as the common factor extracted from a set of seven di¤erent economic
slack indicators11. The same methodology is applied to compute INF based on ve
di¤erent quarterly ination indicators12 ;13. Finally, COMM is a detrended and
smoothed measure of commodity prices based on the CRB spot commodity prices
index14.
Figure 1.1 depicts the time series described above. The units associated with
GAP and INF cannot be interpreted, because these factors were normalized to have
zero mean and unit conditional variance. Nevertheless, the dynamics of GAP and
INF capture the timing of the NBER recessions, and the ination peaks associated
9Structural VARs estimated on post-war U.S. data in general give rise to a "pricing puzzle".
That is, they have the counterintuitive property that ination increases in response to a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock. According to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and
Sims and Zha (2006), this puzzle can be solved by including COMM as an additional endogenous
variable in structural VARs. See also Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
10See Appendix 1.A for details.
11The series used to compute GAP are: (i) industrial production index, (ii) total nonfarm
payrolls, (iii) real personal consumption expenditures, (iv) real GDP index, (v) the new orders
component of the ISM manufacturing index, (vi) total housing starts, and (vii) civilian unem-
ployment rate. (i)-(iv) were detrended using linear and quadratic deterministic trends, whereas
(v)-(vii) were used directly in levels. All series were obtained from the St. Louis Fed.
12The series used to compute INF are: (i) CPI fess food & energy, (ii) nished goods PPI less
food & energy, (iii) personal consumption expenditures deator less food and energy, (iv) GDP
deator, (v) average hourly earnings. All series were obtained from the St. Louis Fed, and were
transformer into quarterly growth rates before applying the Kalman Filter.
13The quarterly series used to construct GAP and INF represent gures observed in the rst
month of each quarter. The only two exception are the GDP and GDP deator series, which are
not observed on a monthly frequency and were therefore proxied by their one-quarter lag. This
way the plausibility of the recursive identication scheme described in Section 1.3.2 is guaranteed.
14More specically, I detrend the CRB index (expressed in logs) by applying the standard
Hodrick-Prescott lter. Then, in order to improve the t of the model, I take a moving aver-
age of the detrended CRB index.
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Notes: The 3-month and 5-year yields from CRSP are expressed in percent per annum. GAP and INF are
common factors respectively extracted from several economic slack and quarterly ination series. By construction,
these common factors have zero mean and unit variance. COMM smoothed log-deviations of the CRB
commodity index from an HP trend. The shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
with the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks, very well.
In the remainder of this chapter, them-period bond yield is denoted by ym;t. The
short-rate (i.e. the 3-month rate) is denoted by y1;t  rt. The yields used to evaluate
the t of the model are collected in the 71 vector yt  [ rt y2;t y4;t    y20;t ]0.
Finally, the macro variables are arranged in Mt  [ GAPt INFt COMMt ]0.
1.3 The Macro-A¢ ne Term Structure Model
I model the joint reduced-form dynamics of the macroeconomy and the yield curve
according to a Macro-A¢ ne Term Structure Model (MTSM) similar to Ang and Pi-
azzesi (2003). This family of models explores the discipline imposed by no-arbitrage
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in order to clarify the links between macro shocks and the entire yield curve. The
particular framework I adopt in this chapter follows Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton
(2010).
Section 1.3.1 describes the core equations of the model and shows how it can
be used to identify term premia over the term structure. Section 1.3.2 then shows
how the recursiveness assumption is used to identify monetary policy shocks in the
model. Finally, Section 1.3.3 describes the econometric methodology used to t the
model to the U.S. data.
1.3.1 Identifying Term Premia
I will now describe the details of the model that will allow me to identify term premia
over the term structure. Suppose that the state of the economy is summarized by
the three macro variables described in Section 1.2 plus N additional yield-based
factors. More specically, at any time t, the state-vector of the economy is given by
Zt  [ M 0t P 0t ]0 2 R3+N , where Mt was already dened in the previous section and
theN -column vector Pt contains the yield-based factors. Following Joslin, Singleton,
and Zhu (2011), I assume that Pt consists of returns on observed bond portfolios.
More precisely, for a full-rank matrix of portfolio weights P , I dene Pt  Pyt. My
particular choice for P will be described in Section 1.3.2.
The Macro-A¢ ne Term Structure Model is summarized by three equations:
rt = 0 + 
0
1Pt (1.1)














where QPt  N (0; IN) and PZt  N (0; I3+N).15 According to equation (1.1), the
15The dimensions of the unknown coe¢ cients present in the model are: 0 is a scalar, 1 and
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short-term interest rate, rt, is assumed to be a linear function of Pt. In addition,
the dynamics of the yield portfolios, Pt, under the risk-neutral probability measure
(Q), follow the Gaussian process described in equation (1.2). The model is completed
by assuming that the evolution of the complete state vector Zt under the historical
probability measure (P) is given by the Gaussian process in equation (1.3).
In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, bond prices are determined by equa-
tions (1.1) and (1.2). More specically, letting Vm;t  exp ( m ym:t) represent the
time t price of a bond that repays the investor at time t+m, it can be shown that




shows that combining the bond-pricing condition to equations (1.1) and (1.2) yields
the following solution for bond yields:
ym;t = Am +BmPt (1.4)
where Am and Bm are determined by the rst-order di¤erence equations described
in Appendix 1.B. Importantly, because of the assumed short-rate equation (1.1),
the bond yields of di¤erent maturities are a¢ ne on Pt and not on Mt. This means
that only the risks associated with Pt are priced explicitly by the model. Although
macroeconomic risks are not priced explicitly, they may have important implications
for bond prices, because under P the dynamics ofMt interact with those of the yield
portfolios (see equation (1.3)).
Standard models in the tradition of Ang and Piazzesi (2003) substitute equation
(1.1) for an equation in which rt is a linear function of both Pt and Mt. The bond
prices implied by these more traditional models are then a¢ ne not only in Pt, but
also in Mt. There are at least two reasons why having bond yields follow equation
(1.4) is preferable to those implied by traditional models. First, having yields de-
termined by equation (1.4) is consistent with the fact that a low-dimensional factor
Q0P are N1, Q1P and P are NN , P0Z is 3+N1, and nally P1Z and Z are 3+N3+N .
The matrix
p




structure is su¢ cient to explain most of the variation in yields16. This avoids the
problems that are likely to arise with estimating over-parameterized models, which
will probably be the case when all variables in Zt are explicitly priced. Furthermore,
Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2010) show that in models where bond prices are
a¢ ne on both Pt and Mt, the macro factors are spanned by the term structure (i.e.
a combination of yields explains all of the variation inMt). In a setup similar to the
one developed here, they show that this spanning property is empirically rejected in
the U.S. data (more details follow in Section 1.4.1).
As in Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2006), another important property of
the model (1.1) - (1.3) is that it allows for two-way feedback e¤ects between the
macro variables and the yield curve. Mechanically, the interaction between Mt and
Pt occurs because the conditional covariance matrix of Zt, Z , and the matrix of
the slope coe¢ cients P1Z are potentially full. The model in which these feedback
e¤ects are not present is nested as a constrained version of equations (1.1) - (1.3).
To understand how this model can be used to identify term premia contained
in bond prices, let us consider a risk neutral world. In this world, the risk-adjusted
(Q) and the historical (P) probability measures coincide17. Appendix 1.D shows




m Zt, where A
EH
m
and BEHm follow the recursions shown in the appendix
18. Interestingly, it can be
shown that, up to a convexity term, the m-period bond yield in this hypothetical
world, yEHm;t , behaves according to the EH. In other words, the dynamics of y
EH
m;t are
determined by the expected dynamics of the short-rate. Letting tpm;t capture the
deviations of the m-period yield from the EH, I ultimately obtain the following yield
decomposition:
ym;t  yEHm;t + tpm;t (1.5)
16Traditionally, a 3-factor structure consisting of Level, Slope and Curvature factors is su¢ -
cient to explain most of the cross-sectional variation in the term structure. See Litterman and
Scheinkman (1992).
17In other words, all prices of risk are zero.
18Importantly, the values of AEHm andB
EH
m depend only on the parameters contained in equations
(1.1) to (1.3).
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Following the macro and nance literatures, I will call tpm;t the "m-period term
premium". A positive value for tpm;t indicates that investing in the long-term bond
is riskier than investing in a sequence of short-term bonds for m periods.
1.3.2 Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks
Because the model described in the previous section consists of a reduced-form eco-
nomic system, an identication scheme is needed in order to distinguish exogenous
monetary impulses from those systematic responses of the Fed to changes in the
state of the economy. In this chapter, the identication of monetary policy shocks
follows the recursiveness assumption of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
According to this identication scheme, a particular ordering of the variables in Zt is
imposed in order to give rise to a recursive causal relationship among these variables.
Assume that the Feds monetary policy instrument is one of the endogenous
variables included in Zt. Then the recursive identication scheme of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) can be applied to equation (1.3) of the term-structure
model, just as in any standard VAR. In particular, assume that
p
Z is the Cholesky
factor associated with Z . Then, the lower-triangular shape of
p
Z implies that
the ordering of the variables in Zt establishes a causal relation among the state
variables. In particular, the variables that are ordered in Zt above the monetary
policy instrument do not move instantly when a monetary shock occurs. The values
of these variables in a given period are assumed to be observed by the Fed before
its monetary policy decision is taken. On the other hand, the variables ordered in
Zt below the policy instrument move instantly when a monetary shock occurs; thus,
their values in a given period are assumed to be observed only after the Feds policy
decision. As a result, this identication scheme implies that the policy shocks are
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orthogonal to the variables assumed to be included in the Feds information set19 ;20.
To implement the recursive identication scheme in the model of Section 1.3.1,
rst one needs to choose the variable that will represent the monetary policy instru-
ment of the Fed. A second decision must be made regarding the particular state
variables that are assumed to be included in the information set available to the Fed
before its policy decision (that is, one must choose whether each variable included
in Zt should appear above or below the policy instrument).
I assume that the short-rate, rt, represents Feds the monetary policy instrument.
This choice is motivated by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) who nd that, except for
Volckers reserve targeting experiment (1979-1982), in practice the Fed actually has
targeted the interest rate since the 1950s.21 Moreover, many recent empirical analy-
ses of the term-structure such as Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007), Ang, Boivin,
Dong, and Loo-Kung (2009), and Mumtaz and Surico (2009) also view the short
rate as the Feds monetary policy instrument. I introduce the policy instrument
in the state vector Zt by assuming that one bond portfolio contained in Pt simply
replicates rt. More specically, I set one line of the matrix of portfolio weights P to
[ 1 0 ::: 0 ].
In contrast to my approach, Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2006) introduce
rt in the state vector through Mt and not through Pt. However, their approach
does not rule out arbitrage opportunities in bond prices. By introducing the short-
rate as a portfolio in Pt, I guarantee the absence of arbitrage opportunities across
short-term and longer-term bonds.
19It can be shown that the monetary policy shocks identied through this recursive scheme do
not depend on (i) the particular ordering of the variables above the policy instrument in Zt, and
(ii) the particular ordering of the variables below the policy instrument in Zt. See Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
20The Cholesky factorization of Z actually implies a just-identication scheme. Therefore,
it provides a simple recursive identication to 3 + N "structural" shocks in the model. In this
paper I focus on monetary policy shocks, because in this case the recursive identication scheme
is supported by many previous theoretical and empirical papers in the macro literature.
21According to Cook (1988), movements in the fed funds rate followed judgemental actions of
the Fed even during Volckers reserve targeting experiment.
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With respect to the causal relations in the state vector, I choose the following
ordering for the elements of Zt:
Zt =

GAPt INFt COMMt rt P2;t ::: PN;t
0
where Pi;t represents the ith element of Pt (with P1;t  y1;t  rt). Note that the
bond portfolio that replicates rt is ordered belowMt and above all remaining N   1
bond portfolios. This implies that all elements ofMt are included in the Feds time t
information set. As a result, Mt responds with a lag to exogenous movements in the
short-rate. On the other hand, the bond portfolios P2;t; :::;PN;t are not in the Feds
time t information set, and therefore are allowed to adjust instantly to monetary
shocks.
The motivation behind my ordering in Zt is as follows: because bond portfolios
reect asset prices that are purely forward-looking (see the bond pricing equation
in Section 1.3), it is reasonable to assume that an exogenous change in rt triggers
instant movements in P2;t; :::;PN;t. In other words, as soon as investorsexpectations
are revised to incorporate the new level of rt, the observed bond prices will be
a¤ected. In contrast, in case of Mt, the same policy shock in general will "a¤ect
economic conditions only after a lag that is both long and variable"22. This lag
could be rationalized in terms of the economic costs related, for example, to changes
in production plans, revising goodsprices, and etc. As a result, the policy shock
will take longer to show up in the aggregate macroeconomic data.
Finally, note that the normalizations imposed to obtain econometric identica-
tion (see Appendix 1.C) result in the coe¢ cients of the short-rate equation (1.1)
being 0 = 0 and 1 = [ 1 0    0 ]0. Therefore, in my identication scheme the
short-rate dynamics are actually determined by the state equation (1.3) rather than
equation (1.1). Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), the short-rate
22Friedman (1961).
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process implied by my framework therefore can be interpreted as an interest-rate
feedback rule of the sort proposed by Taylor (1993) (expressed in reduced form).
According to this view, endogenous short-rate movements would occur in response
to changes in Mt, while all residual movements would be interpreted as monetary
policy shocks.
1.3.3 Estimation Methodology
Because the rst bond portfolio to enter Pt was already chosen in the previous sec-
tion, it only remains to choose the other N   1 yield-based factors (bond portfolios)
in order to complete the model specication. The nance literature nds that most
of the variation in bond yields is explained well by three unobserved factors usually
referred to as level, slope and curvature. As Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu (2011) show,
these estimated unobserved factors in general are similar to the rst three principal
components (PCs) of the term-structure data.
Accordingly, in this chapter I allow for N = 3 yield-based pricing factors. As
explained before, the rst of these simply replicates the short-rate, rt. The two
remaining factors are given by the second and third term-structure PCs, PC2 and
PC3, which were extracted from my term-structure dataset. More specically, the
matrix of portfolio weights is given by:
P =
266664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0:51  0:45  0:22 0:09 0:28 0:40 0:49
0:60  0:01  0:61  0:34  0:11 0:17 0:33
377775 (1.6)
Note that the loadings associated with the second bond portfolio roughly replicate
the slope of the yield curve, while the third portfolio has the shape of a curvature
factor with a trough on the 1-year maturity. I will therefore refer to PC2 and PC3
as the slope and curvature factors. In my dataset, the correlation between rt and
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the rst term-structure PC is above 0.97. Therefore, the t of the model with my
choice of P must be similar to that of a model where Pt contains the rst three
term-structure PCs.
The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML) after imposing the iden-
tifying normalizations proposed by Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu (2011). The bond
portfolios Pt are assumed to be perfectly priced by the model. However, each ob-
served yield yobsm;t (except for the short-rate) is assumed to be priced with a measure-
ment error um;t 
 
yobsm;t   ym;t
  N (0; !2). The ML estimates of the P-dynamics
of Zt (except for Z) can be conveniently obtained by OLS. Conditional on these
estimates, the likelihood function is optimized with respect to the parameters de-
termining the Q-dynamics of Pt (Z included). For more details see Appendix 1.C.
1.4 Model Analysis
This section analyzes the model estimation results. I show the results from using
two di¤erent subsamples of my dataset, namely 1959:1-1979:3 and 1979:4-2007:4.
This follows from Boivin and Giannoni (2006); in the context of a VAR similar to
the state equation (1.3) of my model, they nd evidence of a structural break in the
U.S. data in 1979:4.
Section 1.4.1 compares the model t to alternative model specications. Section
1.4.2 discusses the implications for the monetary policy transmission mechanism
across the two samples used to t the model.
1.4.1 Bond Pricing Errors
In order for the analysis carried out in the remainder of this chapter to be meaning-
ful, it is required that the long-term yields implied by the model track their observed
counterparts reasonably well. Therefore, it is important to compare the t of the
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MTSM described in Section 1.3 to other standard benchmark models in the liter-
ature. To form a fair comparison with the model from Section 1.3, all alternative
models considered here have exactly three pricing factors23.
The rst alternative model is an A¢ ne Term Structure Model with three yield-
based pricing factors and no macro factors. As is standard in the nance literature,
this yields-only model assumes that the pricing factors are the rst three PCs of
the term structure data. Based on their loadings on the term-structure data, these
three PCs follow the usual Level, Slope and Curvature interpretation. Note that,
unlike the model from Section 1.3, I use the rst PC (i.e. the Level factor) in this
case instead of rt for the rst yield-based factor.
The second model that I consider is an MTSM, as described in Section 1.3, with
the exception that the macro factors in this case are assumed to be spanned by the
term structure. More specically, the model with spanned macro factors substitutes
the short-rate equation (1.1) for another specication where rt is a linear function
of both Pt and Mt (i.e. both yield-based and macro factors are explicitly treated
as pricing factors). In this case, it can be shown that the model-implied yields are
linear in Pt and Mt. Importantly, Joslin, Le, and Singleton (2011) show that this
model has the property that Mt can be replicated by appropriately chosen bond
portfolios24  i.e. the macro variables are spanned by the information contained
in the term structure. Models that have this spanning property include Ang and
Piazzesi (2003), Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007), and Bikbov and Chernov (2010).
Because I am only focusing on three-factor models, the particular spanned MTSM
that I estimate includes GAP , INF and COMM as pricing factors; no yield-based
factor was included25.
23In the model from Section 1.3 only the risks associated with the 31 vector Pt were explicitly
priced.
24More precisely, the Spanned-Macro model implies that Mt = 0 + 1 ePt, where ePt is a vector
of bond portfolios with as many entries as the number of priced factors in the model. See Joslin,
Le, and Singleton (2011).
25Keeping the three-factor specication, I also compared the unspanned MTSM from Section
1.3 to a spanned MTSM with the following pricing factors: GAP , INF and PC1 (instead of
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Table 1.1: Comparing Price Errors Across Di¤erent Term-Structure Models
















m = 4 4.9 -15.3 19.5 4.9 -17.3 15.9
m = 12 5.4 -14.6 24.0 5.4 -14.0 19.8
m = 20 6.6 -21.7 18.9 6.6 -23.4 22.6
(II) Yields-only model:
m = 4 4.8 -17.4 19.6 4.1 -25.1 12.4
m = 12 4.8 -16.5 18.4 4.1 -13.4 13.5
m = 20 4.5 -15.8 9.2 4.8 -28.9 17.5
(III) Spanned MTSM:
m = 4 62.7 -245.5 248.2 135.1 -612.3 413.1
m = 12 50.5 -191.7 191.7 126.3 -477.2 375.6
m = 20 46.7 -187.0 178.2 118.5 -406.5 378.2
Notes: "Unspanned MTSM" is the model described in Section 1.3, with 3 yield-based pricing factors given by the
portfolio weights in (1.6) and 3 unspanned macro factors; "Yields-only model" is an A¢ ne Term-Structure Model
with 3 yield-based pricing factors (the rst 3 PCs) and no macro factors; "Spanned MTSM" is a 3-factor
Macro-A¢ ne Term Structure Model where the pricing factors are given by Mt. All gures are expressed in
annualized basis points.
Panels (I) to (III) of Table 1.1 compare the t of the three models discussed
above for the 1959:1-1979:3 and 1979:4-2007:4 samples. The t of each model is
evaluated according to the mean absolute bond pricing error, 1
T
PT
t=1 jbum;tj, as well
as the minimum and maximum estimated pricing error within each sample. All
gures are expressed in annualized basis points. Table 1.1 focuses on 1-,3-, and
5-year maturities.
The pricing errors associated with models "yields-only" and the unspanned
MTSM are very similar in both samples. For these models, the pricing errors on
average are small in absolute terms and they uctuate inside a relatively narrow
GAP , INF and COMM). Still in this case, the unspanned MTSM ts the term-structure data
signicantly better than this specication of the spanned MTSM.
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interval. There is little deterioration in t as we go from the yields-only model to
the unspanned MTSM. This is because the former assumes that the pricing factors
are the rst three term-structure PCs, whereas the latter substitutes the rst PC
for the short-rate. Therefore, the cost of having the short-rate in the state vector to
allow for monetary policy identication is very small.
Comparing now the unspanned and spanned MTSMs, observe that the latter
displays pricing errors that are an order of magnitude larger in both samples. This
is because most of the variation in yields can be explained by the rst three term-
structure PCs, and GAP , INF and COMM fail to replicate the variation on these
PCs26. Only at the cost of increasing the dimension of the vector of pricing factors
(in particular, if extra yield-based factors are added) will the spanned MTSM t the
data as well as the model unspanned MTSM.
Therefore, in terms of t to the term-structure data, the unspanned MTSM pro-
posed in Section 1.3 is comparable to the standard yields-only model. The advantage
of the unspanned MTSM vis-à-vis the yields-only model is that the former allows
for interactions between the term structure and the macroeconomy, crucial for the
purposes of this chapter. Additionally, in comparison to the three-factor spanned
MTSM, the unspanned model delivers a much better t to the term-structure data.
I therefore conclude that the unspanned MTSM is an adequate tool for the study of
monetary policy shocks carried out in the next sections.
1.4.2 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the Unspanned MTSM
In this subsection, I use the unspanned MTSM from Section 1.3 to study how shocks
to the assumed monetary policy instrument, rt, transmit to the macroeconomy and
to the term structure. I begin by computing the model-implied impulse-response
functions (IRFs) to a monetary policy shock. In so doing, I pay particular attention
26This point was rst made by Joslin, Le, and Singleton (2011).
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to the di¤erences that emerge between the two samples used to estimate the model,
namely the 1959:1-1979:3 sample and the more recent 1979:4-2007:4 sample. In order
to make the IRFs comparable across samples, I normalize the monetary policy shock
to be an exogenous increase of 100 basis points in the (annualized) short-rate.
Figure 1.2 shows the movements of the state vector Zt  [ M 0t P 0t ]0 following
the monetary policy shock dened above. Model-implied IRFs based on the 1959:1-
1979:3 sample are shown in the top panel, whereas the bottom panel shows the
same for the 1979:4-2007:4 sample. In each chart the solid line corresponds to the
mean response, whereas the shaded areas represent small-sample 95% condence
intervals27.
I begin by analyzing the IRFs for the macro variables GAP , INF , and COMM .
Note that the IRFs for these variables di¤er substantially across the two samples.
In the model estimated using the rst sample, the policy shock leads to statistically
signicant and persistent movements in GAP , INF , and COMM . For the second
sample, the responses are much smaller in fact, all three IRFs in the second sample
are not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
This result is in line with Boivin and Giannoni (2002), who nd that the impacts
of monetary policy shocks on output and ination are much smaller since the begin-
ning of the 1980s than in the period before. Based on estimated general equilibrium
models, they associate these reduced monetary policy impacts to an increase in the
Feds responsiveness to ination expectations that began in the 1980s.
Note that for the model estimated over the 1959:1-1979:3 sample, the response
of INF stays positive for some quarters before turning negative. In the literature
27The condence intervals were computed using the following bootstrap method: (i) resample,
with replacement, T residuals from the estimated model; (ii) given the inital state vector Z0, use
the resampled residuals and the estimated model parameters to construct new time series for the
state-vector and the yield curve; (iii) re-estimate the model using the resampled data; (iv) repeat
steps (i) - (iii) 500 times. The dashed lines report the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the distribution
of estimated impulse responses.
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this is known as the "price puzzle"28, and is usually treated by including a measure
of commodity prices in the model. In fact, excluding COMM from the unspanned
MTSM amplies this e¤ect signicantly.
Returning to Figure 1.2, the bottom row of charts in each panel shows the IRFs
for the pricing factors r, PC2, and PC3. In both samples the monetary policy shock
triggers a persistent reaction of the short rate. In the 1959:1-1979:3 sample, the
short-rate reaction stays positive for two years, turns negative and then approaches
zero from below. In contrast, for the 1979:4-2007:4 sample the reaction stays positive
for the entire time until it disappears. The slope factor, PC2, falls after the shock
in both samples, implying that long-term yields react to the shock by less than the
short-rate. Finally, the curvature factor, PC3, does not react signicantly to the
shock in the 1959:1-1979:3 sample, whereas this factor decreases two periods after
the shock hits in the 1979:4-2007:4 sample.
According to equation (1.4), as the three pricing factors respond to the shock, the
model-implied yields will also move in general. Moreover, because of the recursive
ordering that I proposed in Section 1.3.2, all of the pricing factors, and consequently
all individual bond yields, are allowed to move instantly with the shock. I now study
how monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the term structure; in particular, I
consider the model-implied decomposition of bond yields into premium and Expec-
tations Hypothesis (EH) components.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show how the term-structure and its decomposition react to
the same monetary policy shock that was considered earlier. Each gure refers to a
di¤erent sample over which the model was estimated. To make the comparison across
samples easier, I also plot Figure 1.5, which juxtaposes the IRFs for the two samples.
In all charts, the horizontal axes measure maturity going from one quarter to ve
years. The black lines represent mean responses across maturities and the shaded
28See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and Sims and Zha (2006).
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Notes: Impulse responses to an increase of 100 basis points in the short-rate. The horizontal axes measures time in
quarters. COMM is expressed in % deviation from an HP trend, whereas r is expressed in percent per annum.
The units of GAP , INF , PC1 and PC2 are not interpretable. The dashed lines are 95% bootstrapped condence
intervals.
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areas are the 95% bootstrapped condence intervals (for presentational reasons, I
ignored the condence intervals in Figure 1.5). Each row of charts in Figures 1.3
to 1.5 corresponds to a given number of periods after the shock hits. E.g. the
rst row displays IRFs for the quarter when the shock hits; the second row shows
IRFs for two quarters later; and etc. Finally, the columns correspond to the yield
decomposition of equation (1.5), i.e. ym;t, yEHm;t and tpm;t.
I begin by analyzing the IRFs for the model-implied yields, ym;t, as shown in the
rst columns of Figures 1.3 and 1.4. 29 To help organize the discussion, I begin with
my rst result:
Result I: In both samples, an exogenous increase in the short rate moves
long-term yields by a signicantly positive amount, at the same time reducing the
yield curve slope. The IRFs for the two samples are remarkably similar across
maturities and over time.
As soon as the monetary policy shock hits the economy, all long-term yields
reported increase by a signicantly positive amount in both samples. The impact
of the shock on yields declines as maturity increases. In fact, whereas the short rate
increases by 100 basis points, the 5-year yield increases by only about 50-to-60 basis
points in both samples. This means that the monetary shock considered here leads
to a drop of about 40-to-50 basis points in the 5-year slope of the yield curve. Going
back to Figure 1.2, this is in line with the fact that the slope factor PC2 drops in
response to the shock.
Over the quarters following the shock, the IRFs of bond yields die out in both
samples. Note, in particular, that these responses over time and at di¤erent matu-
rities are remarkably similar across the two samples (see the rst column of Figure
29Impulse response functions and variance decompositions of ym;t, yEHm;t and tpm;t are trivial
to compute in the unspanned MTSM because these variables are all linear functions of the state
vector Zt.
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Figure 1.3: 1959:1-1979:3; Yield Curve Decomposition after a Monetary Policy
Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to an increase of 100 basis points in the short-rate. The horizontal axes measures bond
maturities from one quarter to ve years. All responses are expressed in percent per annum. The gray areas are
95% bootstrapped condence intervals.
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Figure 1.4: 1979:4-2007:4; Yield Curve Decomposition after a Monetary Policy
Shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to an increase of 100 basis points in the short-rate. The horizontal axes measures bond
maturities from one quarter to ve years. All responses are expressed in percent per annum. The gray areas are
95% bootstrapped condence intervals.
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Figure 1.5: Yield Curve Decomposition after a Monetary Policy Shock; Comparing
Samples
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Notes: Impulse responses to an increase of 100 basis points in the short-rate. The horizontal axes measures bond
maturities from one quarter to ve years. All responses are expressed in percent per annum.
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1.5). At the same time, we know that the short-rate IRFs di¤er signicantly across
samples (Figure 1.2). Consequently, it is very likely that the EH and term premia
components of the term structure respond di¤erently to the shock depending on the
sample analyzed. This leads me to formalize my second result:
Result II: In both samples an exogenous increase in the short rate leads to
statistically signicant increases in term premia across maturities. These responses
are more pronounced and persistent in the 1959:1-1979:3 than in the 1979:4-2007:4
sample.
In fact, the last column of Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show that term premia of all matu-
rities increase by a signicant amount following the shock. However, this increase is
larger in general for the model estimated over the 1959:1-1979:3 samples than when
I use data from the later sample (see the third column of Figure 1.5). For example,
while in the 1979:4-2007:4 sample the 5-year term premium instantly increases by 26
basis points on average, in the earlier sample it increases by more than double that
amount. Moreover, in the rst sample the term premia responses of all maturities
persistently stay above zero for more than six quarters after the shock. For the
second sample, on the other hand, the term premia responses statistically become
zero after about four quarters following the shock.
The fact that term premia move signicantly following the shocks may have
crucial implications for the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Remember
from Section 1.3 that the term-structure model I analyze allows for two-way feedback
e¤ects between the macro variables and the yield curve. As a result, there is a term-
premium channel through which monetary policy a¤ects output and ination. More
specically, movements in term premia following a monetary shock in general will
have an impact on the pricing factors contained in Pt, which then will a¤ect the
dynamics of the macro variables contained in Mt. Interestingly, the fact that term
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premia respond more to the shock in the 1959:1-1979:3 than in the 1979:4-2007:4
sample suggests that the term-premium channel may be particularly important in
the earlier sample.
I now try to quantify the term-premium channel of monetary transmission. Let
	Z;h be the impulse response of the state vector h periods after a monetary policy
shock occurs. Appendix 1.E shows that 	Z;h can be decomposed into two compo-
nents: 	EHZ;h and 	
TP
Z;h. The rst component, 	
EH
Z;h , measures what the response of
Zt would be to a monetary policy shock if the term premium were held constant. In
this case, the response of Zt will be a¤ected only by the EH component of the term
structure. I refer to this as the EH channel of monetary transmission. The second
component, 	TPZ;h, holds the EH component of the term structure xed and accounts
only for the change in Zt that is caused by movements in term premia; this is the
term-premium channel mentioned above.
Figure 1.6 shows the decomposition of the impulse responses of GAP , INF
and PC2 into their EH and term-premium components. The top panel shows IRFs
for the 1959:1-1979:3 sample; the bottom panel refers to the 1979:4-2007:4 sample.
Based the decomposition of the IRFs shown in this gure, I now formalize my third
result:
Result III: In the 1959:1-1979:3 sample, the term-premium channel is responsible
for a large fraction of the movements in the macro variables following a monetary
policy shock. In this case, the term premium channel acts to diminish the
e¤ectiveness of monetary policy shocks. The opposite is true for the 1979:4-2007:4
sample, for which the term-premium channel is close to being non-existent.
The top panel of Figure 1.6 shows that a large portion of the responses of GAP
and INF in the 1959:1-1979:3 sample are due to the term premium channel. The
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Notes: Impulse responses to an exogenous increase of 100 basis points in the short-rate. The horizontal axes
measures time in quarters. The units of GAP and INF are not interpretable.
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exact mechanism behind this result is as follows: movements in term premia caused
by the monetary impulse are reected directly into the pricing (yield-based) factors
included in Zt. These in turn feed back into the macro variables through equation
(1.3) which, in the 1959:1-1979:3 sample, causes large movements in GAP and INF .
Going one step further, note that in the rst sample the term-premium and EH
channels of GAP and INF move in opposite directions. For example, the drop in
GAP in response to the shock is the result of a sharp drop in activity due to the EH
channel, which is signicantly moderated by the term-premium channel. For both
GAP and INF , the term premium channel in the rst sample acts to diminish the
e¤ectiveness of monetary policy shocks.
To understand this last point, let me focus for a moment on the IRF of PC2
shown in the top right corner of Figure 1.6. This chart shows that the movements in
term premia following a monetary impulse pressure the slope factor to move up (not
down, as the EH channel would predict). In fact, going back to Figure 1.3, note that
in this sample the IRFs of term premia are increasing in bond maturity thus they
exert upward pressure on the yield curve slope. In turn, this positive pressure on
the slope factor feeds back into the macroeconomy through equation (1.3), causing
the term premium channel to pressure GAP and INF in the direction opposite of
the EH channel.
In terms of the 1979:4-2007:4 sample, note that the term-premium channel barely
moves in the responses of both GAP and INF . In fact, for these variables the lines
corresponding to the total IRF and the EH channel are almost exactly on top of each
other, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.6. This striking di¤erence across
samples occurs mostly because the term-premium channel pressures the slope factor
PC2 by much less in the second than in the rst sample (see the bottom right graph
in Figure 1.6).
To conclude this section, I study the variance decomposition of the yield curve
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Table 1.2: Forecast Error Variance Due to Monetary Policy Shocks
1959:1 - 1979:3 1979:3 - 2007:4








































Notes: Numbers in parentheses are 95% bootstrapped condence intervals.
components. Table 1.2 shows the portion of the variance of h-period ahead forecasts
of ym;t, yEHm;t and tpm;t that is due to identied monetary policy shocks. For purposes
of presentation, I only report here the cases where m is equal to 20 quarter and h is
set to 4, 12, and 20 quarters. The left panel corresponds to the 1959:1-1979:3 sample;
the right panel refers to the 1979:4-2007:4 sample. The numbers in parentheses are
bootstrapped 95% condence intervals.
Even though the bootstrapped condence intervals are quite wide, at all horizons
considered in Table 1.2 monetary policy shocks explain a substantial fraction of the
forecast error variance of the 5-year yield and its premium and EH components. In
the 1959:1-1979:3 sample, in particular, monetary policy shocks explain about 60%
of the 5-year term-premium forecast error variance. As we look at the more recent
sample, though, this fraction drops quite substantially, to around 15 to 20%. This
leads me to my fourth result:
Result IV: A substantial portion of the term-premia forecast error variance is due
to monetary policy shocks. In the 1959:1-1979:3 sample, these shocks explain
around 60% of the forecast error variance of the 5-year term-premium. In the
second sample, this fraction drops to around 15 to 20%.
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This result is surprising in light of some recent theoretical results obtained from
general equilibrium models. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) study the nominal
term premium in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
(DSGE) with long-run risks as in Bansal and Yaron (2004). They nd that the
variability of term premia is dictated by technological shocks. Monetary policy
shocks are responsible for only a small portion of the variability in term premia. In
contrast, the results in Table 1.2 show that monetary policy shocks, at least in the
context of the model developed here, are crucial to understanding the variability in
term-premia.
1.5 Shocks to Future Monetary Policy Expectations
Up until now I have considered only shocks that directly a¤ect the short-term interest
rate rt. However, one of the major challenges of central banking is to coordinate the
publics future expectations, allowing the monetary authority to reach its objectives
with minimum costs30. In particular, modern macroeconomic theory shows that
expectations about the future directions of key macroeconomic variables such as
GDP, ination and the short-rate are crucial to determining the success of current
monetary policy actions. In fact, the introduction to Michael Woodfords classic
book states that:
"For successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of e¤ective
control of overnight interest rates as it is shaping market expectations of
the way in which interest rates, ination, and income are likely to evolve
over the coming year and later". [Woodford (2003)]
30The importance of expectationscoordination became clear with the advent of micro-founded
models for the analysis of monetary policy. These models highlight that future expectations play
a crucial role in the decision making of private agents, which will in turn a¤ect the macroeconomic
equilibrium. See Woodford (2003).
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It follows that central bankscommunication with the private sector is now con-
sidered to be one of the most important instruments for the conduct of monetary
policy. In the words of Woodford (2003):
"... insofar as it is possible for the central bank to a¤ect expectation,
this should be an important tool of policy stabilization... Not only do
expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current conditions,
very little else matters" (authors italic).
In this section I study the macroeconomic implications of shocks to expectations
about the future path of the monetary policy instrument rt. The MTSM from
Section 1.3 is a particularly convenient tool for this study because it allows for the
decomposition of long-term yields into policy expectations (i.e. the EH component
of ym;t) and term premia.
Section 1.5.1 shows how the unspanned MTSM can be used to identify the future
policy expectations shock discussed above. Section 1.5.2 studies the transmission
of shocks to future policy expectations to the macroeconomy. Since the consensus
that expectations are crucial for monetary policy started to form in the mid 1980s,
I will only show results for the more recent sample, 1979:4-2007:431, in this section.
1.5.1 Identifying Shocks to Monetary Policy Expectations
I dene a shock to policy expectations m periods ahead as an exogenous impulse
in yEHm;t that is neither accompanied by an instantaneous movement in the short-
rate rt nor by an instantaneous change in the macro variables in Mt. Because the
EH states that (up to a Jensens inequality term) the m-period yield equals the
average short-rate from t until maturity, the expectations shock that I consider
31Results for the pre-Volcker sample are available upon request.
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directly a¤ects the future path of the traditional monetary policy instrument, rt,
from the current period until maturity. The requirement that rt does not move on
impact guarantees that the shock will not be confused with the standard monetary
policy shock considered in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. Also, the assumption that Mt does
not move on impact maintains a coherence with the monetary policy transmission
mechanism discussed in the previous sections.
Two points about my shock denition are worth mentioning. Firstly, although
the short rate is assumed to remain constant on impact, it is allowed to move
endogenously in the periods after the shock hits. Second, I allow the term premia
to move instantly when the shock hits.
To make the discussion more concrete, I now show how to identify shocks to
monetary policy expectations in the MTSM from Section 1.3. 32 The main idea is
to use a recursive identication scheme as described in Section 1.3.2, except that
instead of using the state equation (1.3) to identify the shocks, I now use a rotated
version of this equation. In the rotated model, the quantity I want to shock, yEHm;t ,
appears explicitly as an endogenous variable in the rotated state vector.
More precisely, let the rotated state vector be given by eZt  M 0t rt yEHm;t tpm;t0.
Appendix 1.F shows that there exists a 61 vectorW0 and an invertible 66 matrix


















The choices of W0 and W1 rely on the fact that in the unspanned MTSM yEHm;t











Zt. Note that the decomposition of ym;t into policy
32See Appendix 1.F for more details of the identication methodology.
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expectations, yEHm;t , and term premium, tpm;t, appears explicitly in the last two entries
of the rotated state vector. Appendix 1.F shows that eZt evolves according to
eZt = eP0Z + eP1Z eZt 1 +pW1ZW 01Pzt
where eP0Z and eP1Z are known functions of W0, W1, P0Z and P1Z .
As before, I identify shocks using the recursiveness assumption and thus assume
that
p
W1ZW 01 is the Cholesky factor associated with matrix W1ZW
0
1. The or-
dering of the variables in eZt is again crucial. In the particular way I dened eZt in
equation (1.7), an exogenous shock to yEHm;t agrees with my denition of a policy
expectations shock. That is, on impact all three variables in Mt and the short rate
shows no response to the shock; on the other hand, the term premium is allowed
to move instantly. Only one period after the shock hits, all variables in eZt will be
allowed to respond to the shock.
1.5.2 The Transmission of Policy Expectations Shocks
Figure 1.7 plots the IRFs of GAP and INF to a +100-basis-point shock to future
monetary policy expectations. In each chart, the lines correspond to alternative
choices for m. In particular, the dotted lines refer to IRFs when m equals 1, in
which case the shock collapses to the standard monetary policy shock studied in
Section 1.4 (note that the scales of the vertical axes in this gure are di¤erent from
the ones in Figure 1.2). The marked lines, on the other hand, refer to IRFs to policy
expectations shocks for the cases where m is equal to 2, 3 and 4.
Consider rst the IRFs to a standard monetary policy shock, i.e. m = 1. In
this model, this shock generates counter-intuitive responses for the macro variables
shown in Figure 1.4. That is, both GAP and INF increase persistently following
the standard monetary policy shock (even though we showed in Section 1.4 that
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Notes: Impulse responses to an increase of 100 basis points in yEHm;t . The horizontal axes measure the number of
quarters after the shock. The units of GAP and INF are not interpretable.
these movements were not statistically signicant), contrary to what is suggested
by monetary theory. On the other hand, a shock of the same magnitude to policy
expectations 2, 3 or 4 periods ahead causes bothGAP and INF to drop persistently.
Intuitively, once private agents learn that monetary policy on average will be tighter
from now untilm, both activity and ination drop for several quarters. Interestingly,
these drops occur quite quickly, with the trough of the responses occurring just one
quarter after the shock hits. Also, increasing the shock horizon, m, from 2 to 4
reduces the initial impact of the shock on both GAP and INF . I summarize these
results as follows:
Result V: In the 1979:4-2007:4 sample, an exogenous shock to monetary policy
expectations leads to drops in activity and ination. The troughs of these responses
occur only one quarter after the shock hits. Increasing the horizon of the expected
future policy shock from 2 to 4 quarters attenuates the initial drops in GAP and
INF.
As mentioned before, an important advantage of using the MTSM to study
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Notes: Impulse responses to an increase of 100 basis points in ym;t (black lines) and yEHm;t (red lines) for di¤erent
values of m. The horizontal axes measure the number of quarters after the shock. The units of GAP and INF are
not interpretable.
policy expectations shocks lies in the fact that this model allows for the separation
of premium and EH component of yields33. Therefore, I now ask the following
question: what would be the di¤erence in the IRFs shown in Figure 1.7 had I
ignored the term premium component of long-term yields and directly shocked ym;t
instead of yEHm;t ?
To answer this question, I compare the IRFs to the policy expectations shocks
shown in Figure 1.7 to the new IRFs following a shock to ym;t. Figure 1.8 plots the
results. The IRFs to yEHm;t shocks correspond to the red lines; the black lines are
responses to shocks to ym;t. For each shock, I continue to show responses for the
case where m is set to 2, 3 and 4.
Note that for all policy horizons (m) shown in Figure 1.8, the IRFs following a
shock to ym;t are less pronounced than those following a shock to yEHm;t . In general,
the responses to a yEHm;t shock are about two times stronger on impact than the
corresponding IRFs to a ym;t shock. Therefore, if I had ignored the term-premium
33The importance of separating policy expectations and premia in the context of monetary policy
shocksidentication was also highlighted by Piazzesi and Swanson (2008).
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component of long-term yields when identifying policy expectations shocks, I would
have gotten substantially weaker IRFs than in the case where this component is
accounted for. This result is summarized below:
Result VI: If the objective is to identify shocks to future policy expectations, then
shocking ym;t instead of the true model-implied policy expectations yEHm;t leads to
biased IRFs of GAP and INF . These IRFs following a shock to ym;t are
substantially weaker than the corresponding ones for the case where yEHm;t is
shocked. This is because the shock to yEHm;t controls for the term premium
component of the long-term yield.
1.6 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that, in the context of a Macro-A¢ ne Term Structure Model,
movements in bond premia may play an important role in the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism. I found that, during the pre-Volcker sample, a large portion of
the movements in ination and economic activity following a monetary policy shock
are due to movements in term premia that feed back into the economy. In the
post-Volcker period, in contrast, this channel of monetary transmission is empiri-
cally irrelevant. I also have shown that in the post-Volcker period, shocks to policy
expectations produce more pronounced and more plausible responses for the macro-
economic variables than do standard shocks to the contemporaneous value of the
monetary policy instrument.
My ndings show that accounting for premia is important not only to under-
standing movements in bond prices, as highlighted by Dai and Singleton (2002),
but also to understanding the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables, such as
ination and output. This rea¢ rms, in the context of a monetary policy trans-
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mission analysis, the crucial role that nancial assets play in the behavior of the
macroeconomy.
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Appendix 1.A Extraction of GAP and INF from a Rich
Dataset
This appendix describes the details behind the estimates of GAP and INF shown in
Section 1.2. Suppose that one wants to extract a common factor from a set of K di¤erent
observed economic indicators fx1;t; :::; xK;tg. Following Stock and Watson (1988), one way
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where Ct is a common factor, i;t for i = 1; :::;K are idiosyncratic factors (one for each




for i = 1; :::;K, and are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other at all lags. Therefore,
each observed economic indicator loads both on the common and on an idiosyncratic
factors.
For simplicity, I assume that both the common and the idiosyncratic factors follow
AR(1) processes, even though more complex lag structures could also be considered. The
common-factor model is estimated via Maximum Likelihood using standard Kalman l-
tering techniques. Details about the economic indicators used to extract GAP and INF
are shown in Table 1.3. Note that the Kalman Filter is particularly convenient in handling
missing observations in the economic indicatorstime series, a feature that occurs often in
my dataset.
Appendix 1.B No-Arbitrage Bond Pricing
This appendix shows how to derive the rst-order di¤erence equations that determine Am
and Bm in equation (1.4). No-arbitrage pricing implies that the price of an m-period






. Start by guessing that the model-
implied Vm;t follows an a¢ ne function of the pricing factors, that is V;t = exp( ~A+ ~BPt).







































Table 1.3: Economic Indicators Used to Construct the Commmon Macro Factors
( 1 ) SERIES USED IN GAP:
long name: short name: series ID: sample: transf.:
(i) Industrial Production Index INPROD INDPRO 58:4 - 07:4 DT
(ii) Total Nonfarm Payrolls PAYROLL PAYEMS 58:4 - 07:4 DT
(iii) Real Personal Consumption PCE PCEC96 59:1 - 07:4 DT
Expenditures
(iv) Real GDP Index GDP GDPC96 58:4 - 07:4 DT
(v) ISM manufacturing index ISM NAPMNOI 58:4 - 07:4 LEV
(New Orders)
(vi) Total Housing Starts HOUST HOUST 59:1 - 07:4 LEV
(vii) Civilian Unemp. Rate URATE UNRATE 58:4 - 07:4 LEV
( 2 ) SERIES USED IN INF:
(i) CPI less food & energy CPI CPILFESL 58:4 - 07:4 QG
(ii) Finished Goods PPI PPI PPILFE 74:2 - 07:4 QG
less food & energy
(iii) PCE Deator PCEDEF PCEPILFE 59:2 - 07:4 QG
less food and energy
(iv) GDP deator GDPDEF GDPDEF 58:4 - 07:4 QG
(v) Average Hourly Earnings EARN AHEMAN 58:4 - 07:4 QG
Notes: The transformations applied to the series are the following: DT = quadratic deterministic trend removed,
QG = series transformed into quarterly growth rates , and N = no transformation applied. All series were
obtained from the St. Louis Fed database. * corresponds to ID codes for the St. Louis Fed database.
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where the third equality uses the properties of the log-normal distribution. It follows that:






~Bm   ~Bm 1 = ~Bm 1Q1P   01
where ~A0 = 0 and ~B0 = 0. The m-period continuously compounded yield, ym;t   Pm;tm ,
is then given by:
ym;t = Am +BmXt
where Am    ~Amm and Bm   
~Bm
m .
Appendix 1.C Details of the Econometric Methodology
Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu (2011) propose a set of normalizations that not only allow
for identication of the model described in Section 1.3.1, but also simplies the task of
nding a global maximum of the likelihood function. More specically, the model with
observable pricing factors has the property that the parameters governing bond pricing,
Q0P ;
Q
1P ; 0; 1







where rQ1 represents the long-run mean of the short rate under Q, and Q is the N -vector
of ordered eigenvalues of Q1P .
The bond portfolios contained in Pt are assumed to be priced perfectly by the model.
The observed yields, except the short-rate (which is included in Pt), are allowed to di¤er





. Note that it is assumed for simplicity that the variance of the measurement
errors is the same across all long-term yields used to t the model.
The likelihood function of the model is then given by
L









ZtjZt 1; P0Z ;P1Z ;Z

where yobst contains the yields observed with measured errors. A convenient feature of
the normalization proposed by Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu (2011) is that the ML estimate
of P0Z and 
P
1Z , that is bP0Z and bP1Z , are obtained by OLS. Conditional on bP1 , an
optimization algorithm searches for the values of rQ1, 
Q, Z , and ! in order to nd the
global maximum of the likelihood function.
Note that the search algorithm in the second stage of the estimation procedure usually
converges very quickly because good starting values are easy to obtain. First, good starting
values for the parameters in Z can be obtained by running an OLS regression of Zt on
Zt 1. Also, good starting values for rQ1 and 
Q are not di¢ cult to obtain because these
parameters are rotation-invariant and therefore carry economic interpretation.
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Appendix 1.D Risk Premium Accounting in the MTSM
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where Zt  [ M 0t P 0t ]0. Note that, di¤erently from the model described in Section 1.3,
here I let all factors, macro and yield-based, be treated as pricing factors (i.e. I do not
impose that the macro factors are unspanned by the yield curve). The case of unspanned




In a risk neutral world, the risk-adjusted (Q) and the actual (P) probability measures
coincide, which implies that bond prices would be given by






Note that this would imply that, up to a convexity term, the EH holds. I follow the
derivations in Appendix 1.B and, also in the risk neutral world, I guess and verify that the
log of bond price is an a¢ ne function of Zt, i.e. V EHm;t = exp( ~A
EH
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m . Finally, dening the term premium at maturity
m, tpm;t, as the deviation of ym;t from m-period yield consistent with the EH, it is easy
to see that









Appendix 1.E Decomposing the Impulse Response Func-
tions
Let the column of
p








follows from the assumption that the short-rate is ordered as the rst bond portfolio and
is below the macro variables in Mt. The impulse response of Zt after h periods since a







34In this paper I am restricting attention to models where the factors, Zt, are markovian. More
general models can be obtained by relaxing this assumption.
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0, eB =  B01 B02 B04    B0200, and B = 0 eB.
Setting the prices of risk to zero, the version of yt that is consistent with the EH is an
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Note that Atp = A AEH and Btp = B  BEH .











where 	y;0 is the impulse response of yt on impact. Moreover, 	y;0 can be decomposed




























and it follows that the impulse response of Zt to a monetary policy shock h periods after

















where 	EHZ;h and 	
tp
Z;h are respectively the EH and the term premium components of the
impulse response to a monetary policy shock.
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Appendix 1.F Identifying Shocks to yEHm;t
To be able to shock monetary policy expectations and term premia, I will rotate Zt 
[ M 0t P 0t ]0 so that the quantities shocked appears explicitly in the rotated state vectoreZt. Let W0 be a 3+N  1 vector and W1 be an invertible 3+N  3+N matrix such that
eZt W0 +W1Zt
i.e. W0 and W1 rotate Zt linearly. If, for example one wants to rotate Zt  [ M 0t P 0t ]0
in order to obtain eZt = [ GAPt INFt COMMt rt yEHm;t tpm;t ]0, the choices of W0
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where B(i)m is the ith entry in the vector Bm and B
tp
m  [0 Bm]   BEHm with Btp(i)m being
the ith entry in Btpm.
Using the eZt denition, equation (1.3) in the text can be written in terms of the rotated
state vector eZt:
W 11
 eZt  W0 = P0Z + hP1Z + IiW 11  eZt 1  W0+pZPzt
,eZt = eP0Z + eP1Z eZt 1 + W1pZ Pzt
where eP0Z =W1  P0Z  P1ZW 11 W0 and eP1Z =W1  P1Z + IW 11 . A recursive identi-
cation of the shocks that hit the rotated state vector can therefore be obtained by taking
the Cholesky decomposition of the variance of the rotated residuals W1ZW 01. Moreover,
the dynamics following the shock can be obtained through the rotated matrices of VAR
coe¢ cients, namely eP0Z and eP1Z .
2 SwitchingMonetary Policy Regimes and
the Nominal Term Structure
2.1 Introduction
The U.S. nominal yield curve on average has been steeper since the mid-1980s than
during the Great Ination of the 1970s. This is puzzling because, in general, the
average slope of the yield curve is thought to reect risk premia demanded by bond
investors. Therefore, in periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty such as the
Great Ination, in principle one should expect bonds to pay higher premia that is,
term premia than they would from the mid-1980s until 2007 when macroeconomic
uncertainty had reached historically low levels (the Great Moderation). I refer
to this apparently inconsistent relation between the yield curves slope and macro-
economic uncertainty as the Slope-Volatility Puzzle. In this chapter, I propose a
theory that is based on switching macroeconomic regimes to explain this puzzle.
In the proposed framework, investors incorporate the possibility that the econ-
omy switches across di¤erent regimes into their beliefs. In particular, if the nominal
short-rate uctuates around di¤erent means across regimes, then the average slope
of the yield curve in general will reect not only the standard term premium, but
also a new term attributable to the Expectations Hypothesis in the presence of
regime shifts. I call this level risk, and it reects the risk that, conditional on the
economy being in a low short-rate regime, long-term bonds will lose value in the
case of a shift to higher short-rate regimes. The level risk will be positive in this
case. Similarly, a negative level risk occurs when the short-rate is currently high and
there is a possibility of switching to low short-rate regimes, which represents gains
for bond holders.
I estimate the level risk during the post-World War II period using a simple
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Markov-Switching Vector Autoregression of the U.S. economy. This model identi-
es a high macroeconomic volatility regime that corresponds broadly to the Great
Ination of the 1970s. This regime is also characterized by a high average short-
rate (and high ination) and is not very persistent, with an average duration of
only 7.7 years. On the other hand, the Great Moderation period appears in the
model as the realization of a highly persistent regime (average duration of almost 35
years) associated with low macroeconomic volatility and a low average short-rate. If
investors form beliefs according to this model, then the level risk was large and neg-
ative during the Great Ination. Intuitively, because agents perceived this regime
as relatively short-lived, there was as high probability that the short-rate would
switch to lower levels in the future, causing nominal bonds to gain value. Since
the mid-1980s, in contrast, the level risk has been more moderate in magnitude and
positive. In this case, investors ascribed a relatively low probability to a switch back
to the high short-rate regime of the 1970s, which would have caused nominal bonds
to lose value. Extracting the estimated level risks from observed yield curve slope
measures, I nd that term premia on average were substantially higher during the
Great Ination of the 1970s than they have been since the mid-1980s. Therefore,
my rst main conclusion in this chapter is that the Slope-Volatility Puzzle can be
explained by di¤erences in level risks across regimes.
One important implication of the level risk is that term structure models that
do not allow for Markov-Switching regimes tend to generate biased estimates of
term premia. In other words, if agents consider the possibility of regime shifts when
forming expectations, then models that do not take this into account will have the
term premium explain too much of the yield curves slope. Because the level risk
operates exclusively through investors expectations, this bias will appear even if the
term structure model is tted to particular subsamples of the data that correspond
to a single economic regime.
Next I ask: what fundamental macroeconomic changes could reproduce the
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Slope-Volatility Puzzle? My answer is based on a simple Markov-Switching dy-
namic general equilibrium model, calibrated to replicate the U.S. economy. Fol-
lowing Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and many
others, I assume that monetary policy switches between a regime where the central
bank accommodates ination pressures (passive policy) and a regime where the cen-
tral bank ghts these pressures in a proactive manner (active policy). What sets
this model apart from standard ones is that here, as in Davig and Leeper (2007),
agents incorporate into their expectations the possibility of regime switches. In this
model, agents acquire di¤erent levels of precautionary savings depending on the cur-
rent policy regime. As a result, the average short-term interest rate di¤ers across
regimes, giving rise to potentially sizeable level risks over the yield curve.
Under my calibration, households hold more precautionary savings when the
passive regime occurs. The intuition behind this is that consumption growth is
more volatile in the passive than in the active regime; therefore, risk averse agents
will want to hold more "insurance" when the passive regime realizes. Thus, the
nominal short-rate in the passive policy regime is higher than in the active regime,
giving rise to level risks. In the passive regime, level risks are large and negative
as I estimated for the Great Ination regime. In the active regime, level risks are
moderate and positive, replicating my estimate for the post-1985 period. Therefore,
my second main conclusion in this chapter is that a general equilibrium model with a
Markov-Switching monetary policy rule is capable of explaining the Slope-Volatility
Puzzle.
Many economists, including Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006, 2010), Wright
(2008), and Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2010), have highlighted gains from the
adoption of an explicit ination targeting framework. Under this policy arrange-
ment, improved communication between the central bank and the public would
reduce uncertainty about the particular way that the monetary authority will deal
with inationary pressures. This can be rationalized in the context of the model
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I present here. All else constant, agents would perceive a change from the active
towards the passive regime as less likely under explicit ination targeting than if
the central bank did not adopt this framework. According to the model, increas-
ing the persistence of the active regime on average attens the yield curve in that
regime, because both level risks and term premia fall. Using the Wright (2008) in-
ternational dataset, I show that this prediction of the model is corroborated by the
data. That is, measures of average yield curve slope in developed economies that
adopted explicit ination targeting are systematically lower than in economies that
did not adopt such a framework. I interpret this as additional evidence supporting
the model with a Markov-Switching monetary policy rule.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 includes a brief review of the
literature. Section 2.3 documents the Slope-Volatility puzzle. Section 2.4 describes
how allowing for a regime switching approach gives rise to the level risk. Section
2.5 provides level risk estimates for the United States which are shown to explain
the Slope-Volatility Puzzle. In Section 2.6, the general equilibrium term-structure
model with a Markov-Switching monetary policy rule is presented and shown to
replicate the main features of this puzzle. I also show that the model replicates the
yield curve evidence from ination targeting countries. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
In this chapter, I focus on how level risks on average a¤ect the nominal U.S. yield
curve. Level risks naturally emerge from the Expectations Hypothesis component
of the term structure, once the short-rate is modelled as a Markov-Switching (MS)
process. This insight draws on two important earlier contributions.
Hamilton (1988) pioneered in studying term structure behavior when the short
rate follows a simple autoregressive MS process. He found that when regime shifts
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were incorporated into agentsbeliefs, violations of the Expectations Hypothesis of
the term structure were less severe than in single regime models. Bekaert, Hodrick,
and Marshall (2001) proposed the peso problem theory which I also draw on. They
noted that violations of the Expectations Hypothesis in the United States, to a
large extent, are due to a peso problemwhich is associated with the short-rate
process: observed long-term yields in the United States largely can be reconciled
with short-rate behavior if investorsbeliefs allow for short-rate levels not observed
ex-post in the data. This theory can be formalized by rst assuming a reduced-form
MS process for the short rate and then letting long-term bonds be priced by rational
agents who form beliefs taking this MS process into account.
Both Hamilton (1988) and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (2001) focus on
reduced-form short-rate processes, but I go one step further here and, in a no-
arbitrage general equilibrium framework, relate the behavior of short- and long-term
nominal yields in the United States to macro factors. In a structural micro-founded
framework, I claim that changes in monetary policy regimes can explain observed
changes in key U.S. macro and term structure moments over time.
There is substantial reduced-form empirical evidence in the literature showing
that changes in monetary policy did a¤ect the behavior of the U.S. term structure
(and the macroeconomy) over time35. For example, Bikbov and Chernov (2008)
have shown that the information contained in the nominal term structure can be
crucial in identifying regimes in which the Fed adopted an active or passive stance
for ination. Similarly, in the context of identied time-varying VARs with no-
arbitrage bond prices, both Ang, Boivin, Dong, and Loo-Kung (2009) and Mumtaz
and Surico (2009) nd evidence of large movements in the Feds response to ination
35The literature on term-structure models with only yield-related factors also provides ample
support for the view that the stochastic behavior of the U.S. yield curve has varied over the past
decades. See, for example, the latent-factors, regime-shifting, no-arbitrage frameworks of Bansal
and Zhou (2002) and Dai, Singleton, and Yang (2007). Without relying on no-arbitrage restrictions,
Ang and Bekaert (2002) show that regime shifts in the nominal term structure are present in the
US, UK and Germany datasets. Evidence of regime shifts in real term structures in the US and
the UK respectively also has been provided by Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008) and Evans (2003).
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over the last six decades. Bianchi, Mumtaz, and Surico (2009) nd evidence for
the United Kingdom that monetary policy shocks contributed signicantly more to
the variability of key macro and term structure time series before than after the
adoption of ination targeting36. My contribution to this strand of the literature is
a structural, micro-founded no-arbitrage approach to modelling the term structure
in the presence of monetary policy shifts.
Interestingly, my proposed level-risk theory is related to the peso problem (or
rare disaster) as suggested by both Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) in the context of
the equity premium puzzle. In their formulation, equity becomes very risky because
there is a small probability in every period of a sudden and very sharp drop in the
economys productive capacity. In my case, a change from an active to a passive
monetary policy regime, where holding nominal bonds involves signicantly more
risk, could be seen as a rare disaster by bond traders. As in Bansal and Yaron (2004),
I also show that when shifts to a passive monetary policy regime are possible, the
amount of long-run risk in the economy during the active regime is substantially
higher than in a single active regime model.
The available literature on MS Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (MS-
DSGE) models, including Davig and Leeper (2007), Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
(2007), Davig and Doh (2008), Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) and Liu and Mum-
taz (2010), relies on linear approximations to the true model solution, which by
construction rule out precautionary savings and premia in nancial assets. Amisano
and Tristani (2010a,b) considered non-linear solutions to MS-DSGE models with
MS shocksvolatilities, but their method does not allow for changes in the Feds re-
sponse to inationary pressures. I also contribute to this branch of the literature by
36The existence of shifts in the U.S. monetary policy regime are supported by a well-known
macro literature that tries to identify the main reason behind the Great Moderation of the post
mid-1980s. See, for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and
Boivin and Giannoni (2006). Romer and Romer (2004) also produce compelling narrative evidence
of changes in the Feds monetary policy conduct during the 20th century. For other explanations
for the Great Moderation, see for example, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Primiceri (2005),
Sims and Zha (2006), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
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o¤ering a non-linear perturbation solution method to the standard New-Keynesian
model with a Markov-Switching monetary policy rule37.
2.3 The Slope-Volatility Puzzle
I now document the Slope-Volatility Puzzle. In the following subsection I derive
results from the no-arbitrage theory linking the slope of the nominal yield curve to
the underlying level of uncertainty in the economy. I then go on to show that these
theoretical predictions are at odds with the U.S. data.
2.3.1 The Slope of the Yield Curve and Macroeconomic Uncertainty
Consider a long-term nominal bond that costs B;t at time t and promises to repay
the investor one dollar in t +  (throughout this chapter, I assume that bonds
are zero-coupon and default-free). The continuously compounded  -period yield to
maturity is dened as i;t    1 logB;t. The economys short-term nominal interest
rate is given by it  i1;t. Following Dai and Singleton (2002) and letting Et be
the expectations operator conditional on date t information, I dene the  -period
nominal term premium as NTP;t  i;t   1
P 1
j=0 Et [it+j]. This measure captures
the deviations of i;t from the pure expectations hypothesis and is positive when it
is riskier to invest in the long-term bond than to invest in a sequence of short-term
bonds for  periods.
Rearranging the term premium denition, it follows that the  -period yield curve
37Chib, Kang, and Ramamurthy (2011) estimate a MS-DSGE model for the US nominal term
structure. Their solution method relies on the linear/log-normal approach of Bekaert, Cho, and
Moreno (2010), which assumes that the short-rate is not a¤ected by precautionary savings e¤ects
(i.e. the average short rate is the same across regimes). As a result, their solution method by
construction rules out the existence of level risks along the yield curve.
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slope, i;t   it, can be written as38









I call the term in parentheses in equation (2.1) the expectations hypothesis (EH)
component of the slope. If the nominal term premium remains constant, then when-
ever investors revise their short-rate forecasts up (down), the EH component of the
slope increases (decreases). Similarly, if the EH component remains unchanged, then
an increase (decrease) in the nominal term premium increases (decreases) the slope.
The term premium denition can be used to gain some insights about the deter-
minants of the yield curve slope in the long run. Taking unconditional expectations
on both sides of equation (2.1), I obtain




(E [it+j]  E [it]) + E [NTP;t]
because of the law of iterated expectations. From the assumption that the short rate
follows a covariance-stationary process it follows that
P 1
j=0 (E [it+j]  E [it]) = 0 8j.
Intuitively, when calculating the mean, periods where the short rate is expected to
increase will cancel out those where the short rate is expected to decrease, and the
EH component of the slope is equal to zero on average. As a result E [i;t   it] =
E [NTP;t], which means that if the nominal yield curve is unconditionally posi-
tively sloped, it is because the term premium is positive on average. Therefore, to
understand why yield curves in general are positively slopped, it is important to
understand the determinants of the term premium.
38This slope denition sometimes has been refered to in the literature as term spread, but is
not to be confused with the term premium.
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where Mt;t+1 and t;t+1 are the real stochastic discount factor (SDF) and the ina-
tion rate between periods t and t+1. All else constant, an increase in the expected
rate of ination will reduce the price of the bond today because its expected resale
value, measured in real terms, falls.
Taking a second-order expansion of the Euler condition above around the deter-
ministic steady state, the nominal term premium is given by39









Et fCovt+j [bmt+j;t+j+1; bt+j;t+j+1]g!
where for any variable Xt with steady state X dene bxt  log  Xt=X, while Covt
represents the conditional covariance operator. Therefore, the nominal term pre-
mium can be separated into three parts. The rst corresponds to the  -period real
term premium. This is dened as RTP;t  r;t   1
P 1
j=0 Et [rt+j], where r;t is the
yield to maturity on a  -period ination indexed bond40 and rt is the real short-rate.
The real term premium captures deviations of the long-term real yield from the EH
which, as shown in Appendix 2.A, depends only on the autocorrelation structure of
the SDF41. The second component of NTP;t, Convexity;t, represents an ination
convexity term that in practice is not very relevant.
The third component appearing in parenthesis in equation (2.3) is what I focus
39The following expression holds exactly if SDF and ination are jointly log-normally distributed.
Detailed derivations can be found in Appendix 2.A.
40Ination indexation is assumed to be perfect.
41There is evidence that the real term premium over the US term structure is close to zero or
slightly negative. Compared to premia related to ination, however, real premia are thought to be
quantitatively less relevant. See Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) and
Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008).
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on. This term corresponds to compensation for ination risk. Its rst part is positive
when ination from t until maturity co-varies positively with the investors SDF. In
this case, nominal bonds lose value exactly when wealth is most important to the
investor. The second component of the ination premium measures the (average ex-
pected) one-period-ahead ination co-variability risk. Because ination uncertainty
is relatively low in such a short horizon, the rst part of the ination premium tends
to dominate.
I use these results to relate the term premium to the underlying level of uncer-
tainty in the economy. The dominant part of the ination premium in equation
(2.3) can be rewritten as
1

Covt [bmt;t+ ; bt;t+ ] = 1

Corrt [bmt;t+ ; bt;t+ ] (V art [bmt;t+ ]V art [bt;t+ ])1=2 (2.4)
where V art and Corrt are the conditional variance and correlation coe¢ cient. The
square root term on the right hand side of this equation represents the product of the
ex-ante volatilities of ination and the SDF. If the conditional correlation between
the SDF and ination is positive (i.e. if the ination premium is positive) and
relatively constant over time, then periods associated with higher levels of ination
uncertainty will also be associated with higher ination compensations and higher
term premia. Intuitively, when ination uncertainty is high, the future payo¤s from
investing in long-term nominal bonds are very uncertain if evaluated in real terms.
As a result, investors will demand higher premia to hold long-term nominal bonds
than when uncertainty is low.
Equation (2.4) also reveals that, in addition to ination uncertainty, real uncer-
tainty matters for term premia. To see this, note that macro models usually have
the SDF be a function of real variables, such as consumption, hours worked, etc.
Therefore, an increase in the level of uncertainty surrounding these real variables will
increase the ex-ante volatility of the SDF, which in turn will have an impact on the
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nominal term premium through its ination compensation component42. Intuitively,
the investor cares about how the real payo¤ from investing in the long-term bond
co-varies with his future path of consumption. If consumption becomes more di¢ -
cult to predict, then investors will perceive long-term bonds as riskier and demand
higher premia.
2.3.2 Evidence for the US
From the discussion above follows that periods characterized by high levels of macro-
economic uncertainty should be associated with higher term premia than periods of
low uncertainty. Accordingly, di¤erences in average term premia across periods are
entirely reected in the yield curve slope (provided that there are enough observa-
tion from each period)43. Do these theoretical predictions hold for the post-World
War II U.S. data?
To address that question, I construct slope measures using the 5 and 10-year
zero-coupon nominal yields from the CRSP Fama-Bliss and the Gurkaynak, Sack,
and Wright (2007) databases44. To measure the short-rate I use the 3-month T-Bill
returns taken from the CRSP Fama riskfree rate le. All of the series are arranged
at a quarterly frequency, and the sample goes from 1952:2 to 2008:4. Interest rates
42The real term premium component of NTP t may also respond to the increase in real uncer-
tainty. See Appendix 2.A.
43In Section 2.3.1 I characterized the relation between the slope of the yield curve and macro-
economic volatility in terms of unconditional moments, resulting in E [i;t   it] = E [NTP;t].
Although applying unconditional moments simplies the exposition, it fails to agree precisely with
my empirical analysis, which is interested in the co-movements between the slope and macro volatil-
ity across di¤erent subsamples of the U.S. data. A more appropriate characterization would then
be the following. Assume that the economy switches across di¤erent regimes over time, and yet
private agents believe the current regime to last indenitely. This is the implicit assumption in a
great number of papers in the macro literature, such as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Smets
and Wouters (2007). It then follows that E [i;t   it=st] = E [NTP;t=st], that is the slope and
term premium are on average equal conditional on each regime st. Section 2.4 shows that this
equality is not true once agents incorporate the possibility of regime shifts into their beliefs, which
will help to explain the Slope-Volatility Puzzle.
44Although the Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) database also contains the 5-year zero-
coupon yield, it only starts in 1961. The CRSP Fama-Bliss le starts in 1952, but does not contain
the 10-year maturity.
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are continuously compounded, expressed in annualized terms, and observed on the
last working day of each quarter.
The measures of macroeconomic uncertainty that I focus on are based on real
consumption growth and ination. The former is measured by the quarterly growth
in the Real Personal Consumption Expenditures index (PCE); the latter is measured
by the quarterly growth in the core PCE deator45. All growth rates are contin-
uously compounded and multiplied by 400 to be expressed in percent per annum.
Consumption growth is intended as a proxy for the unobservable SDF.
Because bond prices are fully forward looking, ination and consumption uncer-
tainty must be quantied according to an ex-ante concept (only using information
up to t to measure uncertainty from period t + 1 onwards). Therefore I estimate
univariate GARCH processes for the ination and consumption growth series over
the 1952:2-2008:4 sample, and then measure uncertainty by the GARCH-based one-
quarter-ahead forecast for the conditional variance46.
The 5- and 10-year slope measures, together with the conditional variance fore-
casts for ination and consumption growth, are shown in Figure 2.1. The vertical
dashed lines in this gure identify subperiods of the U.S. sample where, according to
Romer and Romer (2004), the Fed followed di¤erent monetary policy regimes. Each
subsample is identied with the names of the Federal Reserve chairmen in o¢ ce at
the time47. I abandon these pre-specied subsamples in Section 2.5 and use more
45Consumption growth is measured by the quarterly change in the real PCE index (series code:
PCECC96). For ination I use the PCE deator excluding food and energyobtained from the
St. Louis Fed webpage (series code: JCXSE). For the latter, the observations from 1952 until 1959
were estimated using the CPI excluding food and energyand the PCE deator all items(series
codes: CPILFESL and PCECTPI) and applying the principal components method suggested by
Walczak and Massart (2001).
46The conditional mean of ination and consumption growth are modelled respectively as an
AR(2) and an ARMA(1,4) process. For both series the best tting model for the conditional
variance was a GARCH (1,1).
47Romer and Romer (2004) view monetary policy in the years where Paul Volcker and Alan
Greenspan were Federal Reserve chairmen as based on the same principles. Here, I separate
the Volcker era from the subsequent one, because the general macroeconomic environment in the
two periods was substantially di¤erent. In particular, while Volcker inherited an ambience of
high/volatile ination where credibility in monetary policy was very weak (see Goodfriend and
King (2005)), the same is not true for Greenspan.
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rigorous statistical methods to identify the U.S. regimes.
The two bottom charts in Figure 2.1 show a well-known stylized fact in the macro
literature: from the mid-1980s until 2007, a period that corresponds roughly to my
Greenspan / Bernanke subsample, the levels of macroeconomic uncertainty (in this
case ination and consumption growth uncertainty) were historically low. This is
referred to in the literature as the Great Moderation48, and usually is portrayed in
terms of ex-post measures of uncertainty, such as the realized standard deviation
of key macro time series. Figure 2.1 makes a similar point but uses GARCH-based
volatilities which, as discussed before, better capture the level of ex-ante uncertainty
faced by forward looking bond traders.
The subsamples depicted in Figure 2.1 can be interpreted as di¤erent regimes
characterized by di¤erent levels of macroeconomic uncertainty. The Greenspan /
Bernanke subsample might be viewed as a low uncertainty state, whereas the Burns
/ Miller and the Volcker subsamples can be seen as high uncertainty regimes. This
classication is in line with the more rigorous estimates shown in Section 2.5. Ac-
cording to the theory developed in subsection 2.3.1, term premia and consequently
yield curve slope measures in principle should reect the underlying level of macro
uncertainty. Following this logic, the yield curve slope on average should be atter
in the Greenspan / Bernanke subsample than in the Burns / Miller and Volcker
subsamples.
As the top chart in Figure 2.1 shows, this does not hold in the data. During the
Greenspan / Bernanke years, both the 5 and 10-year slope measures on average seem
higher than in all three previous subsamples. If the theory above is correct, then
these slope measures tell us that investing in nominal bonds during the Greenspan /
Bernanke period is riskier than in all previous subsamples. However, this is di¢ cult
to reconcile with the low levels of macroeconomic uncertainty that characterize this
48See Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). In addition, Stock and
Watson (2002) conduct a detailed review of the literature and present some new evidence.
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Martin Burns/Miller Volcker Greenspan/Bernanke
%
year
Notes: GARCH () and GARCH (c) are the one-quarter-ahead forecasts of the conditional variance of ination
() and consumption growth (c), estimated through univariate GARCH(1,1) processes. The conditional means
of ination and consumption growth are modelled respectively as an AR(2) and an ARMA(1,4). The two yield
curve slope measures are expressed in percent per annum.
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subsample.
This point is reinforced in Table 2.1, which displays in more detail certain proper-
ties of the slope, ination, and consumption growth time series across the previously
dened subsamples. The rst two lines of this table show the average 5 and 10-year
slope measures in each subsample, together with their associated standard errors.
Two alternative measures of ex-post uncertainty are shown in lines three through
six. These can be compared to the ex-ante GARCH-based measures for the sake of
robustness. In particular, the third line displays the realized standard deviation of
ination, whereas lines four through six display the root mean squared forecast error
(RMSFE) of ination at three di¤erent horizons, based on a simple random-walk
model49. The same measures of uncertainty for the case of consumption growth
are shown in lines seven to ten. Finally, the last line shows the contemporaneous
correlation coe¢ cient between consumption growth and ination.
Note that the 10-year slope on average is 179 basis points during the Greenspan
/ Bernanke period, the highest across all subsamples. At the same time, all ex-post
measures of ination and consumption growth uncertainty are unambiguously lower
in this period than in all other subsamples.
I can now formulate the main stylized fact that motivates the remainder of this
chapter:
 The Slope-Volatility Puzzle:
Although the ination and consumption-based uncertainty measures suggest
that the Greenspan / Bernanke subsample is the least risky for investors hold-
ing long-term nominal bonds, the nominal yield curve on average is steeper
during that period than in the Martin, Burns / Miller and Volcker subsamples.
49The RMSFE we report are based on Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Stock and Watson
(2007). To be more precise, let t be the annualized quarterly ination rate at time t. To com-







= 14 (t + :::+ t 3). An equivalent methodology is used for consumption
growth.
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Table 2.1: The Slope-Volatility Puzzle
Martin Burns / Volcker Bernanke /
Miller Greenspan
(52:2-69:4) (70:1-79:2) (79:3-87:2) (87:3-08:4)
E(i5Y   i) 0:61 0:93 1:10 1:19
(0:06) (0:21) (0:31) (0:13)
E(i10Y   i) 0:51y 1:09 1:32 1:79
(0:11) (0:25) (0:35) (0:18)
SD() 1:23 2:00 2:16 1:01
RMSFE () h = 4 0:75 1:88 1:11 0:48
h = 8 0:83 2:10 1:40 0:48
h = 12 0:93 2:04 1:67 0:55
SD(c) 3:26 3:30 3:50 2:10
RMSFE (c) h = 4 3:10 3:16 2:26 1:49
h = 8 2:54 3:39 2:15 1:55
h = 12 2:31 3:10 2:37 1:62
Corr (c; )  0:25  0:51  0:46  0:17
Notes: The measures of average slope are expressed in percent per annum and the values in parenthesis are
Newey-West HAC consistent standard errors, calculated using monthly slope series. SD(c) and ination SD()
are the standard deviation of consumption growth (c) and ination (), also expressed in percent per annum.
RMSFE () and RMSFE (c) are the random-walk-based, root mean squared forecast errors h periods ahead for
consumption growth and ination. Corr(,c) is the contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cient between ination
and consumption. y sample starts in 1961:2.
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Returning to equation (2.4), one possible explanation for the puzzle is that
Corrt [bmt;t+ ; bt;t+ ] on average is su¢ ciently higher during the Greenspan / Bernanke
subsample than in the previous ones. An increase in this correlation coe¢ cient might
o¤set the drop in ensuing uncertainty as the economy moves from the Volcker to the
Greenspan / Bernanke periods. To rule out this possibility, the last line of Table
2.1 reports the realized contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cient between ination
and consumption growth across all subsamples. This measure is a proxy for the
unobserved conditional correlation in equation (2.4). Because the SDF is negatively
related to consumption growth in most economic models, the correlation coe¢ cient
being negative in all subsamples is consistent with positive term premia. Note that
the absolute value of the correlation coe¢ cient changes across subsamples in the
same direction as changes in uncertainty. This suggests that movements in the cor-
relation coe¢ cient across subsamples reinforce the puzzle, rather than helping to
explain it.
2.4 The Level Risk
This section puts forth a theoretical approach that potentially can explain the Slope-
Volatility Puzzle. It hinges on the assumption that, over time, the economy switches
across di¤erent macroeconomic regimes characterized by di¤erent short-rate levels.
By letting investors explicitly incorporate into their beliefs the possibility of regime
shifts, I show that this assumption has important implications for the EH component
of the yield curve slope.
Section 2.4.1 begins by assuming, for simplicity, that regimes evolve according
to an exogenous Markov chain. Section 2.4.2 then incorporates the MS process
into investorsbeliefs. Conditional on a given regime, I show that in general the
mean slope and term premium are not equal. The wedge between the two is what
I call level risk: that is, the risk of a level shift in the short-rate process in case
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the economy switches to a new regime. I conclude by showing that the level risk
potentially can explain the Slope-Volatility Puzzle.
2.4.1 A Simple Markov-Switching Environment
Suppose that the short-rate, it, follows a regime-switching process. In particular, I
assume that:
 Assumption (1) Markov-Switching Environment:
The short-rate it follows a Markov-Switching process with two possible states:
st 2 f1; 2g. Regimes evolve according to an exogenous Markov Chain with
constant regime-switching probabilities arranged in the 2  2 matrix P . The
element in the ith row and jth column of P represents Pr (st+1 = j=st = i) 
pij for i; j 2 f1; 2g. Accordingly, each line of P must sum to one. The
regime-switching probabilities are known to all agents, who are also assumed
to observe the realization of st in the beginning of period t. 50
Assumption (1) implies that the short rate follows a potentially di¤erent dy-
namic, conditional on each regime. Particularly important for the results below,
the short rate may uctuate around di¤erent means across regimes. The assump-
tions that the Markov Chain is exogenous and features a constant transition matrix
are made in order to simplify the derivations below. Additionally, I focus on the
2-regime case for expositional purposes; generalizations for an arbitrary number of
regimes are simple to obtain.
I further assume that:
50This is di¤erent from empirical applications of the Hamilton (1989) lter, where agents use the
available information to lter out the probability of being in each regime. See Hamilton (1993).
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 Assumption (2) Past State Dependence:
The MS process for the short-rate is covariance-stationary in each regime and
has the following property:
E [it=St] = E [it=st] for t = 1; 2; 3; :::
where St  fs0; s1; :::; stg corresponds to the history of regimes realized up to
period t  1.
Assumption (2) means that the average level of the short rate depends only
on the current regime, not on regimes realized in previous periods. The intuition
is: if, for example, regime shifts imply changes of chairman of the Fed, then the
average short-rate level chosen by a new chairman does not depend on the economic
dynamics during previous regimes. Although this assumption is debatable, I adopt
it on the grounds that it greatly simplies the derivations that follow. Additionally,
this assumption arises naturally as a property of the reduced form of the model
which I analyze in Section 2.6. 51
2.4.2 Accounting for Markov-Switching Probabilities in AgentsBeliefs
Given the proposed MS environment, I now compute the average yield curve slope,
conditional on each regime. Let 
t represent the complete information set available
to investors in period t, which summarizes all aspects of history that are relevant
to the economys future evolution, including st. To build the intuition, I start by
considering the 2-period slope and later generalize for the slope at the  -period
horizon. In case  equals 2, taking expectations on both sides of equation (2.1),
51See equation (2.17).
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conditional on st = s, yields:
E [i2;t   it=st = s] = E [it=st = s] + E [E [it+1=
t] =st = s]
2
  E [it=st = s]
+E [NTP2;t=st = s]
for s = 1; 2. Since st is contained in 
t, the law of iterated expectations implies
that:
E [E [it+1=
t] =st = s] = E [it+1=st = s]
= ps1E [it+1=st = s; st+1 = 1] + ps2E [it+1=st = s; st+1 = 2]
where the second equality uses the probabilities contained in P to parameterize
expectations so that regime switches are taken into account explicitly. Combining
the last two equations and using the Assumption (2) above52 yields:
E [i2;t   it=st = s] = E [NTP2;t=st = s] (2.5)
+

ps1E [it+1=st+1 = 1] + ps2E [it+1=st+1 = 2]  E [it=st = s]
2

for s 2 f1; 2g. Therefore, unlike the case analyzed in Section 2.3.1, once investors
beliefs incorporate the regime-switching probabilities, the mean slope conditional on
regime s in general is not equal to the mean term premium in that particular regime.
Instead, it is equal to the mean term premium plus the expression in parentheses in
equation (2.5). This new term arises from the EH component of the slope denition
in equation (2.1). Unlike the case analyzed in Section 2.3.1, conditional on a given
regime, the EH component now does not cancel out in expectations. Intuitively, the
new term takes into account the risk that the average level of the short-rate process
switches due to a regime change. I refer to the expression in parentheses in equation
(2.5) as thelevel risk.
52See Appendix 2.C for the case where Assumption 2 is dropped.
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For a short-rate process that is covariance-stationary in each regime, it is easy
to show that equation (2.5) can be written more compactly as:
E [i2;t   it=st = 1] = (1  p11)DsE [it=st]
2
+ E [NTP2;t=st = 1] (2.6)
E [i2;t   it=st = 2] =   (1  p22)DsE [it=st]
2
+ E [NTP2;t=st = 2] (2.7)
where DsE [it=st] is dened as the average short-rate di¤erential across regimes,
i.e. DsE [it=st]  E [it=st = 2]   E [it=st = 1]. Without loss of generality, let
E [it=st = 2]  E [it=st = 1], which implies that DsE [it=st] is non-negative. It fol-
lows that, because p11; p22 2 [0; 1], the level risk is non-negative in the low-average
short-rate regime 1 and non-positive in the high-average short-rate regime 2. In-
tuitively, conditional on the economy being in regime 1, the possibility of future
regime changes introduces a risk of increase in the average short-rate level, which
would in turn reduce bond prices. Conditional on regime 2, the opposite would be
true: regime switches would represent a risk of reduction in the average level of the
short rate, which would increase bond prices. If p11 increases, everything else being
constant, then the level risk associated with regime 1 falls, because switching from
regime 1 becomes less likely. Similarly, the level risk associated with regime 2 falls
in absolute value as p22 increases.
Note that only in two particular cases does the level risk equal zero. First, if
E [it=st = 2] = E [it=st = 1], then switching regimes implies no change in the average
level of the short rate. As a result level risks are zero in each regime. Also, if investors
believe regime s 2 f1; 2g to be an absorbing state, that is if pss = 1, then the level
risk conditional on this regime is zero: once regime s is reached, investors perceive
it as lasting indenitely; consequently, further regime shifts are not considered when
investors form beliefs about the future.
Generalizing equations (2.6) and (2.7) for  > 2 is simple. Following Hamilton
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(1994), the probability that an observation of regime i will be followed k periods
ahead by an observation of regime j, that is Pr (st+k = j=st = i), is the element






generalizations of equations (2.6) and (2.7) for the case   2 are then:













DsE [it=st] + E [NTP t =st = 1]
(2.8)













DsE [it=st] + E [NTP t =st = 2] .
(2.9)
It can be shown that as  !1, the factors multiplying the interest rate di¤erential
DsE [it=st] in equations (2.8) and (2.9) converge to 1  perg and  perg respectively,
where perg is the ergodic probability associated with regime 1 (and the one associated
with regime 2 is 1   perg). In case p11 = p22 < 1, the ergodic probability of the
Markov-Chain is perg = 0:5, which implies that in the limit, where  ! 1, half of
the interest rate gap DsE [it=st] is reected in the average slope in each regime. For
example, for an interest rate di¤erential of 4% across the two regimes, in the limit
as  ! 1 the level risk in regimes 1 and 2 will be sizeable namely 2% and -2%
respectively.
Is the level risk quantitatively relevant for values of  far form the limit? Figure
2.2 plots on the vertical axis the factors multiplying the interest rate di¤erential
DsE [it=st] in equations (2.8) and (2.9) against the slope horizon  on the horizontal
axis. Each full line corresponds to factors associated with equation (2.8) for a
particular choice of the regime-switching probabilities. The dashed lines show the
same, but in case of equation (2.9). Figure 2.2 displays only the case where p11 = p22,
which implies that the level risk associated with regime 2 is the mirror image of that
associated with regime 1. For example, the line labeled p11 = p22 = 0:90 says
that, at the 5-year horizon (i.e.  = 20), slightly less than 40% of the interest rate
di¤erential DsE [it=st] is going to be reected in the average slope conditional on
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p 11 = p 22 = .99
p 11 = p 22 = .975
p 11 = p 22 = .90
p 11 = p 22 = .5
p 11 = p 22 = .99
p 11 = p 22 = .975
p 11 = p 22 = .90
p 11 = p 22 = .5
Notes: Each full line corresponds to the factors multiplying the mean interest rate gap from equation (2.8) as a
function of  for a di¤erent choice of regime-switching probabilities. The dashed lines represent the same for
equation (2.9).
regime 1. The dashed line shows that the same quantity, but with a negative sign,
appears in the slope conditional on regime 2.
Note that the level risk increases in absolute value as the slope horizon increases.
Intuitively, the probability of a regime switch happening during the life of the long-
term bond considered in the slope measure increases in  . Additionally, as the
probability of remaining in the same regime gets closer and closer to one, the level
risk takes longer to reach its limiting value as  ! 1. As a result, it becomes
quantitatively less relevant for values of  far from the limit. However, even for the
case where p11 = p22 = 0:99, the magnitude of the level risk at the 10-year horizon
corresponds to a sizeable 15% of the mean interest rate di¤erential across regimes.
One important implication of the level risk is that, when the true data-generating
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process displays regime switches, term structure models that do not allow for MS
regimes probably will generate biased term premia estimates. In other words, if in
reality agents consider the possibility of regime shifts when forming expectations,
then models that do not take this into account will tend to force the term premium
to explain too much of the cross section of yields. I emphasize that, because the level
risk operates exclusively through investors expectations, this bias appears even if
the term structure model is tted to particular subsamples of the data that correspond
to a single economic regime. Consider, for example, the case where a researcher tries
to t a model that does not allow for regime switches to a particular subsample of
the data encompassing a regime characterized by a relatively low short rate. If this
regime is not an absorbing state, then the existence of a positive level risk implies
that term premia estimates based on this model could be biased upwards.
To conclude, let me return to Figure 2.1. Can the level risk help to explain the
Slope-Volatility Puzzle? In principle the answer is yes. When agents incorporate
the MS short-rate process into their beliefs, the average slope in each subsample
depicted in this gure may represent a combination of term premium and level risk.
If, for example, there was a negative level risk during the Burns / Miller and Volcker
subsamples and a positive level risk in the Greenspan / Bernanke years, then the
puzzle potentially could be resolved. For this to be true, the mean short-rate in the
regime represented by the Burns / Miller and Volcker subsamples must be higher
than in the Greenspan / Bernanke regime. Additionally, both regimes must not be
perceived by investors as absorbing states.
2.5 Level Risks and the Slope-Volatility Puzzle
This section provides level-risk estimates for di¤erent regimes of the U.S. economy.
Subsection 2.5.1 models the dynamics of the U.S. economy according to a two-states
Markov-Switching Vector Autoregression (MS-VAR). Subsection 2.5.2 demonstrates
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that, if investors form expectations based on the estimated MS-VAR, the level risks
were moderate and positive in the Greenspan / Bernanke years and large and neg-
ative in the Burns / Miller and Volcker subsamples. After controlling for the level
risk, the term premium in the Greenspan / Bernanke years were substantially smaller
than in the Burns / Miller and Volcker periods. Accounting for level risks thus solves
the Slope-Volatility Puzzle.
2.5.1 A Simple MS-VAR of the U.S. Economy
I model the dynamics of the U.S. economy during the post-World War II period
according to a quarterly MS-VAR which includes three variables: the ination rate
t; the growth rate of consumption ct; and the short-term nominal interest rate
it. The MS-VAR can be written as





whereYt  (t;ct; it)0 and ut is a 31 vector of iid reduced-form innovations. The
unknown regime-switching parameters are organized in the 31 vector of intercepts
0(st), in the 3  3 matrices of autoregressive coe¢ cients k(st) for k = 1; :::; q and
nally in the 33 covariance matrix of error terms(st). In this empirical application
I consider the more general case where there are potentially more than two regimes
indexed by st 2 f1; 2; :::; Kg. As before, regimes switch over time according to an
exogenous and ergodic Markov-Chain with a K K transition matrix given by P.
This MS-VAR can be viewed as a reduced form of the general equilibrium model
that I develop in Section 2.6, where regime switches trigger changes in the coe¢ cients
of the monetary policy rule followed by the monetary authority. As noted by Benati
and Surico (2009), changes in the coe¢ cients of the monetary policy rule can a¤ect
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Notes: Ination (t), consumption growth (ct) and the short-rate (it) are measured in percent per annum.
both the autoregressive coe¢ cients and the covariance matrix of the innovations in
the models reduced-form53.
The time series included in the MS-VAR were described in Section 2.3.2 and are
shown in Figure 2.3. I use data from 1952:2 until 2008:4 in order to be consistent
with the available yield curve slope data shown previously. I also include in the
dataset q observations before 1952:2 as an initial condition for the MS-VAR.
Assuming that agents form expectations based on the knowledge of the current
regime realization and all of the parameters in equation (2.10), the level risk can be
computed easily using the method discussed in Section 2.4. In the two-regimes case,
the estimated transition matrix and the expected value of the variables included in
the MS-VAR, E [Yt=st], can be used to evaluate the level risk terms in equations
53In reality, the reduced form associated with the DSGE model from Section 2.6 has both linear
and quadratic terms (the model is solved to a 2nd order approximation), while for simplicity the
MS-VAR has only linear terms. This does not represent a serious problem, because in the context





I estimated equation (2.10) via Maximum Likelihood by applying the Hamilton
(1989)54 lter. To choose the number of regimes K and the MS-VAR lag length
q, I used standard information criteria. Table 2.2 shows some important model
selection information for di¤erent choices of K and q. The rst column reports
the number of estimated parameters in each specication. The second through
fourth columns respectively report the maximized value of the log-likelihood, the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
According to the AIC and BIC criteria, the best tting models are highlighted in
the table.
Both the AIC and BIC select models with K > 1. Note that the number of
estimated parameters in case K > 1 increases dramatically with the MS-VARs lag-
length. As a result, both information criteria point to models with low lag-lengths.
It is important to note that as the number of estimated parameters increase, it is
more likely that the optimization algorithm used to estimate the model will get
stuck in local maxima. In Table 2.2, for the model with K = 3, when I increase the
lag length from q = 2 to q = 3, the log-likelihood decreases. This is a sign that the
algorithm is stuck in a local maximum. To avoid this problem, I choose the best
tting model according to the BIC criterion (K = 2 and q = 1). Apart from having
desirable large sample properties, this criterion penalizes models with an excessive
number of parameters more heavily than does the AIC.
54It was assumed in Section 2.4.2 that the agents in the economy observe the current and all
past regime realizations. The econometrician, on the other hand, needs to lter out probabilities
for the regime realizations conditional on the available information. That is, since at any point in
the time series the researcher does not know ex-ante the state of the Markov-Chain, the best she
can do is to use an optimal lter to ascribe probabilities for each state. This lter is described in
Hamilton (1989). Here, the estimation algorithm was implemented via Krolzigs MSVAR package
for OX that uses the EM methods discussed in Krolzig (1997).
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Table 2.2: MS-AR Model Selection Criteria
number of Log- AIC BIC
parameters likelihood
K = 1 q = 1 15  1136:8 10:18 10:45
q = 2 21  1121:8 10:12 10:53
q = 3 27  1112:6 10:12 10:66
q = 4 33  1092:9 10:03 10:70
K = 2 q = 1 38  1030:1 9:41 9:98
q = 2 56  1007:6 9:37 10:22
q = 3 74  992:9 9:40 10:52
q = 4 92  965:7 9:32 10:71
K = 3 q = 1 60  989:8 9:25 10:15
q = 2 87  939:0 9:04 10:35
q = 3 114  939:4 9:28 11:00
q = 4 141  917:6 9:33 11:45
Notes: In the lines, K is the number of regimes and q is the MS-VARs lag-length. In the columns, AIC is the
Akaike Information Criterion and BIC is the (Schwartz) Bayesian Information Criterion.
Chapter 2 86
Table 2.3: MS-VAR Conditional Moments
Regime 1 Regime 2




E [t=st] 2:38 4:93
E [ct=st] 3:30 4:33
E [it=st] 3:96 6:80
SD [t=st] 1:39 2:90
SD [ct=st] 2:65 3:73
SD [it=st] 2:23 3:29
Notes: The conditional moments were computed using numerical simulation of the MS-VAR with K=2 and q=1.
The average regime duration and ergodic probabilities were computed according to Hamilton (1994).
All of the parameter estimates for the best tting MS-VAR withK = 2 and q = 1
are reported in Appendix 2.B. Some selected conditional moments for the MS-VAR
also are shown in Table 2.3, while the ltered and smoothed regime probabilities are
shown in Figure 2.4.







where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Note that, since p11 is close
to unity, regime 1 is very persistent and close to being an absorbing state. According
to Table 2.3, this regime has an average duration of about 35 years. On the other
hand, the probability of remaining in regime 2, p22, is considerably smaller, implying
an average duration of only 7.7 years for regime 2. Note, however, that the estimate
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Filtered Probabilities Smoothed Probabilities
Notes: Probabilities computed using the lters described in Hamilton (1994) for the MS-VAR with K=2 and q=1.
for p22 is not very precise.
Based on the smoothed regime probabilities, regime 1 almost exactly encom-
passes the Martin and the Greenspan / Bernanke subsamples from Section 2.3. In
particular, the MS-VAR interprets the Great Moderation years as realizations of
this regime. On the other hand, regime 2 roughly covers the Burns / Miller and
Volcker subsamples from Section 2.3 (this regime also appears with a high probabil-
ity very briey from 1952:2 to 1953:1) - it therefore encompasses the Great Ination
years. The conditional moments in Table 2.3 reveal that when regime 1 occurs, the
ination rate and the short-term interest rate uctuate around signicantly lower
levels than when regime 2 is realized. Moreover, conrming the results obtained in
Section 2.3.2, the economy conditional on regime 1 is substantially more stable than
when regime 2 realizes55.
I now use the mean short-rate gap across regimes and the regime-switching prob-
abilities estimated above to parameterize investorsbeliefs. Using equations (2.8)
55Interestingly, the regime classication that emerges from Figure 2.4 is very similar to the one
estimated by Ang and Bekaert (2002).
Chapter 2 88
and (2.9), it is straightforward to compute the level risk conditional on each regime.
Using the information reported in Table 2.3, we note that the mean interest rate
di¤erential across regimes 1 and 2, DsE [it=st], is equal to 2.84%. Using the estimated
ergodic probabilities reported in the same table, it is easy to show that in the limit as
 !1 the level risk conditional on regime 1 is given by (1 0:818)2:84% = 0:52%.
A similar calculation for regime 2 yields a limiting level risk of  0:818  2:84% =
 2:32%. Therefore, in the limit the estimated level risk becomes sizeable, especially
for the less persistent regime 2. Observe the sign of the level risk in each regime.
In regime 2 investors anticipate that a future switch to regime 1 is possible. This
switch would imply that the short rate uctuates around a signicantly lower level
than the current one. As a result, there is a negative level risk. In regime 1, on the
other hand, investors believe that there is a possibility of switching to the highly
volatile regime 2, which implies a shift towards higher levels of the short rate. In
this case a positive level risk arises. Because regime 1 is more persistent than regime
2, the level risk is larger in absolute value in the latter than in the former regime.
For values of  far away from the limit, the estimated level risks at di¤erent
maturities are reported in the second (regime 1) and third (regime 2) columns of
Table 2.4. In both regimes, the level risk is relevant in terms of magnitude: in regime
2, the level risk grows quickly to  115 basis points at the 10-year horizon, while in
regime 1 it is still capable of increasing the average 10-year slope by 26 basis points.
By rearranging equations (2.8) and (2.9), we can see that subtracting the esti-
mated level risk from the average slope in each regime makes it possible to recover
the term premium. However, because my MS-VAR does not include the yield curve
slope, I cannot directly obtain the mean value of the slope conditional on each
regime. I therefore use the sample average of observed slope measures as a proxy.
Sample averages of slope measures at di¤erent maturities56 are reported in panel
56In addition to the 5 and 10-year slope measures discussed before, I consider in this section the
1, 2, 3, and 4-year slope measures calculated again using the CRSP database.
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Table 2.4: Yield Curve Slope Decomposition
Regime 1 Regime 2 Great Great
Moderation Ination
(85:3-08:4) (70:3-85:2)
(1) Average  = 1 year 0.38 0.46 0.40 0.48
Slope  = 3 years 0.75 0.78 0.92 0.80
 = 5 years 0.99 0.91 1.25 0.94
 = 10 years 1.47 1.08 1.84 1.08
(2) Level  = 1 year 0.03 -0.14 0.03 -0.14
Risk  = 3 years 0.10 -0.45 0.10 -0.45
 = 5 years 0.16 -0.70 0.16 -0.70
 = 10 years 0.26 -1.15 0.26 -1.15
(3) Residual  = 1 year 0.35 0.60 0.37 0.61
[(1)-(2)]  = 3 years 0.65 1.22 0.82 1.25
 = 5 years 0.84 1.61 1.09 1.64
 = 10 years 1.22 2.23 1.58 2.23
Notes: Average slope measures conditional on regimes 1 and 2 were computed for the sample 1985:3-2008:4 and
1970:3-1985:2 respectively. Level risk measures are based on the estimated MS-VAR.
(1) of Table 2.4. In the second column I report average yield curve slopes for the
quarters when regime 1 was associated with a smoothed probability greater that
50%. The third column reports the same measures for quarters where regime 2
was the predominant regime according to the smoothed probabilities. The fourth
and fth columns of the table report average slope measures for two particular
subsamples of the data of interest: rst, the 1985:3-2008:4 subsample, which is
the portion of regime 1 that corresponds to the Great Moderation; second, the
1970:3-1985:2 subsample, which corresponds to the Great Inationyears of regime
2. Panel (3) of Table 2.4 shows the residuals obtained after subtracting the level
risk from these average slope measures.
The slope averages across regimes restate the puzzle from Section 2.3: conditional
on the high volatility regime 2, the slope on average is lower than in regime 1.
This is true for the 5- and 10-year maturities reported in the second and third
columns of Table 2.4, but if we restrict our attention to the Great Ination and
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Great Moderation subsamples (fourth and fth columns of Table 2.4), this is true
for almost all reported maturities. Importantly, once I control for the level risk,
the puzzle disappears completely. That is, once level risks are subtracted from
the slope measures, regime 2 displays substantially higher premia than regime 1
at all maturities analyzed57. The same is true when I restrict my attention to the
Great Ination and Great Moderation subsamples. In other words, based on slope
measures nominal bonds seem less risky in the Great Ination than in the Great
Moderation not because of a seemingly abnormal pattern of term premia across
regimes, but rather simply because of an outcome of beliefs that incorporate the
possibility of regime switches.
An alternative way to illustrate this last result is shown in Figure 2.5. In the
top chart, the full line plots the estimated level risks in regime 1 against increasing
maturities in the horizontal axis. The diamond markers correspond to the average
slope measures from Table 2.4 for the Great Moderationsubsample. The bottom
chart shows the same analysis but for the level risks conditional on regime 2 and
the average slope measures that correspond to the Great Inationsubsample.
Although the yield curve in both regimes on average is positively sloped at all
available horizons, the decomposition of the slope is quite di¤erent. In regime 1 the
slope measures are a combination of positive term premia and positive level risks,
but in regime 2 the yield curve is positively sloped in spite of substantially negative
level risks. Conditional on regime 2, it takes very high term premia to o¤set the
negative level risks and to generate the observed slope. The residual term premia,
indicated in Figure 2.5 by the curly brackets, are in fact signicantly larger in regime
2 than in regime 1.
57This is similar to Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (2001). They nd that some term structure
anomaliescan be explained by a combination of term premia and a peso problemin the short-rate
process.
Chapter 2 91
Figure 2.5: Decomposing the Observed Mean Slope
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2.6 Level Risks in a Structural Model with MS Monetary
Policy Regimes
In the MS-VAR estimated in the previous section, what makes the short-rate uc-
tuate around di¤erent levels across regimes, giving rise to level risks? Similarly,
what makes the economy less volatile in regime 1 than in regime 2? The reduced-
form MS-VAR is silent about the possible structural changes experienced by the
macroeconomy once it switches to a new regime.
In this section, I investigate whether di¤erences in how the Fed conducts mon-
etary policy jointly can explain the di¤erent macro dynamics and the yield curve
shape across regimes. I nd that the main features of the data explored in the
previous sections can be replicated in a simple MS-DSGE that allows the economy
to switch over time between active and passive monetary policy regimes. Private
agents incorporate the MS possibility into their beliefs, which in turn has important
implications for both the macroeconomic equilibrium and the yield curve.
In Section 2.6.1 I start by describing the MS-DSGE model and proposing an
approximate non-linear solution method. The proposed solution method allows
agents to accumulate precautionary savings, thus giving rise to non-trivial bond
premia. In particular, the model endogenously generates a short-rate di¤erential
across regimes as private agents acquire di¤erent levels of precautionary savings
depending on the monetary policy stance. As a result, level risks appear along the
yield curve. In Section 2.6.2 I show that under a plausible choice of parameters the
model is able to replicate the Slope-Volatility Puzzle. In other words, when there
is a passive policy regime, the amount of macro uncertainty is substantially higher
than in the active regime; as a result, term premia are higher. However, because
of level risks generated endogenously through precautionary savings, during the
passive regime the yield curve is less steep than in the active one, thus reproducing
the Slope-Volatility Puzzle.
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2.6.1 Model Description and Solution
Monetary Policy Regimes Following Davig and Leeper (2007) and many oth-
ers58, I assume that the Fed sets the short-term nominal interest rate it according
to the following MS feedback rule
it = i+ (st)bt + y(st)byt
where bt and byt are the log deviations of aggregate ination and output from the
deterministic steady state59. The crucial di¤erence between this formulation and
more standard Taylor rules is that here the policy reaction coe¢ cients (st) and
y(st) at time t depend on the regime realization st 2 f1; 2g. 60 As a result, a
regime switch can trigger changes in how the Fed sets the short rate in order to ght
deviations of ination and output from their steady-state levels.
Without loss of generality, I set (1)  (2), meaning that monetary policy in
regime 1 is at least as activewith respect to ination deviations as in regime 2.
In particular, when (1) > (2), regime 2 is considered less activethan regime 1.
When (2) < 1, policy in regime 2 is said to be passive.
In a model with xed parameters, a passive monetary policy rule implies inde-
terminacy of the equilibrium solution61. In that case, the policy rate increases less
than one-to-one with an increase in ination; consequently, the ex-post short-term
real interest rate falls. However, in the case of a regime-switching Taylor rule, this is
not necessarily true. As Davig and Leeper (2007) show, although monetary policy
58See, for example, Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2007), Davig and Doh (2008), Liu, Waggoner,
and Zha (2009) and Liu and Mumtaz (2010).
59Adding an autocorrelated monetary policy shock to the monetary policy rule does not signi-
cantly change any of my results.
60A potentially interesting extension would be to analyze models with a regime-dependent ina-
tion target. However, in a recent study, Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2010) found no empirical support
for this specication in the U.S. data.
61When y 6= 0, the threshold above which  respects the Taylor principle is slightly below
but still very close to unity for reasonable Taylor-rule parameterizations. See Bullard and Mitra
(2002).
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is passive in one regime, if the probability of switching to an active enough regime
is su¢ ciently high, then the model has a unique stable solution.
For consistency with my previous results, I assume an MS environment in line
with Assumption (1) from Section 2.5. That is, I again let the economy switch
between two di¤erent regimes over time. These regimes evolve according to an
exogenous Markov Chain indexed by st 2 f1; 2g, with transition matrix P. Finally,
private agents again are assumed to observe the current regime realization st before
making decisions; accordingly, the complete information set available to private
agents at date t will be denoted by 
t = 
 st [ fstg.
Private Agents The macro model contains four agents: households, nal and
intermediate good producers and a monetary authority. The latter was described in
the previous section. I now analyze the behavior of each remaining agent in turn.
Detailed model derivations can be found in Appendix 2.D.
Following Rudebusch and Swanson (2008), the household sector has a represen-
tative innitely-lived agent endowed with Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil
(1990) preferences. Letting Ct and Nt represent the households consumption and
labor supply, those preferences are described by:
Vt =
8>>>>><>>>>>:






1  if u (Ct; Nt)  0 everywhere




1  if u (Ct; Nt)  0 everywhere
(2.11)
where Vt+1 denotes the utility continuation value to the household. The period utility








, where bt represents a time-preference
shock. As Epstein and Zin (1989) show, these preferences disentangle the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), which are
constrained in standard expected utility preferences to be the reciprocal of one
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another. In the particular parametrization above, the degree of risk aversion is
associated with (but not equal to)  2 R, whereas the EIS is given by 1=. When
 = 0, the standard expected utility case is recovered.
The representative household maximizes (2.11) subject to the budget constraint
PtCt + EtfMt+1Xt+1  Xt + PtWtNt + Tt
where Pt is the aggregate price level and EtfMt+1Xt+1 is the value of a complete
portfolio of state-contingent assets with fMt+1 representing the nominal stochastic
discount factor and Xt+1 the portfolio holdings from period t to t+1. Additionally,
Wt represents the real wage rate and Tt summarizes all lump-sum transfers to the
household. It follows from the households optimization problem that the one-period















where, under complete markets, the SDF can be used to price nominal bonds of
di¤erent maturities recursively. More specically, letting t+1  Pt+1=Pt, the price




. In the specic







Note that the term in parenthesis in the SDF expression, which also appears in
expected utility models, captures the current consumption risk. The term in square
brackets containing the continuation utility value introduces aversion to long-run
consumption and labor risks.
Final good rms operate under perfect competition, and the representative pro-
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where Yt is the quantity of nal goods produced through a combination of Yt(f)
of each intermediate good f 2 [0; 1]. Following Steinsson (2003) and Smets and
Wouters (2003), I allow the degree of substitutability across di¤erentiated interme-
diate goods t to vary over time. A decrease in t reduces the monopoly power of
intermediate producers, which in turn reduces their price markup. Prot maximiza-








where Pt(f) is the price of intermediate good f . The aggregate price level is then









In the intermediate-good sector, all rms have identical Cobb-Douglas produc-




where the level of capital K is assumed for simplicity to be xed, Nt(f) is the amount
of labor employed by rm f , and Yt(f) is its level of output. The aggregate level of
technology is denoted by At. As in Rotemberg (1982), rms can reset the prices of
each di¤erentiated good in every period, but incur intangible quadratic adjustment











where  is the steady state rate of ination. These costs do not a¤ect the rms
cash-ows, but must be considered in the optimization problem. Therefore, each
intermediate rm f chooses Pt(f) so as to maximize the expected discounted sum of
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whereDt(f) represents the period t prot which is given by Pt+j(f)Yt+j(f) Pt+jWt+jNt+j(f).
Since rms are owned by households,Mt;t+j 
Yj
k=1
Mt+k is used to discount future
prots. The optimization problem is constrained by sequences of equations (2.13)
and (2.14) starting from period t onwards.
The market clearing condition in the nal good market is given by
Yt = Ct +Gt + K
where Gt represents a shock to the market clearing condition and, following Rude-
busch and Swanson (2008), a constant amount K of the nal good is used to repair
the depreciated capital. If Gt is interpreted as government purchases, then it is
assumed that the government runs a balanced budget nanced through lump-sum
taxes obtained from the household sector.
To complete the model description, assume that the four exogenous shocks follow
AR(1) processes:
bt = bbt 1 + b"
b
t
logAt = A logAt 1 + A"
A
t




+  log (1 + t 1) + "

t
logGt = (1  G) logG+ G logGt 1 + G"Gt
with independently and identically distributed innovations "kt  N (0; 1) for k 2
fb; A; ;Gg.
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Model Solution The macro model has ve (exogenous) predetermined variables:
bt, At, t, Gt and st. The rst four are standard continuously di¤erentiable vari-
ables, whereas the last is a discrete variable that follows a Markov chain with tran-
sition matrix P. In order to write the Markov chain compactly, I dene a 2  1
vector t  (1 [st = 1] ; 1 [st = 2])0 where 1 [st = j] is an indicator function which
is equal to one if st = j. Hamilton (1994) shows that the Markov chain can be
represented in terms of t by the autoregressive process t+1 = Pt + t, where
t is a heteroskedastic zero mean vector of innovations that can only assume dis-
crete values. Collecting the di¤erentiable predetermined variables in a nx 1 vector
xt  (bt; logAt; log (1 + t) ; logGt)0 and letting yt represent the ny  1 vector of
(natural logarithms of the) non-predetermined variables, the macroeconomic sys-
tem together with the bond pricing equations can be written as
Et [f (yt+1;yt;xt; t)] = 0
xt+1 = (I4  )x+xt + "t+1












is the vector of i:i:d: standard normal shocks. The









, while  is a perturbation parameter that scales
uncertainty in the model.
The model above forms a system of Markov-Switching non-linear rational expec-
tations equations for which an analytical solution is not known. Solution methods
based on standard linear approximations have been proposed in the literature e.g.
Davig and Leeper (2007) and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2010b), but they would
give rise to zero risk premia implied in the prices of nancial assets and therefore
are not useful in my context. I will therefore look for a second-order approximation
to the true model solution using the perturbation techniques suggested by Schmitt-
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Grohe and Uribe (2004)62.
In order to be able to apply perturbation techniques to the system (2.15), one
needs to be able to di¤erentiate it with respect to all state variables. But because t
is discrete, it is impossible to apply these techniques directly to the system above.
Therefore I dene an extended system63 of equations in which the dependence of the
control variables on regimes is made explicit. It is then straightforward to implement
perturbation methods to the extended system, because it is fully di¤erentiable in
the state variables.
In order to write the extended system, I introduce a state-contingent notation.
That is, I denote the value of the vector of endogenous variables yt contingent on
st = s 2 f1; 2g by yt(s). Using this notation, the expected value of yt+1 conditional
on 


































xt+1 = (I4  )x+xt + "t+1
t+1 = Pt + t
(2.16)
where each equilibrium condition in the original system (2.15) is represented by two
entries in F (), each contingent on one possible realization of t. Note that the
expectations operator does not condition on st because the MS probabilities are
already dealt with by the state-contingent notation. Observe too that f1 (), for
62In a model where only the shock volatilities follow exogenous MS processes, Amisano and
Tristani (2010a,b) show that the perturbation solution is particularly easy to obtain. However,
their solution method does not apply to the general case where other model parameters, such as
the ones in the policy rule, are allowed to follow MS processes.
63Note that I rewrite the non-linear Markov Switching model represented by system (2.15)
into the extended form. Davig and Leeper (2009) apply a similar transformation to a Markov-
Switching model after log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions and refer to this as the "linear
representation". Since here the model remains non-linear after being transformed into the extended
form, I refer to it as the "extended system" to avoid confusion.
64See Appendix 2.E for more details on the extended non-linear system.
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example, depends on the t+1 vector of control variables contingent on regime 1 and
2. Writing the system this way makes explicit the fact that, in general, the solution
in each regime will depend crucially on the behavior of the economy in the alternative
regime. Expectations that policy may switch in the future will a¤ect households
and rmsdecisions today and will lead to a di¤erent equilibrium relative to a model
without switching regimes. Only when both regimes are absorbing states, that is
p11 = p22 = 1, will the solution in each regime be independent of the behavior of
the economy in the alternative regime. Unlike in (2.15), the extended system only
has di¤erentiable predetermined variables. Therefore a perturbation solution can be
obtained easily65.










xt+1 = (I4  )x+xt + "t+1
t+1 = Pt + t .
My aim is to approximate g1 () and g2 () around the deterministic steady state
dened by xt+1 = xt = x and  = 0, which implies that gj = gj (x; 0) for j 2 f1; 2g.
This is a convenient approximation point because an analytical solution to the non-
linear system can be found easily. Note that the regime-switching parameters (st)
and y(st) do not a¤ect the economy in the deterministic steady state, which implies
that g1 = g2 = g.
Using insights from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), a second-order approximate
65To write the extended system, it is crucial that there be no regime-dependent state variables
in the model. Imagine, for example, that time-varying capital is included in the model. Then, in
order to rewrite the system in extended form, we would need to keep track of all the history of
realized regimes. It then would be impossible to solve the model using the method proposed here.
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solution to the vector of control variables conditional on st = s is given by




(xt   x)0 gsxx[1] (xt   x)
  
(xt   x)0 gsxx[ny ] (xt   x)
377775+ 12gs2 for s = 1; 2 (2.17)
where gsx is a ny  nx matrix of rst derivatives of gs () with respect to the state
variables and gsxx[k] for k = 1; :::; ny are symmetric nxnx matrices of second deriv-
atives of gs () again with respect to the state variables. The ny  1 vector gs
denotes the second derivatives of gs () with respect to the scalar . All matrices of
rst and second derivatives are evaluated at the deterministic steady state. Finally,
note that the gs and g
s
x terms omitted from equation (2.17) are proven to be equal
to zero by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
From equation (2.17), some important properties of the model solution emerge.
First, uncertainty as measured by  only shifts the constant term of the policy func-
tion by gs. This shift causes the control variables to uctuate around a stochastic
steady state, which corrects for the precautionary savings motive and gives rise to
risk premia in nancial assets. Because the cross derivatives between the state vari-
ables and  are all zero up to a second-order, the risk premia within any given regime
are constant. Note, however, that the second derivative term with respect to  will
in general depend on the current regime realization which in turn will give rise to
discrete changes in risk premia as regimes alternate.
Standard perturbation methods solve for the unknown coe¢ cients of the above
Taylor expansion by taking derivatives of (2.16) with respect to xt and , which
are equal to zero and can be evaluated easily at the deterministic steady state. All
unknown coe¢ cients of equation (2.17) are then determined by solving relatively
simple systems of equations66.
66Conditions for uniqueness of a bounded solution in Markov-Switching DSGE models have been
established by Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2010a), but apply to the case of linearized models.
More general conditions that apply to our original non-linear system (2.15) are not yet available in
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2.6.2 Model Analysis
Here I start by calibrating the parameters of the MS-DSGE model. I then analyze
how well the model that is based on switching monetary policy regimes is able to
replicate the key empirical macro and yield curve moments analyzed in Section 2.5.
For convenience, the empirical moments I focus on in this section are reproduced
in Table 2.5. In particular, I am interested in simultaneously replicating two sets
of empirical moments. First, the MS-DSGE model should be able to reproduce the
variances of ination, consumption growth, and the short rate, conditional on each
regime of the MS-VAR. These are displayed in the top panel of Table 2.5. Second, I
require that the MS-DSGE replicates the yield curve slope decomposition based on
the MS-VAR, which I reproduce in the bottom panel of Table 2.5 (for simplicity, I
focus here only on the 10-year maturity). For the latter set of moments, I focus in
this section on the empirical moments shown in the fourth and fth columns of Table
2.4, which correspond to the Great Ination and Great Moderation subsamples.
The objective of this calibration exercise is to verify whether the model implied
moments, conditional on the monetary policy regimes 1 (more active) and 2 respec-
tively, replicate the empirical moments for the Great Moderation and Great Ination
subsamples shown in Table 2.5. Put more formally:
 The Proposed Calibration Exercise:
Consider the MS-DSGE model described above where (1) > (2). Do the
model implied moments conditional on regime 1 (regime 2) replicate the em-
pirical Great Moderation (Great Ination) moments shown in Table 2.5?
The spirit of this exercise is to study how well the model, relying only on shifts in
monetary policy, replicates the macro and yield curve moments in Table 2.5. To
the literature. In what follows, I consider only bounded equilibria that are unique for a linearized
version of the model using the Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2010a) method.
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Table 2.5: Summary of the Empirical Moments
Great Moderation Great Ination
(1) Macro Moments:
SD [t=st] 1:39 2:90
SD [ct=st] 2:65 3:73
SD [it=st] 2:23 3:29
(2) Yield Curve Moments:








Notes: The macro moments in panel (1) are reproduced from table 2.3, whereas the decomposition of the 10-year
average slope in panel (2) is reproduced from the fourth and fth columns of table 2.4.
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keep the results easy to interpret I refrain from analyzing models with MS
volatilities, even though this extra feature potentially could improve the models
t.
Choice of Parameters I calibrate the model such that, conditional on regime 1,
it ts the Great Moderation moments in Table 2.5. The parameter choices shown
in Table 2.6 follow estimated DSGE models such as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004),
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
The parameters in the monetary policy rule conditional on the more active regime
are set according to the post-1982 estimates in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), i.e.
(1) = 2:19 and y(1) = 0:075. In regime 2, the Feds response to ination is set to
the lowest value that guarantees the existence of a unique stable model equilibrium,
i.e. (2) = 0:948. For simplicity, I also set y(2) = 0:075.
67 As in Section 2.5, the
transition probabilities were set to p11 = 0:993 and p22 = 0:967.
For the households preferences, I choose  = 0:99 that implies an annualized
real discount rate of 4% in the deterministic steady state. The utility consumption
curvature  is set to 2: this implies an EIS of one half, in line with micro data
estimates such as Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Following Smets and Wouters (2007), I
set the inverse Frisch elasticity of the labor supply  to 0:4. I set  according to the
best tspecication in Rudebusch and Swanson (2008). A traditional measure of
risk aversion suggested by Epstein and Zin (1989), + (1  ), would then imply a
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of 110. Although high, this risk aversion measure
applies only to endowment economies and, in models with a exible labor supply,
su¤ers from a substantial upward bias (see Swanson (2009)). Moreover, estimated
DSGE models with recursive preferences tted to U.S. bond prices usually feature
67In a reduced form macro-term structure model, Ang, Boivin, Dong, and Loo-Kung (2011)
nd that the Feds policy response to the output gap was roughly stable over the sample period I
analyze.
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Table 2.6: The Benchmark Calibration
Monetary Policy Rule: Exogenous Processes:
(1) 2:19 (2) 0:948 b 0:83 b 0:020
y(1) 0:075 y(2) 0:075 A 0:98 A 0:005
p11 0:993 p22 0:967  0:18  0:051
G 0:94 G 0:008
Structural Parameters: The Steady State:
 0:99  0:33  1:004





 0:40  233 G=Y 0:2
  108  0:02
a high level of risk aversion (e.g. Andreasen, Fernández-Villaverde, and Rubio-
Ramírez (2011)).
The capital share in the production function  is set to 0:33. Also, I choose
 = 0:2, implying a steady-state price markup of 20%. The price adjustment costs
parameter  is set to 233 which, for a linearized version of my model, corresponds
to a Calvo coe¢ cient of 0:75. 68
The four exogenous shock processes were calibrated as follows: the parameters
associated with the shocks to the households preferences and to the price markup
follow the estimates in Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Smets and Wouters
(2007) respectively for the post-Great Ination subsamples69. For the technology
and government expenditure shocks, I t an AR(1) model to a constructed Solow-










(1 ')(1 ')(1 ) in the model considered here yields the same linearized Phillips
curve slope as in a Calvo (1983) version of this model where a fraction ' of the intermediate good
producers are not able to reset prices in each period. See Keen and Wang (2007).
69Although the markup shock in Smets and Wouters (2007) follows an ARMA(1,1) process, here
I consider a more standard AR(1) process. The parameters  and  are calibrated so that the
dynamics of the AR(1) are as close as possible to the ARMA(1,1) in Smets and Wouters (2007).
None of the results change signicantly if I had used instead the ARMA(1,1) process.
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G=Y = 0:20 and  = 0:02. The value of  makes labor in the deterministic steady
state equal to one. In the stochastic steady state,  makes the model t the average
short-rate in the Great Moderation regime.
Results
Result I: The nominal term premium is higher in the passive than in the active
monetary policy regime.
Table 2.7 shows the empirical moments discussed above alongside comparable
moments implied by the calibrated MS-DSGEmodel. Panel (1) focuses on the macro
moments, while panels (2) and (3) focus on yield curve moments. In particular, panel
(2) explores the decomposition of the average slope into term premium and level risk,
whereas panel (3) decomposes the nominal term premium into a real term premium
component and a compensation for ination risk (see equation (2.3)). 70
As expected, conditional on the active policy regime, the model replicates the
relatively low macro volatilities observed during the Great Moderation period fairly
well (the calibration above was tailored to t these moments). When the model
economy switches to the passive policy regime, however, both real and nominal
volatilities become substantially higher. Although the model conditional on regime
2 overshoots the level of nominal volatility observed in the Great Ination period, it
qualitatively replicates the empirical macro moments in each subsample of the data
adequately.
Note that the model-implied 10-year nominal term premium in regime 2 is 35
basis points higher than in regime 1. Even though the nominal term premium
70The model-implied nominal term premium decomposition was obtained as follows: leteB;t  exp( r;t) represent the period t price of a bond that pays one unit of the nal
good at t +  . I include in the MS-DSGE model the following recursive pricing conditions:eB;t = Et hMt;t+1 eB 1;t+1i for   1 with initial condition eB0;t = 1 8t. The real term pre-
mium is then computed using the denition in Section 2.3.1.
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conditional on regime 2 is not as high as my estimate for the Great Ination regime,
the model generates a higher nominal term premium in the regime associated with
higher levels of macro uncertainty. Thus it replicates an important result obtained
in Section 2.5.
To better understand this result, I explore the decomposition shown in panel
(3) of Table 2.7. Consider, for example, an economy that switches from a passive
to an active regime. Two forces pressure the 10-year nominal term premium in
opposing directions. On the one hand, as the level of nominal uncertainty falls, the
ination risk portion of the nominal term premium  the ination risk shown in
table 2.7 includes an ination convexity term, as shown in equation (2.3) drops by
62 basis points. On the other hand, the 10-year real term premium increases by 27
basis points. Intuitively, as the Fed becomes more aggressive in ghting inationary
pressures, the volatility of the short-term real interest rate increases, making long-
term real bonds riskier. Given my choice of parameters, the rst e¤ect dominates
and, as a result, the nominal term premium decreases as the economy goes from a
passive to an active regime.
Result II: The model endogenously generates realistic level risks along the yield
curve.
Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 2.7 is that the MS-DSGE model is
able to endogenously generate level risks very much in line with the ones estimated
in Section 2.5. As discussed above, for this to be true the nominal short-rate process
that results from the model must uctuate around a di¤erent mean conditional on
each regime. That is, DsE [it=st] must be di¤erent from zero. Because the short-rate




in the deterministic steady state (in fact, the
deterministic steady state is the same across regimes for all variables in the model),
the existence of level risks implies that the model generates a short-rate di¤erential
DsE [it=st] endogenously in the stochastic steady state.
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Table 2.7: Actual vs. Model-Based Moments
US Data MS-DSGE Model
Great Great Regime 1 Regime 2
Moderation Ination (1) = 2:19 (2) = 0:95
(1) Macro volatility:
SD [t=st] 1:39 2:90 1:27 4:92
SD [ct=st] 2:65 3:73 2:57 3:41
SD [it=st] 2:23 3:29 2:72 4:62
(2) Slope decomposition:
E [i10Y;t   it=st] 1:84 1:08 1:61 0:95
=
E [NTP10Y;t=st] 1:58 2:23 1:43 1:78
+
Level Risk10Y 0:26  1:15 0:18  0:83
(3) Term Premium decomposition:
E [NTP10Y;t=st] 1:58 2:23 1:43 1:78
=
E [RTP10Y;t=st]     0:66 0:39
+
Inflation Risk10Y     0:77 1:39
Notes: E [x] and SD (x) respectively represent the mean and standard deviation of x. The empirical moments from
Table 2.5 are reproduced here. The two last columns display model implied theoretical moments, except for the
standard deviation of consumption growth, which was simulated. All variables are expressed in percent per
annum. The ination risk shown in the last row includes an ination convexity term (see equation (2.3)).
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Returning to equation (2.17), note that uncertainty causes the constant term
in the approximate policy function to shift from the deterministic steady state g
to the stochastic steady state g + 1
2
gs for s = 1; 2. The size of this shift for any
given variable may depend upon the monetary policy regime. That is, each regime
may be characterized by di¤erent levels of precautionary savings. Accordingly, the
conditional mean of the short rate in general will be di¤erent across regimes71.
To better understand this mechanism, Table 2.8 displays rst moments of key
macro variables conditional on each regime. The model generates a nominal short-
rate di¤erential of 2:04%, close to the 2:84% estimate based on the MS-VAR from
Section 2.5. This di¤erential is a result of three mechanisms in the model:
1. The real short-rate mechanism:
In Table 2.8, the real short-rate rt on average is 0:79% higher in the pas-
sive than in the active regime, producing an upward pressure on it in the
former regime. To understand this mechanism, remember that consumption
uncertainty is higher in the passive than the active regime. The risk-averse
household thus responds by forming more precautionary savings in the passive
than in the active regime (in Table 2.8, the average level of consumption is
lower in the passive regime), implying that the expected growth rate of con-
sumption is positive in the passive, and negative in the active, regime. The
short-term real rate therefore is higher in the passive regime in order to counter
the households desire to smooth consumption over time.
2. The ination level mechanism:
The short-term nominal rate is also higher in the passive than in the active
regime because ination on average is 2:04% higher in the former regime. Due
71Even though level risks are associated with the EH component of the slope in the presence of
a MS short-rate process, they only appear in the MS-DSGE model because of the second-order
term gs in equation (2.17). It follows that level risks are zero if one considers a standard rst
order approximation to the model solution, or if private agents are risk-neutral. Therefore, in the
MS-DSGE model, level risks behave very much like standard premia.
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Table 2.8: Understanding the Nominal Short-Rate Di¤erential Across Regimes
(a) (b) (b) - (a)
Regime 1 Regime 2
(1) = 2:19 (2) = 0:95
E [it=st] 3:90% 5:94% 2:04%
E [rt=st] 2:93% 3:72% 0:79%
E [t=st] 0:87% 2:01% 1:14%








Notes: Model-implied theoretical moments are expressed in percent per annum, except for consumption which is
expressed in level.
to the real short-rate mechanism explained above, intermediate good produc-
ers face a higher discount on their future prots in the passive than in the
active regime. Because current prot has a higher weight in their objective
function, rms choose higher optimal prices in the passive than in the active
regime. In other words, intermediate rms are more concerned with the future
implications of their pricing decision today in the active regime.
3. The ination risk mechanism:
As discussed above, the di¤erence between it and rt represents compensation
for ination risk (again including an ination convexity term). Because ina-
tion uncertainty is higher in the passive than in the active regime, short-term
nominal bonds pay higher premia in the former than in the latter regime. Using
the moments reported in Table 2.8, note that the compensation for ination
risk falls from 0.21% to 0.10% as policy switches from passive to active.
What happens to the 10-year average yield curve slope when the economy switches
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from a passive to an active regime? First, as a result of the three channels explained
above, the level risk switches from being highly negative to moderately positive,
imposing an upward pressure on the 10-year slope. At the same time, because the
short-term real rate is more volatile in the active than in the passive regime, the real
term premium increases, also putting upward pressure on the 10-year slope. Finally,
going in the opposite direction, the drop in ination uncertainty as the economy
switches to the active regime results in a sharp drop in the compensation for ina-
tion risk that is paid by 10-year nominal bonds. Under the proposed calibration,
the rst two e¤ects dominate and the 10-year slope actually increases as the econ-
omy switches from a passive to an active policy regime. Therefore I conclude that
the MS-DSGE model in which monetary policy switches between active and passive
regimes is able to replicate the Slope-Volatility Puzzle.
Result III: The MS economy in the active regime is riskier than a corresponding
economy with a xed active policy.
Table 2.9 compares the active regime of the MS-DSGE model under two di¤erent
assumption for p11: in the second column, p11 is set as in the benchmark calibration
to 0:993, while in the third column the active regime is assumed to be an absorbing
state, that is p11 = 1. All other model parameters are kept at the values showed in
Table 3.1. In the case of p11 = 1, once the economy reaches regime 1 the MS-DSGE
model behaves exactly as a simpler model with a xed active monetary policy rule.
Note that the 10-year nominal term premium is higher in the active regime
with p11 = 0:993 than with p11 = 1. This can be explained by a combination of
two mechanisms. The rst, in line with the Barro-Rietz rare disasters theory, is
as follows. When p11 = 0:993 there is a risk that during the life of the bond a
(relatively) rare bad event will occur and the economy switch to the passive regime
in which nominal bonds are very risky. The risk of a sudden change in policy is
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Table 2.9: Absorbing vs. Non-Absorbing Active Monetary Policy Regimes
MS-DSGE conditional on st = 1
p11 = 0:993 p11 = 1:000
(1) Macro volatility:
SD [t=st] 1:27 1:20
SD [ct=st] 2:57 2:46
SD [it=st] 2:72 2:60
(2) Slope decomposition:
E [i10Y;t   it=st] 1:61 1:19
=
E [NTP10Y;t=st] 1:43 1:19
+
Level Risk10Y 0:18 0:00
(3) Term Premium decomposition:
E [NTP10Y;t=st] 1:43 1:19
=
E [RTP10Y;t=st] 0:66 0:67
+
Inflation Risk10Y 0:77 0:52
Notes: E [x] and SD (x) respectively represent the mean and standard deviation of x. The empirical moments are
reproduced here from table 2.5. The two last columns display model implied theoretical moments, except for the
standard deviation of consumption growth which was simulated. All variables are expressed in percent per annum.
The ination risk shown in the last row includes an ination convexity term (see equation (2.3)).
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priced into nominal bonds. As a result, term premia in the active regime are higher
when p11 = 0:993 than when p11 = 1.
A second mechanism, which resembles the long-run risk theory of Bansal and
Yaron (2004), operates in parallel to the one just described. In order to explain this
new mechanism, Figure 2.6 plots impulse response functions to a negative techno-
logical shock72. The solid lines represent the active regime when p11 = 1, whereas
the dashed lines correspond to the active regime when p11 = 0:993. In both cases,
the technological shock reduces the price of the 10-year nominal bond (ination ex-
pectations increase) exactly when the level of consumption falls, making this bond
a risky asset. Comparing models under di¤erent p11 values, observe that both con-
sumption and the bond price su¤er more pronounced drops when this parameter is
set to 0:993 than to 1, implying that investing is this bond is riskier in the former
case73. Intuitively, when p11 = 0:993 the model equilibrium in the active regime is
a¤ected through private agentsexpectations by the possibility of switching to the
passive regime, generating more pronounced ination responses than when p11 = 1.
74 Therefore, following the shock, an equally active central bank has to ght higher
inationary pressures when p11 = 0:993 than when p11 = 1, resulting in sharper
drops in consumption in the former case. As in the case analyzed by Rudebusch
and Swanson (2008), the possibility of regime switches can be seen as increasing the
amount of long-run risk in the economy relative to a situation in which the active
policy regime is perceived as an absorbing state75.
Result IV: The average yield curve slope is higher in IT than in non-IT countries.
On Table 2.9, note that the 10-year yield curve slope is 42 basis points higher in
72As Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) show, technological shocks are the most important deter-
minants of the term premium in general equilibrium models like the one considered here.
73This also can be observed in Table 2.9, which shows that the MS-DSGE model generates more
macroeconomic volatility in the active regime with p11 = 0:993 than with p11 = 1.
74See Davig and Leeper (2007).
75It is interesting to note that the extra premium charged by investors when p11 is lower comes
in the form of an extra compensation for bearing ination risk, whereas the real term premium
remains almost the same; see panel (3) of Table 2.9.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses to a Negative Technological Shock in the Active
Regime
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Notes: Impulse response functions to a negative one standard deviation shock to technology. Full and dashed lines
correspond respectively to the MS-DSGE model under p11= 1 and p11= 0:993. The vertical axes represent
percentage deviations from the stochastic steady state, where the deviations of the ination rate and the policy
rate are expressed in percent per annum. The numbers in the horizontal axes represent years following the shock.
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an economy with p11 = 0:993 than in a similar economy with p11 = 1. Why? First,
in light of Result III described above, the nominal term premium is higher when
p11 is set to 0:993 than when it is set to 1. This channel alone is responsible for 24
out of the 42 basis-points di¤erence in the slope across models. The remaining 18
basis points are explained by the level risk, which is positive when p11 = 0:993, but
is equal to zero in an absorbing state (see Section 2.4.2).
To verify this models prediction in the data, I compare the observed average yield
curve slope across IT and non-IT countries. I focus only on developed economies
after the mid-1980s, a period characterized by particularly benign ination devel-
opments in both groups of countries. The general idea here is that, relative to the
case where IT is not adopted, private agents in IT countries may believe that future
switches to passive monetary policy regimes are less likely to occur76. In terms of the
MS-DSGE model, the probability that the economy remains in the active regime,
p11, therefore would be higher when IT is adopted than otherwise. So, assuming all
else constant, the yield curve in IT countries should be atter on average than in
non-IT countries.
There are many ways to justify why p11 would tend to be higher in active regimes
with than without IT77. First, a higher p11 could represent improvements in commu-
nication between the Fed and the general public once IT is in place. According to
this view, IT would make clearer to the public that shifts in ination away from the
objective are going to be dealt with actively. Second, in IT countries emphasis is
shifted away from the particular individuals conducting monetary policy in a given
point in time to the monetary policy framework itself. A higher p11 therefore could
signal that, with IT, changes in the individuals in charge of the central bank are less
likely to signicantly modify the way that policy is conducted. Finally, increases in
p11 could represent the gain in central bank accountability prompted by IT. Under
76This exercise implicitly assumes that, within an IT regime, the monetary authority responds
to inationary pressures actively.
77See, for example, Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999).
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IT, a central bank that decides to adopt a passive stance with respect to ination
would have to explain to the public the short and long-term implications of its
decision; as a result, the probability of switching from the active regime decreases.
Using the Wright (2008) database of international monthly zero-coupon yields of
up to ten years maturity, I compute slope measures for ten di¤erent countries: three
non-IT countries (Germany78, Japan, and US) and seven countries that adopted IT
(New Zealand, Canada, UK, Sweden, Australia, Switzerland, and Norway). For the
non-IT countries, I compute the average 10-year slope for the sample which corre-
sponds to the Great Moderation subsample from Section 2.5, specically Sep/1985
- Dec/2008. For each IT country, I instead consider the average 10-year slope from
the month of IT adoption until Dec/2008.
Table 2.10 shows the results. The top panel reports the 10-year average slope for
the non-IT countries; the bottom panel shows the measure for the IT countries. Also,
to facilitate comparisons between IT and non-IT countries, I show in parentheses
the average slope in each of the non-IT countries taken over the same sample as for
the IT country. For example, the values in parentheses for New Zealand correspond
to the average slope in the US, Germany and Japan taken over the Feb/90 - Dec/08
sample.
If the models predictions are correct, then the non-IT countries should be asso-
ciated with steeper yield curves than the IT countries. Indeed, Table 2.10 reveals
that the average 10-year slope across the non-IT countries was 1.46%, more than
60% higher than in the IT countries. Using the numbers in parentheses shown in
Table 2.10, I can compare pairs of IT and non-IT countries while xing the same
sample. Each time the slope in the non-IT country is higher than that of the IT
country, I indicate it with a  in the table. I nd that in the great majority of
78Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) consider Germany as an early case of ination
targeting. I decided to include Germany in the non-IT group because there an explicit ination
objective only has been set for the long run whereas short- to medium-term ination targets have
not been announced (this is also true after the ECB started to operate in 1999).
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Table 2.10: Yield Curve Slope in non-IT vs. IT Countries
Non-IT Countries:
Sample 10-Year Slope
US Sep/85 - Dec/08 1.90
Germany Sep/85 - Dec/08 1.25




IT Country (US, Germany, Japan)
New-Zealand Feb/90 - Dec/08 -0.01 (1.91, 1.19, 1.37)
Canada Mar/91 - Dec/08 1.60 (1.95, 1.24 , 1.49 )
United Kingdom Oct/92 - Dec/08 0.26 (1.81, 1.48, 1.61)
Sweden Jan/93 - Dec/08 1.35 (1.78, 1.51, 1.61)
Australia Sep/94 - Dec/08 0.64 (1.62, 1.65, 1.58)
Switzerland Jan/00 - Dec/08 1.28 (1.83, 1.23 , 1.26 )
Norway Apr/01 - Dec/08 0.77 (2.07,1.30 , 1.22)
Average IT 0.89
Notes: The average measures of yield curve slope were computed using the Wright (2008) database of international
zero-coupon yields. As a proxy for the short-rate, the 3-month zero-coupon yield was used in the slope
computation.
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the pair-wise comparisons, the IT countries had atter yield curves than the non-IT
countries.
Whenmaking cross-country comparisons, it should be noted that country-specic
factors potentially could inuence the results. For example, there could be specic
features of some IT countries that make the yield curve atter in those countries,
even though perceptions about monetary policy are not signicantly di¤erent there
from in the non-IT countries. However, it is reassuring that in almost all pair-wise
comparisons the model prediction was veried. That is, the results shown in Table
2.10 appear to be robust enough across di¤erent pairs of IT and non-IT countries,
thus providing evidence in favor of the explanation that I propose which is based on
monetary policy regimes.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter I studied how shifts in the monetary policy regime might have a¤ected
the average slope of the U.S. nominal term structure in the past decades. My rst
contribution was to show that, in the presence of a Markov-Switching short-rate
process, measures of the average yield curve slope reect not only term premia
but also level risks. I provide level risk estimates based on a simple reduced form
Markov-Switching Vector Autoregression: they are large and negative during the
Great Ination and moderate and positive after 1985. Controlling for level risks,
the average slope measures imply that term premia in the Great Ination were
substantially higher than after 1985.
My second contribution was to show that a calibrated dynamic general equilib-
rium model, where the Taylor rule shifts between an active and a passive stance
for ination, replicates my U.S. level risks and term premia estimates. Because
the model was solved using a second-order rather than a standard rst-order ap-
proximation method, I can analyze the di¤erent levels of precautionary savings that
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characterize each policy regime. The model-implied di¤erences in term premia and
level risks across regimes are a result of the optimal behavior of private agents and
therefore are entirely endogenous.
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Appendix 2.A No-Arbitrage Bond Prices
In this appendix I will show how to derive the approximate no-arbitrage bond pricing
formulas discussed in section 2.3.1. I will start by pricing ination protected bonds and
then will move on to nominal bonds.
(i) Pricing Ination Protected Bonds:
Let eB;t represent the period t price of a bond that pays one unit of the consumption
good at t+  . Because their payo¤s are already expressed in terms of consumption, these
bonds are not subject to ination risk. Under no-arbitrage eB;t is determined byeB;t = Et hMt+1 eB 1;t+1i. Denote the  -period real yield to maturity by

















contains the terms of order higher than two that are ignored.
Using the equation above, it can be shown that the second order approximate real term
premium is given by:
RTP;t  br;t   1 Pj=1Et [rt+j 1] =
  12 V art
hP
j=1 bmt+ji+ 12 Pj=1Et fV art+j 1 [bmt+j ]g
where I made use of the law of iterated expectations to eliminate the rst moments of
the SDF. It is important to note that Et fV art+j 1 [bmt+j ]g 6= V art [bmt+j ] for j  1. I
can also rewrite the real term premium as:
RTP;t =   12 V art
hP
j=1 bmt+ji+ 12 Pj=1Et fV art+j 1 [bmt+j ]g
=   12
P
j=1 V art [bmt+j ]  22 P 1j=1Pk=j+1Covt [bmt+j ; bmt+k]
+ 12
P
j=1Et fV art+j 1 [bmt+j ]g
But note that:
(1) V art+j 1 [bmt+j ] = Et+j 1 h bm2t+ji  (Et+j 1 [bmt+j ])2
+
Et [V art+j 1 [bmt+j ]] = Et h bm2t+ji  Et h(Et+j 1 [bmt+j ])2i




(Et+j 1 [bmt+j ])2i  (Et [bmt+j ])2
+
V art [Et+j 1 [bmt+j ]] + (Et [bmt+j ])2 = Et h(Et+j 1 [bmt+j ])2i
Combining the two results above I get
Et [V art+j 1 [bmt+j ]] = Et h bm2t+ji  V art [Et+j 1 [bmt+j ]]  (Et [bmt+j ])2
= V art [bmt+j ]  V art [Et+j 1 [bmt+j ]]
Then the real term premium can be written as:
RTP;t =   12
P
j=1 V art [bmt+j ]  1 P 1j=1Pk=j+1Covt [bmt+j ; bmt+k]
+ 12
P





k=j+1Covt [bmt+j ; bmt+k]  12
X
j=1
V art [Et+j 1 [bmt+j ]]| {z }
SDF convexity term
Which implies that:




k=j+1Covt [bmt+j ; bmt+k]  12 Pj=1 V art [Et+j 1 [bmt+j ]]
Therefore the real term premium depends on the autocorrelation structure of the SDF
and a convexity term.
(ii) Pricing Nominal Bonds:






j=1Et [bmt+j ] + 1 Pi=1Et [bt+j ]
  12 V art
hP
j=1 bmt+ji  12 V art hPj=1 bt+ji
+ 1Covt
hP
j=1 bmt+j ;Pj=1 bt+ji+O  3








  12 V art
hP
j=1 bt+ji+ 1Covt hPj=1 bmt+j ;Pj=1 bt+ji+O  3
which is a Fisher-type equation extended to take into account the risk premia implied in
long-term bond prices. The nominal term premium according to the denition in the
text can therefore be written as:
NTP;t = RTP;t + Convexity;t
+ 1Covt
hP
j=1 bmt+j ;Pj=1 bt+ji  1 Pj=1Et fCovt+j 1 [bmt+j ; bt+j ]g
where the rst moments of ination drop out due to the law of iterated expectations.
The ination convexity term is given by




k=j+1Covt [bt+j ; bt+k]  12 Pj=1 V art [Et+j 1 [bt+j ]]
Appendix 2.B MS-VAR Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for the best tting MS-VAR model from Section 2.5 together
with their respective standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported below:
bP =





























































0@ 0:36  0:18 0:04 0:18 5:75 0:39
0:04 0:39 0:28
1A b(2) =
0@ 1:51  1:22 0:21 1:22 9:32 0:99
0:21 0:99 2:55
1A
Appendix 2.C Level Risks Without Assumption 2
I show in this appendix that without imposing assumption 2 from Section 2.4.1 level
risks become substantially less tractable. For the case of  = 2, I showed in Section 2.4.2



















where LR(s)  E [i;t   it=st = s]  E [NTP;t=st = s] is the level risk at the 2-period
horizon conditional on regime s. For the case  = 3 the expressions get signicantly more
complicated. Start from the 3-period slope denition:
i3;t   it = it+E[it+1=
t]+E[it+2=
t]3   it +NTP3;t
Taking conditional expectations on both side I get:
E [i3;t   it=st] =  2E[it=st]+E[E[it+1=
t]=st]+E[E[it+2=
t]=st]3 + E [NTP3;t=st]
=  2E[it=st]+E[it+1=st]+E[it+2=st]3 + E [NTP3;t=st]
where the second equality follow from the law of iterated expectations. But the
conditionally expected short-rates can be written as:

















































































I will stop at  = 3, but for the usual long-term maturities of interest such as  = 3 or
 = 40 it is easy to see that the level risk expressions become prohibitively large. In
other words, without assumption 2 the number of di¤erent conditional expectations
terms one needs to keep track of in order to compute an expression for the level risk
increases very fast with maturity.
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Appendix 2.D The New-KeynesianModel Detailed Deriva-
tions






  0 everywhere, the representative household solves the
following problem:
V (Xt) = maxCt;Nt;Xt+1









PtCt + EtfMt;t+1Xt+1  Xt   PtWtNt  Dtio





tfMt;t+1 =   EtV 1 t+1  1  V  t+1 @Vt+1@Xt+1
where the envelope condition is given by @V (Xt)@Xt = t. Note that the optimized value






1  . Therefore, substituting the
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  EtV 1 t+1  1  V  t+1t+1





=Wt, whereas combining the rst and third FOCs yields the nominal stochastic
discount factor:


















one obtains equations (2.12) in the text, wherefMt;t+1 Mt;t+1=t+1.
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2.D.2 Firms
(a) Final Good Producers:
The representative nal good producer chooses Yt(f) for f 2 [0; 1] to solve:
maxYt(f) PtYt  
R 1






















(b) Intermediate Good Producer:
Since capital is xed, the real marginal cost of each rm f is given by Wt divided by the
marginal product of labor, i.e. MCt(f) =
Wt
(1 )AtKN t(f)
. Using the demand for Yt(f), the
























where MCt represents the average real marginal in the intermediate good sector. In

















subject to Yt+j(f) = At+jK






t+j Yt+j , where Mt;t+j is
























































where to simplify notation I let Mt+1 Mt;t+1.
Chapter 2 126
2.D.3 Market Clearing Conditions
(a) Symmetric Equilibrium:
Since rms in the intermediate good sector are identical in every aspects, I can now



























(b) Labor Market Clearing Condition:




























where the term in square brackets is the index of price dispersion across rms. Under
Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs, all rms charge the same price and therefore this




The goods market clearing condition is simply Yt = Ct +Gt + K.
Appendix 2.E The Extended Non-Linear System
This appendix describes in detail the equations that form the extended system as in














































































































































































7: Market Clearing Condition in the Final Good Sector
Yt(s) = Ct(s) +Gt + K
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 = 1; :::; T
3 The Business Cycle Implications of Banks
Maturity Transformation
This chapter consists of work done jointly with Martin M. Andreasen and Pawel
Zabczyk at the Bank of England. I was involved in all developments that led to this
chapter, which includes carrying out the analytical and numerical analysis, writ-
ing the rst drafts, and extending the model to include nominal contracts. I was
responsible for about 60% of the work carried out in this chapter.
3.1 Introduction
The seminal contributions by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) show how nancial frictions
augment the propagation of shocks in otherwise standard real business cycle (RBC)
models.79 This well-known nancial accelerator e¤ect is derived without explicitly
modelling the behavior of the banking sector and a growing literature has therefore
incorporated this sector into a general equilibrium framework.80 With a few ex-
ceptions, in this recent literature banks are assumed to receive one-period deposits
which are instantaneously passed on to rms as one-period credit. Hence, most of
the papers in this literature do not address a key aspect of banksbehavior, namely
the transformation of short-term deposits into long-term credit.
The aim of this chapter is to examine how banksmaturity transformation a¤ects
business cycle dynamics. Our main contribution is to show how maturity transfor-
mation in the banking sector can be introduced in otherwise standard dynamic
79See also Berger and Udell (1992); Peek and Rosengren (2000); Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta
(2002); DellAriccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008); Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008);
Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2009) for a discussion of the real impact of nancial shocks.
80See for instance Chen (2001), Aikman and Paustian (2006), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007),
Teranishi (2008), Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009), and Gerali, Neri, Sessa,
and Signoretti (2009).
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stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, including the models by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). We then illustrate
the quantitative implications of maturity transformation, rst in a simple RBC
model with long-term real contracts and subsequently in a New Keynesian model
with long-term nominal contracts.
Some implications of maturity transformation have been studied outside a gen-
eral equilibrium framework. For instance, Flannery and James (1984), Vourougou
(1990), and Akella and Greenbaum (1992) document that asset prices of banks
with a large maturity mismatch on their balance sheets react more to unanticipated
interest rate changes than asset prices of banks with a small maturity mismatch.
Additionally, the papers by Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and den Heuvel (2006)
argue that banksmaturity transformation also a¤ects the transmission mechanism
of a monetary policy shock. In our context, however, a general equilibrium frame-
work is necessary because we are interested not only in explaining how long-term
credit a¤ects the economy but also in the important feedback e¤ects from the rest
of the economy to banks and their credit supply.
Maturity transformation based on long-term credit has to our knowledge not been
studied in a general equilibrium setting, although long-term nancial contracts have
been examined by Gertler (1992) and Smith and Wang (2006).81 This may partly be
explained by the fact that introducing long-term credit and maturity transformation
in a general equilibrium framework is quite challenging for at least three reasons.
Firstly, one needs to explain why rms demand long-term credit. Secondly, banks
portfolios of outstanding loans are di¢ cult to keep track of in the presence of long-
term credit. Finally, and related to the second point, model aggregation is often
very di¢ cult or simply infeasible when banks provide long-term credit.
The framework we propose overcomes these three di¢ culties and remains con-
81The paper by Gertler and Karadi (2009) implicitly allows for maturity transformation by
letting banks receive one-period deposits and invest in rmsequity, which have innite duration.
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veniently tractable. Our novel assumption is to consider the case where rms face
a constant probability k of being unable to adjust their capital stock in every pe-
riod. The capital level of rms which cannot adjust their capital stock is assumed
to slowly depreciate over time. This setup generates a demand for long-term credit
when we impose the standard assumption that rms borrow in order to nance their
capital stock. That is, rms require a given amount of credit for potentially many
periods, because they may be unable to adjust their capital levels for many periods
in the future.
Interestingly, our setup with infrequent capital adjustments implies heterogene-
ity at the rm level. In particular, the rm-level dynamics of capital in our model
is in line with the main stylized fact which the literature on non-convex investment
adjustment costs aims to explain, i.e. that rms usually invest in a lumpy fashion
(Caballero and Engel, 1999; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). However, we show for
a wide class of DSGE models without a banking sector that the dynamics of prices
and aggregate variables are unchanged relative to the case where rms adjust capital
in every period. This result relies on rms having a Cobb-Doublas production func-
tion, as the scale of each rm then becomes irrelevant for all prices and aggregate
quantities. We refer to this result as the irrelevance of infrequent capital adjust-
ments. This is a very important result because it shows that the constraint we
impose on rmsability to adjust capital does not a¤ect the aggregate properties of
many existing DSGE models. Accordingly, the aggregate e¤ects of maturity trans-
formation we obtain in a model with a banking sector are not a trivial implication
of the infrequent capital adjustment assumption.
Our next step is to introduce a banking sector into the model. We specify the
behavior of banks along the lines suggested by Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2009). That is, banks receive short-term deposits from the household
sector and face an agency problem in the relationship with households. Di¤erently
from Gertler and Karadi (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009), banks assets
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consist in our case of long-term credit contracts supplied to rms. As we match the
life of the credit contracts to the number of periods the rm does not adjust capital,
the average life of banksassets in the economy as a whole is D  1=(1 k). When
k > 0, this implies that banks face a maturity transformation problem because they
use short term deposits and accumulated wealth to provide long-term credit. The
standard case of no maturity transformation in the banking sector is thus recovered
when k = 0.
We rst illustrate the quantitative implications of maturity transformation in
a simple RBC model with long-term real contracts following a positive technologi-
cal shock. Our analysis shows the existence of a credit maturity attenuator e¤ect,
meaning that the response of output to this shock is weaker the higher the degree
of maturity transformation. The intuition for this result is as follows. The positive
technological shock increases the demand for capital and its price. In the model with-
out maturity transformation, the entire portfolio of loans in banksbalance sheets
is instantly reset to reect the higher price of capital. This means that rms now
need to borrow more to nance the same amount of productive capital. Banks pro-
vide the extra funds to rms and consequently benet from higher revenues. With
maturity transformation, on the other hand, only a fraction of all loans in banks
balance sheets is instantly reset, creating a smaller increase in banksrevenues. As
a result, the increase in banksnet-worth and consequently in output are weaker the
higher the degree of maturity transformation.
Our second illustration studies the quantitative implications of maturity trans-
formation in a New Keynesian model with nominal nancial contracts. In the case of
long-term lending, the distinction between nominal and real contracts is especially
interesting because long-term ination expectations directly a¤ect rmsdecisions.
Here, we focus on how maturity transformation a¤ects the monetary transmission
mechanism.
We nd that increasing the degree of maturity transformation attenuates the
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fall in output following a contractionary monetary policy shock. This result can be
explained by three main channels. Firstly, the fall in real activity lowers the price
of capital. As before, changes in the price of capital have weaker e¤ects on banks
revenues for higher degrees of maturity transformation, and this reduces the fall
in output following the monetary contraction. Secondly, there is a debt-deation
mechanism that interacts with the channel just described. The monetary contrac-
tion generates a fall in ination and raises the ex-post real interest rate on loans. The
aggregate value of loans fall by less in the presence maturity transformation (due
to the rst channel) and the higher ex-post real rate therefore has a larger positive
e¤ect on banksbalance sheets and output than without long-term loans. Finally,
the smaller reduction in output (and income) following the shock implies that house-
holdsdeposits fall by less with maturity transformation. Banks are therefore able
to provide more credit and this reduces the contraction in output.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 extends the
simple RBC model with infrequent capital adjustments and analyzes the implica-
tions of this assumption. This model is extended in Section 3.3 with a banking
sector performing maturity transformation based on real nancial contracts. The
following section explores how maturity transformation and long-term nominal con-
tracts a¤ect the monetary transmission mechanism within a New Keynesian model.
Concluding comments are provided in Section 3.5.
3.2 A Standard RBC Model with Infrequent Capital Ad-
justments
The aim of this section is to describe how a standard real business cycle (RBC) model
can be extended to incorporate the idea that rms do not optimally choose capital in
every period. We show that this extension does not a¤ect the dynamics of any prices
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and aggregate variables in the model. This result holds under weak assumptions and
generalizes to a wide class of DSGE models. We proceed as follows. Sections 3.2.1
to 3.2.3 describe how we modify the standard RBC model. The implications of this
assumption are then analyzed in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Households
Consider a representative household which consumes ct, provides labor ht, and ac-
































and the usual no-Ponzi game condition. The left-hand side of equation (3.2) lists
expenditures on consumption and investment it, while the right-hand side lists the
sources of income. We let wt denote the real wage and rkt be the real rental rate of
capital. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), the households prefer-
ences are assumed to display internal habits with intensity parameter b. The capital
depreciation is determined by , while the capital accumulation equation includes
quadratic adjustment costs as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
3.2.2 Firms
We assume a continuum of rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1] and owned by the household.
Prot in each period is given by the di¤erence between rmsoutput and costs,
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where the latter are composed of capital rental fees rkt ki;t and the wage bill wt hi;t.
Both costs are paid at the end of the period. We assume that output is produced






The aggregate level of productivity at is assumed to evolve according to
ln (at) = a ln (at 1) + "
a
t ; (3.5)
where "at  NID (0; 2a) and a 2 ( 1; 1).
The model has so far been completely standard. We now depart from the typical
RBC setup by assuming that rms can only choose their optimal capital level with
probability 1   k in every period. The probability k 2 [0; 1[ is assumed to be
the same for all rms and across time. Capital for rms which cannot reoptimize is
assumed to depreciate by the rate  over time. All rms, however, are allowed to
choose labor in every period as in the standard RBC model.
One way to rationalize the restriction we impose on rmsability to adjust capital
is as follows. The decision of a rm to purchase a new machine or to set up a new
plant usually involves large xed costs. These could be costs related to gathering
information, decision making, and training the workforce. We do not attempt to
model the exact nature of these costs and how rms choose which period to adjust
capital, but our setup still captures the main macroeconomic implications of rms
infrequent changes in capital.
To see how this assumption a¤ects the level of capital for the ith rm, consider
the example displayed in Figure 3.1 for an economy in steady state. The downward
slopping lines denote the capital level for the ith rm over time. The dashed
horizontal line represents the optimal choice of capital for rms that are able to
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Notes: Bold lines represent the capital of the considered rm. Vertical lines mark the periods in which the rm is
allowed to reoptimize capital. The dotted horizontal line represents the steady state level.
optimize (ekss), whereas vertical lines mark the periods in which the rm is allowed
to reoptimize capital. In this example, the rm is not allowed to reoptimize capital
from period zero until the rst vertical line and simply sees its capital depreciate.
Once the vertical line is reached the rm adjusts its capital stock and chooses ekss.
In the following periods capital depreciates again until the rm is allowed to adjust
capital once more. Note that the vertical lines are not equidistant, reecting our
assumption of random capital adjustment dates.
It is important to note that the dynamics of capital at the rm level implied
by our assumption is in line with the key nding in the empirical literature on
non-convex investment adjustment costs (Caballero and Engel, 1999; Cooper and
Haltiwanger, 2006). This literature uses micro data to document that rms usually
invest in a lumpy fashion, i.e. there are many periods of investment inaction followed
by spikes in the level of investment and capital.
Our assumption on rmsability to adjust their capital level implies that there
are two groups of rms in every period : i) a fraction 1   k which potentially
change their capital level and ii) the remaining fraction k which produce using the
depreciated capital chosen in the past. All reoptimizing rms choose the same level
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of capital due to absence of cross-sectional heterogeneity. We denote this capital
level by ekt. By the same token, all rms that produce in period t using capital
chosen in period t  m also set the same level of labor which we denote by ehtjt m










(1  )jekt eh1 t+jjt   rkt+j (1  )j ekt   wt+jeht+jjt :
(3.6)
We see that rms account for the fact that they might not adjust capital for poten-
tially many periods. Note that capital depreciates while the rm does not adjust its
capital level, and the amount of capital available in period t+ j for a rm that last
optimized in period t is (1  )jekt.








at+j(1  )j~k 1t eh1 t+jjt   rkt+j(1  )j = 0. (3.7)
If k > 0, the optimal choice of capital now depends on the discounted value of all
future expected marginal products of capital and rental rates. Note also that the
discount factor between periods t and t+ j incorporates jk which is the probability
that the rm cannot adjust its level of capital after j periods. If k = 0, equation
(3.7) reduces to the standard case where the rm sets capital such that its marginal
product equates the rental rate.







ki;t for i 2 [0; 1]. (3.8)
Here, we do not need to distinguish between optimizing and non-optimizing rms
because all rms are allowed to optimally set their labor demand each period. It is
important to note that the capital-labor ratio only depends on aggregate variables
82A similar notation for capital implies ektjt m  ekt m (1  )m.
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and is therefore identical for all rms.
3.2.3 Market Clearing and Aggregation






A fraction of 1   k rms choose ~kt in period t. The capital demand among non-
reoptimizing rms is equal to the aggregate capital in period t   1 rescaled by k
and adjusted for depreciation. This is because all rms face the same probability of
being allowed to adjust capital. Market clearing in the rental market for capital is
therefore given by
kst = (1  k) ~kt + k (1  ) kst 1: (3.10)
Note that kst = ~kt when k = 0 and all rms are allowed to adjust their capital level
in every period.

















yi;tdi = ct + it: (3.13)
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3.2.4 Implications of Infrequent Capital Adjustments
The parameter k determines the fraction of rms reoptimizing capital in a given
period, or equivalently the average numbers of periods that the ith rm operates
without adjusting its capital level. It is therefore natural to expect that di¤erent
values of k result in di¤erent business cycle implications for prices and aggregate
variables in the model. For instance, large values of k imply that adjusting rms are
more forward-looking compared to the case where k is small, and this could poten-
tially give rise to di¤erent dynamics for prices and aggregate variables. This simple
intuition turns out not to be correct: di¤erent values of k actually give exactly the
same aggregate model dynamics83. We summarize this result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The parameter k has no impact on the law of motions for ct, it,
ht, wt, rkt , k
s
t , and at.




equations. The parameter k only enters in (3.7) and (3.10). The dynamics of
kst follows from ~kt and the system can therefore be reduced to seven equations








which allow us to simplify the algebra. To prove the proposition,
we need to show that the rst-order condition for capital when k = 0 is equivalent

























83Note that the implications of infrequent capital adjustments di¤er substantially from the well-
known real e¤ects of staggered nominal price contracts when specied following Calvo (1983).
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= rkt implies that each of the elements
in the innite sum is equal to zero and so is the conditional expectations. To prove
(= we rst lead the innite sum by one period and multiply the expression by










































































The intuition behind this irrelevance proposition is simple. When the capital
supply is predetermined, it does not matter if a fraction of rms cannot change
their capital level because the other rms have to demand the remaining amount of
capital to ensure equilibrium in the capital market. The fact that the capital-labor
ratio is the same across rms further implies that aggregate labor demand is similar
to the case where all rms can adjust capital. The aggregate output produced
by rms is also una¤ected due to the presence of constant returns to scale in the
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production function. The result in theorem 1 is thus similar to the well-known result
from microeconomics for a market in perfect competition and constant returns to
scale, where only the aggregate production level can be determined but not the
production level of the individual rms.
There are at least two interesting implications of the infrequent capital adjust-
ments at the rm level. Firstly, the distortion on rmsability to change their capital
level does not break the relation from the standard RBC model, where the marginal
product of capital equals its rental price. In other words, the induced distortion in
the capital market does not lead to any ine¢ ciencies because the remaining part of
the economy is su¢ ciently exible to compensate for the imposed friction.
Secondly, the infrequent capital adjustments give rise to rm heterogeneity.
There will be rms which have not adjusted their capital levels for a long time
and hence have small capital levels due to the e¤ect of depreciation. These rms
will therefore produce a small amount of output and will also have a low labor de-
mand due to (3.8). Similarly, there will also be rms which have recently adjusted
their capital levels and therefore produce relatively high quantities and have high
labor demands. This rm heterogeneity relates to the literature on rm specic
capital as in Sveen and Weinke (2005), Woodford (2005), among others.
When proving Proposition 1 we only used two assumptions from our RBC model,
besides a predetermined capital supply. Hence, the irrelevance result for k holds for
all DSGE models with these two properties. We state this observation in Corollary
1.
Corollary 1 Proposition 1 holds for any DSGE model with the following two prop-
erties:
1. The capital labor ratio is identical for all rms
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2. The parameter k only enters into the equilibrium conditions for capital
Examples of DSGE models with these properties are models with sticky prices,
sticky wages, monopolistic competition, habits, to name just a few. The three most
obvious ways to break the irrelevance of the infrequent capital adjustments can be
inferred from (3.8). That is, if rms i) do not have a Cobb-Douglass production
function, ii) face rm-specic productivity shocks, or iii) face di¤erent wage levels
due to imperfections in the labor market.
Another way to break the irrelevance of infrequent capital adjustments is to make
k a¤ect the remaining part of the economy. We will in the next section show how
this can be accomplished by introducing a banking sector into the model.
3.3 An RBC Model With Banks and Maturity Transforma-
tion
This section incorporates a banking sector into the RBC model developed above.
Here, we impose the standard assumption that rms need to borrow prior to -
nancing their desired level of capital. This requirement combined with infrequent
capital adjustments generate a demand for long-term credit at the rm level. Banks
use one-period deposits from households and accumulated wealth (i.e. net worth)
to meet this demand. As a result, banks face a maturity transformation problem
because they use short-term deposits to provide long-term credit.
Having outlined the novel feature of our model, we now turn to the details. The
economy is assumed to have four agents: i) households, ii) banks, iii) good-producing
rms, and iv) capital-producing rms. The latter type of rms are standard in the
literature and introduced to facilitate the aggregation (see for instance Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)).
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Figure 3.2: RBC Model With Banks and Maturity Transformation
The interactions between the four types of agents are displayed in Figure 3.2.84
Households supply labor to the good-producing rms and make short-term deposits
in banks. Banks then use these deposits together with their own wealth to provide
long-term credit to good-producing rms. The good-producing rms hire labor and
use credit to obtain capital from the capital-producers. The latter rms simply repair
the depreciated capital and build new capital which they provide to good-producing
rms.
We proceed as follows. Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 revisit the problems for the house-
holds and good-producing rms when banks are present. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4
are devoted to the behavior of banks and the capital-producing rm, respectively.
Market clearing conditions and the model calibration are discussed in Section 3.3.5.
We then study the quantitative implication of maturity transformation following a
technology shock in Section 3.3.6.
84For simplicity, Figure 3.2 does not show prot ows going from rms and banks to households.
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3.3.1 Households
Each household is inhabited by workers and bankers. Workers provide labor ht to
good-producing rms and in exchange receive labor income wtht. Each banker man-
ages a bank and accumulates wealth that is eventually transferred to his respective
household. It is assumed that a banker becomes a worker with probability b in
each period, and only in this event is the wealth of the banker transferred to the
household. Each household postpones consumption from periods t to t+1 by hold-
ing short-term deposits in banks.85 Deposits bt made in period t are repaid in the
beginning of period t+ 1 at the gross deposit rate Rt.
The householdspreferences are as in Section 3.2.1. The lifetime utility function
is maximized with respect to ct, bt, and ht subject to
ct + bt = htwt +Rt 1bt 1 + Tt: (3.15)
Here, Tt denotes the net transfers of prots from rms and banks. Note that the
households are not allowed to accumulate capital, as in the previous model, but are
forced to postpone consumption through deposits in banks.
3.3.2 Good-Producing Firms
We impose the requirement on good-producing rms that they need credit to -
nance their capital stock. With infrequent capital adjustments these rms therefore
demand long-term credit which we assume is provided by banks.
It is convenient in this setup to match the number of periods a rm cannot
adjust capital to the duration of its nancial contract with the bank. That is, the
85As in Gertler and Karadi (2009), it is assumed that a household is only allowed to deposit
savings in banks owned by bankers from a di¤erent household. Additionally, it assumed that within
a household there is perfect consumption insurance.
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nancial contract lasts for all periods where the rm cannot adjust its capital level,
and a new contract is signed whenever the rm is allowed to adjust capital. Since
the latter event happens with probability 1  k in each period, the exact maturity
of a contract is not known ex-ante. The average maturity of all existing contracts,
however, is known and given by D = 1= (1  k).
The specic obligations in the nancial contract are as follows. A contract signed
in period t species the amount of capital ekt that the good-producing rm wants
to nance for as long as it cannot reoptimize capital. As in section 3.2.2, capital
depreciates over time, meaning that after j periods the rm only needs funds for
(1  )j ektpkt units of capital. Here, pkt denotes the real price of capital. The bank
provides credit to nance the rental of capital throughout the contract at a constant
(net) interest rate rLt + . The rst component of the loan rate r
L
t reects the
fact that rms need external nance, whereas the second component  refers to the
depreciation cost associated with capital usage. It should be emphasized that we do
not consider informational asymmetries between banks and the rm, implying that
the rm cannot deviate from the signed contract or renegotiate it as considered in
Hart and Moore (1998).
As in the standard RBC model, good-producing rms also hire labor which
is combined with capital in a Cobb-Douglas production function. We continue to
assume that the wage bill is paid after production takes place, implying that demand
for credit is uniquely associated with rmscapital level.
The assumptions above are summarized in the expression for profitt+jjt, i.e. the
prot in t+ j for a rm that entered a nancial contract in period t:
profitt+jjt = at+j
h
(1  )j ekti h1 t+jjt| {z }
production revenue
  wt+jeht+jjt| {z }
wage bill
   rLt +  pkt h(1  )jekti| {z }
capital rental bill
: (3.16)
Note that all future cash ow between the rm and the bank are determined with
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certainty for the duration of the contract. That is, the rm needs to fund ekt units
of capital based on a xed price pkt , which is done at the xed loan rate r
L
t .
The good-producing rm determines capital and labor by maximizing the net
present value of future prots. Using the householdsstochastic discount factor, the









ekt 1 h1 t+jjt    rLt +  pkt (1  )j = 0: (3.17)





pkt . The rst-order condition for the optimal choice of labor
is exactly as in the standard RBC model, i.e. as in (3.8).
3.3.3 The Banking Sector
We incorporate banks following the approach suggested by Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2009) and Gertler and Karadi (2009). Their specication has two key elements.
The rst is an agency problem that characterizes the interaction between households
and banks and limits banks leverage. This in turn limits the amount of credit
provided by banks to the good-producing rms. The agency problem only constrains
bankssupply of credit as long as banks cannot accumulate su¢ cient wealth to be
independent of deposits from households. The second key element is therefore to
assume that bankers retire with probability b in each period, and when doing
so, transfer wealth back to their respective households. The retired bankers are
assumed to be replaced by new bankers with a su¢ ciently low initial wealth to
make the aggregate wealth of the banking sector bounded.86
Although our model is very similar to the model by Gertler and Karadi (2009),
the existence of long-term nancial contracts complicates the aggregation. This is
86Note that their second assumption generates heterogeneity in the banking sector and there
does not exist a representative bank.
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because new bankers must inherit the outstanding long-term contracts from the
retired bankers, but the new bankers may not be able to do so with a low initial
wealth. We want to maintain the assumption of bankers having to retire with
probability b, because this justies the transfer of wealth from the banking sector
to the households and in turn to consumption. Our solution is to introduce an
insurance agency nanced by a proportional tax on banksprot. When a banker
retires, the role of this agency is to create a new bank with an identical asset and
liability structure and e¤ectively guarantee the outstanding contracts of the old
bank. This agency therefore ensures the existence of a representative bank and that
the wealth of this bank is bounded with an appropriately calibrated tax rate.
We next describe the balance sheet of the representative bank in Section 3.3.3
and present the agency problem in Section 3.3.3.
BanksBalance Sheets As mentioned earlier, the representative bank uses ac-
cumulated wealth nt and short-term deposits from households bt to provide credit
to good-producing rms. This implies the following identity for the banks balance
sheet
lent  nt + bt; (3.18)
where lent represents the amount of lending.
The net wealth generated by the bank in period t is given by
nt+1 = (1  ) [revt  Rtbt] ; (3.19)
where  is the proportional tax rate and revt denotes revenue from lending to good-
producing rms. The term Rtbt constitutes the value of deposits repaid to con-
sumers. Combining the last two equations gives the following law of motion for the
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banks net wealth
nt+1 = (1  ) [revt  Rtlent +Rtnt] : (3.20)
The imposed structure for rms inability to adjust capital implies simple ex-






= (1  k) pktekt| {z }
adjust in period t
+ (1  k)k (1  ) pkt 1ekt 1| {z }






where simple recursions are easily derived. Similarly, for the total revenue we have
revt = (1  k)
1X
j=0
((1  )k)j RLt jpkt jekt j: (3.22)
Here, RLt  1 + rLt is the gross loan rate. The intuition for these equations is
as follows. A fraction (1  k) of the banks lending and revenue in period t re-
lates to credit provided to adjusting rms in the same period. Likewise, a fraction
(1  k)k (1  ) of lending and revenue relates to credit provided to rms that
last adjusted capital in period t  1, and so on. For all contracts, the loans made j
periods in the past are repaid at the rate RLt j. Thus, a large values of k makes the
banks balance sheet less exposed to changes in RLt compared to small values of k.
The most important thing to notice, however, is that k a¤ects the banks lending
and revenue and thereby its balance sheet, implying that the irrelevance theorem of
infrequent capital adjustments in Section 3.2.4 does not hold for this model.
The Agency Problem As in Gertler and Karadi (2009), we assume that bankers
can divert a fraction  of their deposits and wealth at the beginning of the period,
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and transfer this amount of money back to their corresponding households. The
cost for bankers of diverting is that depositors can force them into bankruptcy and
recover the remaining fraction 1    of assets. Bankers therefore choose to divert
whenever the benet from diverting, i.e. lent, is greater than the value associated


















This expression reects the idea that bankers attempt to maximize their expected
wealth at the point of retirement where they transfer nt to their respective household.
Note that the discount factor in (3.24) is adjusted by (1  b)jb to reect the
fact that retirement itself is stochastic and therefore could happen with positive
probability in any period.
We assume that lending to the good-producing rms is protable for banks. This
implies that banks lend up to the limit allowed by the incentive constraint, which
therefore is assumed to hold with equality. Consequently, the amount of credit
provided by the representative bank is limited by its accumulated wealth through
the relation





is the banks leverage ratio. The two control variables x1;t and x2;t follow simple
recursions derived in Appendix 3.B.1.
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3.3.4 Capital-Producing Firms
A capital-producing rm is assumed to control the aggregate supply of capital. This
rm takes depreciated capital from all good-producing rms and invests in new
capital before sending the refurbishedcapital back to these rms. The decisions by
the capital-producing rm are closely related to the nancial contract provided by
the representative bank. This is because the capital-producing rm trades capital
at individual prices with each of the good-producing rms. That is, throughout a
given nancial contract, capital is traded at the price when this contract was signed.
For instance, if a contract was signed in period t 4, then the capital-producing rm
trades capital with this particular rm at the price pkt 4 throughout the contract.
That is, when the good-producing rm enters a nancial contract, it obtains the
right to borrow at the constant rate rLt based on the current value of its capital
stock pkt . By doing this we ensure that within each nancial contract the cash ows
between banks and good-producing rms are known with certainty87.








[vt+j   vt+j(1  )  it+j] : (3.27)
Here, vt is a value aggregate given by







vt = (1  k) pktekt + k (1  ) vt 1: (3.29)
According to (3.27), the capital-producing rm obtains depreciated capital from
good-producing rms vt(1 ) and allocates resources to investments it. The output
87Another way to justify this assumption is to consider the bank and the capital-producing rm
as a joint entity.
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from this production process is an upgraded capital stock, which is send to the good-
producing rms resulting in revenue vt.
When maximizing prots, the rm is constrained by the evolution of ~kt, i.e.
kt = (1  k) ~kt + k (1  ) kt 1; (3.30)
and the law of motion for aggregate capital:










The optimization of (3.27) is described in Appendix 3.B.2. An important point
to note is that the Lagrange multiplier for (3.31), i.e. qt, is the standard Tobins Q
and indicates a marginal change in prot following a marginal change in the next
period capital kt+1. On the other hand, the price of capital pkt denotes the marginal
change in prot for a marginal change in current capital kt.
3.3.5 Market Clearing and Calibration
Market clearing conditions in the capital, labor, and good markets are similar to
those derived in Section 3.2.3, and technology evolves according to the AR(1) process
in (3.5).88
The model is calibrated to the post-war US economy in Table 3.1. We chose
standard values for the discount factor  = 0:9926, the capital share  = 0:36, the
coe¢ cient of relative risk-aversion 0 = 1, and the rate of depreciation  = 0:025.
In line with the estimates in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we set the
intensity of habits to b = 0:65 and investment adjustment costs to  = 2:5. The
inverse Frisch elasticity of the labor supply 1 is set to 1=3. This is slightly below
88The complete list of equations in the model is shown in Appendix 3.B.3.
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Table 3.1: Baseline Calibration
 0:9926  0:2
b 0:65 b 0:972
0 1  0:017
1 1=3  2:5
 0:36  0:025
k free a 0:90
a 0:7%
the value estimated in Smets and Wouters (2007) but preferred to account for the
fact that there are no wage rigidities in our model. The parameters a¤ecting the
evolution of technological shocks are set to a = 0:90 and a = 0:007.
There are three parameters that directly a¤ect the behavior of banks: i) the
fraction of banksassets that can be diverted , ii) the probability that a banker
retires b, and iii) the tax rate on bankswealth  . We calibrate these parameters to
generate an external nancing premium of 100 annualized basis points and a steady
state leverage ratio of 4 in the banking sector as in Gertler and Karadi (2009).89
The value of k determines the average duration of nancial contracts and is left as
a free parameter to explore the implications of maturity transformation. Finally, we
compute the model solution by a standard log-linear approximation.90
3.3.6 Implications of Maturity Transformation: A Shock to Technology
Figure 3.3 shows impulse response functions to a positive technological shock. In
each graph, the continuous line shows the model with banks and no maturity trans-
formation, i.e. in case the average duration of contracts in the economy, D, is
set equal to 1. The dashed lines, on the other hand, correspond to two di¤erent
calibrations of the model with maturity transformation D = 4 and D = 12.
89Simple algebra shows that the steady state level of the external nancing premium implied by
our model does not depend on k.
90All versions of the model are implemented in Dynare. Codes are available on request.
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We start by analyzing the model without maturity transformation. As in stan-
dard RBC models, the shock generates an increase in consumption, investment, and
output. Households become temporarily richer and therefore raise their deposits bt
while rt falls. With a higher level of deposits, banks increase their supply of credit,
resulting in a fall in the loan rate rLt . Firms demand more capital and therefore
its price pkt increases. This means that they now need to borrow more in order to
nance each unit of capital, and rms therefore increase their demand for credit.
These combined e¤ects generate an increase in banksnet worth as shown in Figure
3.3. As banksnancial position is strengthened following the shock, restrictions to
credit provision are relaxed and banksleverage ratio increases. We therefore obtain
a nancial accelerator e¤ect in the sense of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
The business cycle implications of maturity transformation can be considered
by comparing the full and dashed lines in Figure 3.3. We see that increasing the
average duration of loans to D = 4 and D = 12 generates weaker responses in output
following the shock. Accordingly, our model predicts a credit maturity attenuator
e¤ect. To understand why, consider banksbalance sheet equations (3.20) to (3.22).
The presence of maturity transformation (k > 0) implies that only a fraction of
all loans is reset to reect a higher price of capital pkt following the shock. The
remaining fraction of contracts was signed in the past and does not respond to
changes pkt . Consequently, good-producing rms increase their demand for credit by
a smaller amount the higher the degree of maturity transformation. Banksrevenues
and net-worth therefore increase by less, which in turn results in a weaker response
of output to the shock.
Interestingly, in our general equilibrium setup, the e¤ects of di¤erent degrees of
maturity transformation are felt not only in the relation between banks and good-
producing rms, but also in the behavior of all agents in the economy. Capital
producers, for example, know that higher degrees of maturity transformation are
associated with weaker increases in the demand for capital after the shock. They
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therefore raise investment by less compared to the case without maturity transfor-
mation, resulting in more room for householdsconsumption to increase. Over time,
however, the smaller increase in investment a¤ects householdsincome and, conse-
quently, consumption goes back to the steady state faster the higher the degree of
maturity transformation.
3.4 A New Keynesian Model: Nominal Financial Contracts
The analysis has so far focused on long-term nancial contracts set in real terms,
i.e. with ination protection. Such insurance against ination is often not avail-
able in reality and most lending is therefore conducted based on nominal contracts.
The distinction between nominal and real contracts is especially interesting in our
setup, because long-term ination expectations here have a larger impact on rms
decisions compared to one-period nominal contracts as considered in Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (2003) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007). The aim
of this section is therefore to extend the model presented in Section 3.3 to nominal
contracts and study how maturity transformation a¤ects the monetary transmission
mechanism in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model.
We proceed as follows. Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 revisit the problems for the good-
producing rms and banks, respectively, when we have long-term nominal contracts.
To introduce price stickiness into the model, Section 3.4.3 follows Gertler and Karadi
(2009) and adds retail rms to the economy. Monetary policy and market clearing
conditions are outlined in Section 3.4.4. Section 3.4.5 then studies the quantitative
implications of maturity transformation following a monetary policy shock.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to a Positive Technological Shock
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price of capital (pkt )
Notes: Impulse response to a one standard deviation positive shock to technology. In each graph the vertical axis
measures percentage deviation from the deterministic steady state of the respective variable, whereas the
horizontal axis measures quarters after the shock hits.
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3.4.1 Good-Producing Firms
The basic setup for the good-producing rms is similar to the one presented in
Section 3.3.2, except rms now need to borrow based on the nominal price of their
capital stock when signing the contract. To see the implications of this assumption,
let Pt denote the nominal price level of aggregate output (dened below) and let P kt
be the nominal price of capital. The expression for real prot in period t + j for a










  rLt +  (1  )jekt P ktPt+j| {z }
capital rental bill
; (3.32)
where P intt is the nominal price of the good produced by the rm. That is, the rm
borrows ektP kt units of cash throughout the contract, and the interest rate on this
loan rL;nomt is now expressed in nominal terms. Importantly, changes in the price
level Pt a¤ects the real value of the loan and thereby its implied real interest rate.
This e¤ect is easily seen by rewriting the rms prot as
profitt+jjt = pintt+jat+j(1  )j








ekt (1  )j ;
where we dene the real prices pintt  P intt =Pt and pkt  P kt =Pt. Moreover, t 
Pt=Pt 1 denotes the gross ination rate. Hence, higher ination during the contract







, and vice versa for lower ination. The rm and the bank are aware
of this e¤ect when signing the contract, and rL;nomt therefore accounts for long-term
ination expectations.
As in Section 3.3.2, the good-producing rm determines capital and labor by
maximizing the net present value of future prots. Applying the householdssto-
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The rst-order condition for labor remains unchanged as in equation (3.8).
3.4.2 The Banking Sector
The behavior of the representative bank is similar to the case with real contracts.
However, the fact that contracts are set in nominal terms introduces a debt-deation
channel following Fisher (1933). We briey describe how this e¤ect operates via
banksbalance sheet within our model.
Redoing the arguments in Section 3.3.3 for nominal variables imply that
Nt+1 = (1  ) [REVt  Rnomt LENt +Rnomt Nt] ; (3.35)
where Nt is nominal net worth, REVt is nominal revenue, and LENt is nominal
lending. Re-expressing this equation in real terms implies












where revt  REVt=Pt, lent  LENt=Pt and nt  Nt=Pt. The important di¤erence
compared to the corresponding equation based on real contracts in (3.20) is the
correction for ination. Hence, a reduction in ination increases the real value of
banksnet worth from the previous period nt=t+1 and their revenue revt=t+1. The
real value of deposits lent=t+1 also increase, but the combined e¤ect is likely to be
positive, in so far as banks are running a surplus in period t.
This e¤ect from ination introduces a debt-deation mechanism whereby fun-
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damental macroeconomic shocks a¤ect real activity. The channel operates in the
following way. Unpredictable macro shocks may move ination temporarily away
from what was expected when contracts were signed, resulting in changes in the
ex-post real revenue of long-term loans. This in turn a¤ects banks net worth and
therefore also the supply of credit.
The remaining equations for the banking sector are as in Section 3.3.3, given
appropriate corrections for ination (see Appendix 3.C.1).
3.4.3 Retail Firms
The nal output in the economy is assumed to be a CES composite produced from











where  > 1 and yf;t is the product from retail rm f . Cost minimization implies







where Pf;t is the price of the retail good from rm f . The aggregate price level is







The role of the individual retail rms is to re-package the good from the good-
producing rms using a linear production technology. Nominal rigidity is introduced
based on a Calvo-style formulation, where only a fraction 1  p of retail rms can
reset their prices every period. This price is denoted by P t . The remaining fraction
p of retail rms simply let Pf;t = Pf;t 1. Accordingly, the problem for retail rms
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3.4.4 Monetary policy and Marked Clearing Conditions
Monetary policy is specied by a standard Taylor-rule
rnomt = r
nom
t 1 + (1  )












where Rnomt  1 + rnomt and "rt  NID (0; 2r). That is, central bank aims to close
the ination and output gaps, while potentially smoothing changes in the policy
rate.
The market clearing conditions are standard and stated in Appendix 3.C.1.
3.4.5 Implications of Maturity Transformation: AMonetary Policy Shock
This section examines e¤ects of maturity transformation following a positive mone-
tary policy shock, i.e. an exogenous increase in rnomt . The real part of the model is
calibrated as in Table 3.1. The parameters associated to the nominal frictions are
calibrated as follows. Ination in the steady state is assumed to be zero, while we
let p = 0:75 so that retail rms on average change their prices once every year.
The value of  is set to 6, consistent with a 20% price markup as implied by the
benchmark estimate in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Finally, the co-
e¢ cients in the Taylor-rule are taken from the post-1984 estimates in Justiniano and
Primiceri (2008), i.e.  = 0:84,  = 2:37, and y = 0:02. Figure 3.4 displays the
impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock of 25 basis points (equivalent
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to an annualized 100 basis points shock). As before, the continuous line represents
the model without maturity transformation (D = 1), whereas dashed lines refer to
di¤erent calibrations of maturity transformation with D = 4 and D = 12.
Starting with the simpler model where D = 1, the policy shock generates an
increase in the implied real deposit rate (rnomt increases and t decreases) which
results in the familiar contraction in consumption, investment, output, and ination.
The reduction in ination increases the real value of banksnominal assets and banks
are therefore better o¤ on impact. However, the fall in the demand for capital and
the associated fall in pkt reduces banksreal revenues, lowering their net-worth from
the second period onwards.91 The positive co-movement between net-worth and
output generates a nancial accelerator e¤ect as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999).
We next study how maturity transformation a¤ects the monetary transmission
mechanism. Our model predicts that the fall in output is weaker the higher the
degree of maturity transformation. In other words, we also obtain a credit maturity
attenuator e¤ect in the case of a monetary policy shock. This is in contrast to the
"bank capital channel" analyzed in the context of partial equilibrium models by
den Heuvel (2006). According to this theory, the presence of maturity mismatches
in banksbalance sheets implies that only a small fraction of loans can be quickly
adjusted following a monetary policy shock, whereas deposits are almost entirely
adjusted on impact. This means that an increase in the policy rate would have a
negative impact on banksprots and consequently on the supply of credit, poten-
tially exacerbating the real e¤ects of the shock. To explain the di¤erence between
this theory and our result, we focus on how maturity transformation a¤ects banks
net-worth within our model. Here, we emphasize three general equilibrium e¤ects,
which are not present in the partial equilibrium analysis behind the bank capital
91Note in equation (3.36) that on impact movements in nt following any shock are only a result
of the change in ination. Changes in revt, lent and Rnomt can only a¤ect banksnet-worth from
the second period and onwards.
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channel.
First, in the model without maturity transformation the fall in the price of capital
pkt implies a reduction in the value of all loans, and banks therefore see a fall in their
revenues. However, with maturity transformation only a fraction 1 k of loans are
reset every period to reect the fall in pkt . Accordingly, banks revenues do not fall
as much the higher the degree of maturity transformation.
A second general equilibrium e¤ect occurs as a result of the debt-deation chan-
nel discussed in Section 3.4.2. The reduction in ination following the shock raises
the ex-post real interest rates paid by the good-producing rms. The aggregate
value of loans fall by less in the presence maturity transformation (due to the rst
channel) and the higher ex-post real rate therefore has a larger positive e¤ect on
banksbalance sheets and output than without long-term loans.
The third general equilibrium e¤ect is as follows. With maturity transformation,
the smaller reduction in banksnet-worth nt implies that output (and income) does
not fall as much as in the case without long-term contracts. Hence, the decline
in households deposits is smaller, and banks are able to provide more credit to
good-producing rms. As a result, this e¤ect also reduces the contraction in output
following the shock.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows how to introduce a banking sector with maturity transformation
into an otherwise standard DSGE model. Our novel assumption is to consider the
case where rms face a constant probability of being unable to reset their capital level
in every period. We rst show that this restriction on rmsability to adjust capital
does not e¤ects prices and aggregate quantities in a wide range of DSGE models.
Importantly, the considered friction generates a demand for long-term credit when
Chapter 3 161
Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to a Positive Monetary Policy Shock
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Notes: Impulse response to a 25 basis points positive monetary policy shock. In each graph the vertical axis
measures percentage deviation from the deterministic steady state of the respective variable, whereas the
horizontal axis measures quarters after the shock hits.
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we impose the standard requirement that rms borrow when nancing their capital
stock. As a result, banks face a maturity transformation problem because they
use short term deposits and accumulated wealth to fund the provision of long-term
credit. Within an RBC model featuring long-term contracts and banks, we then
analyze the quantitative implications of maturity transformation following a positive
technological shock. Our model suggests that the responses of the model economy
to this shock are in general weaker the higher the degree of maturity transformation
in the banking sector.
The nal part of this chapter studies implications of maturity transformation
when nancial contracts are set in nominal terms. We therefore extend the con-
sidered RBC model with sticky prices, long-term nominal contracts, and a central
bank. E¤ects of maturity transformation within the banking sector are then an-
alyzed following a positive monetary policy shock. We once again conclude that
responses in the economy in general are weaker the higher the degree of maturity
transformation in the banking sector.
Our way of incorporating maturity transformation is only a rst step in analyzing
this topic in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setup. Interesting extensions
could introduce extra nancing options for rms, possibly by breaking the match
between the duration of rmsexposure and their nancial contract. This would
also have the potential to create a time-varying maturity transformation problem
within the banking sector. Studying higher-order e¤ects and the impact of risk on
banksbehavior would also make for an interesting extensions.
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Appendix 3.A A Standard RBCModel with Infrequent Cap-
ital Adjustments
3.A.1 Households
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i;t+j  Rkt+jki;t+j   wt+jhi;t+j

:
This problem is divided in two steps. We rst derive the ith rms demand of labor, which
takes the standard form since labor is optimally chosen in every period. In the second
step, we derive the optimal value of capital eki;t for rms that are able to adjust capital in
period t. Note that a rm adjusting capital in period t faces a probability jk of not being
able to reoptimize after j periods in the future and hence have (1  )j eki;t units of capital
in period t+ j.
i Labor, ht :
In every period t + j, for j = 0; 1; 2; :::, all rms are allowed to adjust their labor


















ii Capital, ekt :
A rm adjusting capital in period t chooses eki;t to maximize the present discounted
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Using the demand for labor derived above, the optimality condition associated with

















Appendix 3.B An RBC Model With Banks and Maturity
Transformation
3.B.1 Recursions for x1;t and x2;t



































= (1  ) [lentx1;t + ntx2;t]





















Straightforward algebra then implies the following recursions:





























3.B.2 First-order conditions for the capital-producing rm
To simplify the optimization, we isolate ~kt from (3.30) and substitute it into (3.29). Hence,
we need to optimize (3.27) with respect to vt, kt, and it subject to (3.30) and (3.31). The






































The rst-order conditions are:
i. The value-aggregate vt:

































































Notice that qt is the standard Tobins Q, i.e. indicating the marginal change in
prot of a marginal change in kt+1. On the other hand, pkt is the marginal change
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8) kt = (1  k) ~kt + k (1  ) kt 1
Banking sector:
9) nt+1 = (1  ) [revt  Rtlent +Rtnt]
10) revt = (1  k)RLt pkt ekt + (1  )krevt 1
11) lent = (1  k) pkt ekt + (1  )klent 1




13) Vt = (1  ) [lentx1;t + ntx2;t]


































17) u1;t =  +Et
h
 t+1t u1;t+1k (1  )
i







2    itit 1   1 itit 1+Et h t+1t qt+1 it+1it   1 i2t+1i2t i
19) qt +Et
h










 t+1t qt+1 (1  )
i
20) vt = (1  k)ektpkt + k (1  ) vt 1
Market Clearing Conditions:
21) yt = atkt h
1 
t
22) yt = ct + it
Exogenous Processes:
23) log at = a log at 1 + "at
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8) kt = (1  k) ~kt + k (1  ) kt 1
Financial Intermediaries:
9) nt+1 = (1  ) 1t+1 [revt  Rnomt lent +Rnomt nt]
10) revt = (1  k)RL;nomt pkt ekt + (1  )krevt 1 1t
11) lent = (1  k) pkt ekt + (1  )klent 1 1t
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